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* This article is one of a series of articles on probate law undertaken while the
writer was a Research Associate at the University of Michigan Law School in connection with the drafting of the Model Probate Code. The writer is deeply indebted to
Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan Law School who has contributed many valuable suggestions and criticisms to· this study. Appreciation is also
due to Professor Thomas E. Atkinson ot" the New York University Law School,
especially for his criticism of that part dealing with dispensing with ancillary administration.
The article will appear in Problems in Probate Law, a book to be published by the
University of Michigan Press as a part of the Michigan Legal Series.
_
The statutes which are discussed herein are complete to January 1, 1945. In
addition all legislation passed during 1945 which was available at the time of printing is
also included.
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W

ITH an elaborate system existing in every state for the administration of decedents' estates, it should not be assumed
that every estate is or need be subjected to official supervision by a
probate court. According to studies made in th1s connection there is
approximately one administration for every four deaths.1 In some
cases there is no estate to be administered. In others it is of such small
value that administration is neither required nor justified. Even when
a decedent dies possessed of a moderate or large estate, it does not
follow that administration is absolutely essential. It is the experience
of every lawyer that an administration in many estates is not needed.
On the other hand, the opinion of many heirs and beneficiaries that
an administration on the estate in which they are interested is or should
be unnecessary is an erroneous one. The purpose of this study is to
consider the precise· circumstances which will justify dispensing with
1 Powell and Looker, "Decedents' Estates," 30 CoL. L. REV. 919 at 922, 923
(1930); ATKINSON, WJLLS 538-539 and notes 53-55 (1937).
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a formal administration, in whole or in part, on the estate of a decedent,
and the extent to which modern legislation·has specifically provided for
its being dispensed with or has favored or permitted "informal" or "unofficial" administrations.
The formal process of administration is peculiar to the common
law. A personal representative was unknown to the Roman law and
to the civil law. Under these systems the estate of the decedent passed
directly to the heir in the event of intestacy or to the instituted heir
where there was a will, without any intervening administration whatever as known to the common law.2 Such an heir took the property
absolutely but became personally liable for all debts of the decedent
even though they exceeded the amount of property received. 3 Only
if the heir renounced the succession or claimed the benefit of inventory
was he freed from liability for the decedent's debts/ Thus the personality of the decedent was continued in the heir, and the decedent's
estate passed immediately and absolutely to the heir who became
liable for the payment of the decedent's debts and legacies given in
the will. These obiigations could be enforced as against the heir. In
this light they might be regarded as administrative duties although
not subjected to supervision by any court. It remained for the common
law to develop the practice of appointing a personal representative
accountable to the state to continue the personality of the decedent
for a period long enough to insure the payment of his _debts and any
legacies provided for in the will/ Thus court control over such a
personal representative has led to the elaborate system of probate
courts and supervision both in England and America. The origin of
this institution has been attributed 6 to the desire to protect creditors
and to secure the payment of fees and inheritance taxes-both legitimate interests of the sovereign.
The phenomenon of a complete lack of any official administration
upon a decedent's estate under the civil law is described here in order
to suggest a close analogy to those situations in Anglo-American law
in which. there need be or is no formal administration.1 In this con2
Rheinstein, "European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased
Persons," 20 lowA L. REV. 431 (1935).
8
Id. at 432-433.
~Id.at 435-436.
11
Id. at 438.
6
Id. at 438.
71d. at 468-475. This analogy is fully developed by Professor Rheinstein in the
article cited. One should read it in full to appreciate the close parallels which prevail
under the two systems.
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nection it will be observed that under the civil law the property of a
decedent is never removed from commerce, whereas under our probate system it is largely taken out of commerce for the period of
administration. Any worthy procedure of this kind should not impair
too seriously the purposes for which administration is provided. At
the same time it should be welcome both to heirs and distributees, and
would advance the social interest of keeping property in commerce
without substantial interruption upon the occasion of death.
There are two general situations in which administration might
be dispensed with, either in the public interest or on behalf of those
concerned in the estate. First, administration is scarcely justified in
many small estates provided no one is adversely affected by its omission.
This may be said of most estates of deceased minors who have but
limited capacity to contract debts and whose estates are likely to be
small. Second, many estates of substantial amount may not require
administration, if all the interested parties can resolve their conflicting
interests among themselves. Each of these situations suggests the desirability of a careful and complete statement of the objectives to be
achieved by an administratiop. how far each of them is secured only,
or more effectively, by an administration, and to what extent administration may be dispensed with without seriously impairing the larger
objectives.
·

I
FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATION

Under the Anglo-American system of administration the title to a
decedent's personal property passes to his executor or administrator
for the -period of administration. During that time his functions are:
(I) to collect the assets belonging to the estate, ( 2) to pay the debts
of the deceased and claims against the estate, and (3) to distribute
the residue to the heirs or legatees. Each of these functions involves
or may involve a resolution of conflicting interests. The collection
of assets implies a positive duty on the part of the personal representative. Such is for the benefit of creditors as well as distributees of the
estate, since a collection of assets may be necessary in order to pay
creditors. At the same time the interests of distributees are opposed to
those of creditors, inasmuch as the latter have a prior interest in the
distribution of the estate. The payment of the debts of a decedent implies an opportunity.for creditors to present and have a judicial determination of their claims and, in case of an insolvent estate, a resolution
of the claims of competing creditors. The payment of claims against the
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estate ( as distinguished from debts of the decedent) involves a determination and payment of funeral expenses, costs and expenses 9f
administration, claims arising in connection with the carrying on of a
decedent's business and whatever estate, inheritance or succession taxes
and other obligations which may be similarly classed. And finally the
distribution of the residue to the heirs or legatees may involve a
resolution of many kinds of conflicting interests, as between different
classes of distributees and between distributees of the same class. It
may also present problems of advancements, ademptions, contributions
and the like.
The idea is fundamental in our system that some person occupying
an official position under a supervisory court should perform these
functions. This is due primarily to the state's solicitude for creditors
of the decedent, and perhaps secondarily to the belief that only in this
way can the residue of the estate be properly and justly distributed to
those ultimately entitled to it. The social and economic desirability of
maintaining personal credit by the means of official administration has
prevailed over the more direct method of the civil law. Furthermore,
the complicated nature of property interests often makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the heirs or distributees to divide the decedent's
property among themselves although they may be willing to do so.
Our probate courts are maintained to effectuate the prompt settlement
of estates and to resolve such conflicts as occur in the process. In a
sense, an administration is a liquidation of the decedent's estate,8 affording creditors a means of realizing upon their claims and at the
same time limiting the liability of the heirs who succeed to the property
of the decedent.

II
PERSONS INTERESTED IN AND AFFECTED

BY

ADMINISTRATION

IN TERMS OF STATED FUNCTIONS

The three general functions of administration having been stated,
it remains to determine which groups of persons are interested in each
of these objectives, to what extent the process of administration is
essential for their accomplishment, and in what circumstances it could
be dispensed with.
8 See Bordwell, "The Conversion of the Use Into a Legal Interest," 21 lowA L.
REv. I at 34 (1935); and dissenting opinion of Campbell, J., "in Lafferty v. People's
Savings Bank, 76 Mich. 35 at 63, 43 N.W. 34 at '45 (1889). _
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A. Collection of Assets
Upon the death of a decedent it is ordinarily desirable that someone take charge of his property and proceed to make collection of that
which is not already in possession. This may be necessary in the interests of preserving the property and making it available for those
ultimately entitled to it. It may involve the bringing of suits for the
collection of debts owed to the decedent. In each of these cases the
heirs 9 and creditors of the estate will be interested, because each aids in
the realization of their respective claims upon the estate. If a debtor ·
of the estate is willing to pay, he is entitled to know with certainty
that the payment will operate to discharge his debt. Consequently, each
of the three classes of persons interested in the estate, heirs, creditors
and debtors, is concerned in this .function of administration. Under
the system prevailing in many states at the present time, a debtor who
pays the heirs directly may remain liable to a personal representative,
if one is subsequently appointed.

B. Payment of Debts and Claims .
Society's concern for creditors of the decedent has been the prime
purpose in maintaining probate courts in which estates could be ad. ministered. 10 If an heir proceeds to take possession of the decedent's
property without admjnistration, a creditor may petition the probate
court for letters of administration and then present his claim for allowance in the administration proceeding. If, however, the heirs pay
the ~reditor, he ceases to be an interested party to require administration or be concerned with the disposition of the property by the heirs.
In providing machinery for liquidation of decedents' estates the state
is said to be concerned in seeing that the assets shall be applied to the
payment of debts and claims which otherwise might remain unpaid.
The heirs also are interested in having the assets of the estate applied to the discharge of claims against it. Otherwise their interest in
the residual estate remains subject to the claims of creditors. Only by
the machinery of a formal administration can the existence of debts
be determined and their payment provided for. And the claims of
creditors will not ordinarily be barred by the statute of limitations in
the absence of administration, for the running of the statute is ordinarily
suspended between the date of the decedent's death and the ti~e when
9 The term "heirs" as used throughout this study is intended to include devisees
and legatees as well as next of kin unless the context indicates to the contrary.
10 2 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 201 (1923).
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a personal representative is appointed. 11 This interest on the part of the
heirs is particularly significant where land is involved, because of the
necessity for some effective judicial method to release it from the
potential claims of creditors and permit it to become freely alienable,
unencumbered by claims that are without foundation or are not asserted
with reasonable promptness.

C. Distribution of Residue
After the collection of assets and the payment of debts and claims
against the estate, the heirs and legatees -remain the sole interested
parties in the remaining function to be accomplished, viz., the distribution of the residual estate to themselves. In most cases this involves a simple division of property among those entitled to it in
accordance with their interests. In other cases it may involve a partition,
or some kind of arbitrary allocation of different pieces of property to
different distributees. Where interests in property are more complex,
the distributees themselves may desire an official distribution according to law or the provisions of the decedent's will.
In addition to securing a proper and satisfactory distribution to
themselves the distributees will doubtless have some occasion later to
transfer the property so received by them. In that event they will be
much interested to know that the distribution has been an effective one
and of such a character that it will be readily accepted by a purchaser.
This is particularly true where the property is land, and it is true also
for personal property which requires some kind of official or public
recording for its transfer.

III

.

EXTENT TO WHICH FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATION MAY BE
AcooMPLISHED WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION

A. Ante-mortem D8'T.Jices to Avoid Administration
Many methods are available by which the use or right of enjoyment of we~th may pass to others at the time of a decedent's death
without leaving an estate to be administered. The creation of inter
vivos trusts and joint estates are both well recognized methods of
accomplishing this end, although either of these devices may subject
11 Id. at § 401. See also comment, "Executors and Administrators--Comparison
of Nonclaim Statutes and the General Statutes of Limitations," 36 M1cH. L. REv. 973
(1938).
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the property to inheritance taxes. Also savings bank deposits naming
other persons as beneficiaries are upheld in most states as another
means of transmitting the beneficial enjoyment of property at death,
which does not constitute a strict testamentary disposition. Insurance
is another method, although the insured alone does not always, during his lifetime, create the fund which becomes payable to beneficiaries
at the time of his death. In none of these cases is there any property
which would become assets in the hands of a personal representative
appointed to administer the decedent's estate.
In the absence of any fraud upon creditors at the tiine of creating
any of these funds or estates, each of them is perfectly valid for the
purpose intended. These methods operate to prevent an executor or
administrator subsequently appointed from making a suc.cessful claim
to the fund and also to prevent any claim by creditors of the decedent.
There ate, however, other devices which are often used to avoid administration but which, if discovered; are not valid to insulate the ·
particular transactions from the claims of a personal representative or
of creditors. Thus, fully executed deeds not delivered in the decedent's
lifetime, endorsed securities and the like are often resorted to without
being questioned. Or interested parties may simply appropriate unregistered property of a kind which may pass by delivery. But these
latter devices are always dangerous and not immune from the claims
of a personal representative or of creditors, if attacked.12 Furthermore,
unless a limitation exists on the grant of administration, such tni.nsactions ordinarily remain open indefinitely to the claims of creditors.

B. Summary Settlement After Appointment of
Personal Representative
Administration is often commenced when it is believed that an
estate is larger than it turns out to be or when the total amount of
assets is unknown. If it subsequently appears that the estate is not
large and would be eventually distributable to the decedent's family
in any event_, there is a feeling that it should be made available to
them at a time when their need for it is likely to be the greatest and
that the benefits of a formal administration should be available without
requiring its usual procedure, formalities and duration. In such estates
there can be no justification in subjecting the estate to the usual exSee Oswald, "Legal Efficacy of 4ttempted Methods of Avoiding Probate," 5
WASH. L. REv. I (1930).,
12
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penses of admip.istration or in withholding delivery to the family until
the expiration of the ordinary period for full administration. The
following discussion is intended to consider existing statutes designed
to accomplish this result. Statutes already have been adopted to achieve
this purpose, and they are becoming more widely acceptable with time.
A method for small estates
a. As dependent on f amity exemptions antl allowances
I.

According to common custom, the rights of homestead and all
exemptions enjoyed by the head of a household are transferred to
and continued in the widow and minor children after his death.111 It
is also usual to provide for a family allowance of a sum sufficient to provide for their maintenance and support during the period of administration and until distribution of the estate may be made to them.14 The
amount of such allowance will naturally vary with the number of persons in the family, their standard of living and the size of the estate.
In a few states there is also an allowance to the widow of a certain
amount of money or other property as her absolute property and as
such it is not considered a part of the estate.15 The property of the
decedent, to the extent that it comprises the homestead or exempt
property or is applied in payment of the family allowance or the
widow's absolute property, is ordinarily not subject to the claim of
creditors. Upon the setting off of the homestead and exempt property
and the payment of a family allowance and widow's absolute property,
there is a removal or withdrawal of these items· of property from the
estate for the purposes of administration.16 If the estate is thereby
exhausted, there is no reason why the personal representative should
not then render a :final accounting and be discharged, even though
the usual period of administration has not expired. Creditors would
not be aided and no useful purpose would be served by keeping the
estate open longer.
A survey of existing legislation reveals that the statutes of Florida,17
See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 228 (1935); I WoERNER, AMERLAw oF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§ 94-104 (1923).
u 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 636-637 (1935); 1 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§ 77-93 (1923).
·
15
I WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§ 77, 78, 82
(1923).
16
Bell v. Bell, 2 Cal. App. 338, 83 P. 814 (1905).
17
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 734.08.
18
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Illinois, Kansas,19 Kentucky,2° Minnesota, 21 Missouri, 22 Oregon,23
24
Wisconsin and Wyoming 25 provide for an early termination of administration in this manner. Not infrequently they provide that if it
appears upon the return of the inventory that the estate does not exceed a homestead and exemptions, the court may order the same turned
ovh or assigned to the w1dow and minor children and the personal
representative discharged and the estate closed. Such an order operates
to vest the persons ~ntitled thereto with the complete title to the personal estate.26
,..
Some of these statutes include the family allowance or widow's
absolute property in the list of items which can thus be used to exhaust the estate. Thus the Illinois statute provides for a summary distribution of the property of the estate when it does not exceed the
amount of the widow's or child's award or both after the payment of
first class claims, .and for a discharge of the personal representative.
This is also true of the Wisconsin statute. The Minnesota and Missouri
statutes authorize such a procedure if the estate does not exceed the
exemptions and allowances to the surviving spouse. The Oregon statute
· applies if the value of the estate does not exceed $ r 50 over and above
the exempt property. This $150 allowance is thus available to provide
a small fund from which funeral and administration expenses may be
paid, since distribution is made subject to their payment.
The recent Florida statute 21 on this subject is representative of
the best in draftsmanship and contains the following clear and concise
statement both of function, and procedure:

"If at any time during the course of administration it shall
be made to appear . . . that the estate does not consist of more
than the homestead and exempt personal property of the decedent,
the county judge may thereupon direct and order the distribution
of said estate among the persons entitled to receive the same and
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 450.
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1507.
2
ll Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 395.460 and 395.499.
,
21
Minn. Stat, (1941) § 525.51.
22
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 249.
23 Ore. Comp. Laws. Ann. ( 1940) § 19-604.
24
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 311.04, to be renumbered Wis. Stat. (1945) § 3u.05.
25
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-2905 as amended by Wyo.
Laws, 1943, c. 105, § 5.
26 Such is the effect of all of these statutes. See Bell v. Bell, 2 Cal. App. 338, 83
P. 814 (1905).
21
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 734.08.
18

19
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upon said distribution may thereupon enter his order relieving,
releasing and discharging the personal representative."

b. As dependent on size of estate
A similar type of statute designed to accomplish the same purpose
is predicated upon the size of the estate rather than upon its exhaustion
by setting off the homestead, exemptions and widow's absolute property, and payment of a family allowance. The total value of property
left by the decedent, irrespective of whether real or personal and
whether within the technical scope of homestead and exempt property,
determines the applicability of the statute. Such statutes are particularly
common in the western states which have patterned their probate laws
after the California Code.
The California Probate Act of 1851 28 provided for a summary
procedure of this kind whenever it appeared upon the return of the
inventory that the value of the whole estate of an intestate did not
exceed $500. In this event the court was to assign it by decree for the
use and support of the decedent's widow and minor children. Thereafter, the act provided, "there shall be no further proceedings in the
administration, u,rless further estate be discovered." The amount was
raised to $1,500 in 1871,28 and to $2,500 in 1921.30 In connection with
the amendment of l 87 l which raised the amount to $ l ,500, a note
of the commissioners states that "The distinction is too great between
the family of one who has invested in real property and happens to
own it when he dies, and one who, not so provident, or it may be more
conscientious towards his creditors than careful of his family; has provided no homestead. Again, but few estates which do not amount to
more than $1,500, could pay the expenses of administration. In any
such cases, it is better that the family enjoy it than to spend it in useless
administration." 81 The distinction to which the commissioners referred
is between estates which included homesteads, which were exempt up
to $5,000, and those which included personal property only.
The net result of this new statute is to carry forward for the benefit
of the surviving family of the decedent a new kind of exemption,
28

Cal. Laws, 1851, p. 464, § 126, now Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944)

§ 642.

2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc., p. 204, § 1469 (1872).
109, p. 101.
81
2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc., p. 205, note to § 1469 (1872). The distinction to
which the commissioners referred is between estates that included homesteads, which
were exempt up to $5,000, and those that included personal property only.
29

8

°Cal. Stats., 1921, c.
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made up of a stated maximum amount for the use and support of the
. family, and which is exempt froni the claims of the, decedent's creditors. An estate consisting of property not exceeding this value is thus
made available to the surviving family even though all of it would not
qualify as exempt to the decedent duting his life. Under ordinary circumstances one who has acquired a homestead is accorded exemptions
different from another who has acquired an equivalent amount of
wealth solely in personal property. Statutes of the kind under consideration provide a measure of economic security to the family of a
decedent whose wealth exceeds ordinary exemptions but who has not
acquired a homestead, ·comparable to that of the family which has
invested its wealth in a homestead.
Legislation similar to the California statute exists in Arizona,82
Idaho,88 Indiana,84 Michigan,85 Montana,86 North Dakota,87 Oklahoma,88 Oregon,89 Pennsylvania,40 Washington 41 and Utah.42 The
Arizona statute applies to estates not exceeding $2,000; the Idaho,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Utah statutes to estates not
exceeding $1,500. These latter were doubtless taken from the California statute at various periods between 1871 and 1921 when the
amount of $1,500 prevailed in California. The Washington statute,
on the other hand, allows property up to $3,000 to be set off to' the
surviving spouse which shall include the home and household goods.
, An Indiana statute authorizes a summary distribution to a surviving widow if an executor or administrator shall discover that the
whole estate of the decedent is not worth over $ 500, exclusive of mortgages, bona fide liens or other encumbrances.
In Michigan letters may be issued without notice where a decedent
-

32

Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-905.

88 Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-506.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-1703.
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943 and Supp. 1945) §§ 27.3178(448), 27.3178(449),
27.3178(450).
86
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10149 as amended
by Mont. Laws, 1941, c. 57•
87
N.D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943) §§ 30-1701 to 30-1706 inc.
88
Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 317. It has been held that only personal
property may be set off under this statute. Minnery v. Thompson, 146 Okla. 72, 293
P. 231 (1930) •.
89
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. ( l 940) § 1<)-6o4. This statute includes estates which
· do not exceed $150 over and above exempt property. Thus it partakes partly of the
nature of the statutes previously discussed.
40
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 863.
41
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1473.
42
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-8-2.
84

85
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is survived by a widow or widower, or children under the age of
sixteen years or by both, and leaves only personalty having a value not
exceeding $500. After the payment of the funeral expenses the estate
may be distributed to the widow or guardian of the minor children, and
the personal representative discharged without further accounting or
notice.
The Pennsylvania statute applies to estates not exceeding $500
in value. One aspect of this statute gives it the appearance of being
based in fact upon an exemption statute since a widow under Pennsylvania law is entitled to an exemption of this precise, amount.4 8 However, this statute applies to any decedent and not merely to a deceased
husband. Final settlement and distribution in such small estates is
authorized after six months.
The first group of statutes making summary distribution dependent
upon the exhaustion of the estate in setting off the homestead and
exempt property is not radically different from the second group
predicated upon the size of the estate measured in terms of a stated
monetary value. However, theY, do contain certain different theoretical bases and have somewhat divergent applications. The idea of the
former is merely to carry forward the immunities formerly possessed
by the head of the household and nothing more. The latter, on the
other hand, is predicated upon the idea that a family allowance of a
minimum amount should be devoted to the continued maintenance
and support of the family even to the exclusion of creditors. In the
language of the Supreme Court of Washington in In re Lavenberg's
Estate,44 " • • • they sound deeper in the policies upon which homestead •
and exemption laws are made to rest." They are designed to continue
for· a period the maintenance of the family as the decedent did during
his lifetime. The law is said to step into his shoes and to make the
same provision for his family. The North Dakota statute, however,
has been construed as a new kind of exemption statute, providing
additional property to the head of the surviving family.,i 5
As might be expected, this right of summary distribution is superior
to the power of testamentary control.46 The primary function of such
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 471.
104 Wash. 515 at 517, 177 P. 328 (1918). See also Estate of Woodbnrn,
212 Cal. 683, 300 P. 22 (1931), in which it was pointed out that this statute
was derived from that part of the California Code of Civil Procedure expressly relating
to the support of the family.
45
See Woods v. Teeson, 31 N.D. 610, 154 N.W. 7i97 (1915).
6
~ In re Walkerly's Estate, 108 Cal. 627, 41 P. 772, 49 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1895);
In re Miller's Estate, 158 Cal. 420, III P. 255 (1910); McMillan v. Boese, 45 Cal.
48

44
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statutes is to pass small estates to the surviving spouse and minor children free from the claims of creditors and with the least possible
expense and delay, consistent with the rights of any other persons who
may be interested in the estate.47
In the application of the second group of statutes described, some
question has arisen as to what property is to be included in ascertaining
wheth~r the value of the estate is less than the amount named. It is
generally held that a homestead is not to be included.48 All other real
and personal property located within the state is included.49 If prop'erty is subject to a lien or encumbrance, only its net value is considered,
and it is assigned or distributed subject to such liens or encumbrances.50
In those states providing for community property ownership it is also
said to be immaterial whether the property is separate or community
App. {2d) 764, I 15 P. (2d) 37 (1941). The Utah statute, however, expressly permits the testamentary disposition of homestead and exempt property. In re Schenk's
Estate, 53 Utah 381, 178 P. 344 (1919).
47
De Ledesma v. Stanley, 57 Cal. App. 470, 207 P. 693 (1922); Estate of Neff,
139 Cal. 71, 72 P. 632 (1903). In general on this point see 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN
LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 668-669 (1923).
48
Johnson v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 49, 97 P. (2d) 933 (1940); Estate of Neff, 139
Cal. 71, 72 P. 632 (1903); In re Shirey's E·state, 167 Cal. 193, 138 P. 994 (1914);
In re Adamson's Estate, (Cal. 1910) 5 Cof. Prob. Dec. 397. According to the preceding decisions distributive rights under these statutes are superior to homestead if the
decedent's estate is less than the amount specified and includes the homestead. In Utah,
however, homestead property is apparently included in the total estate in computing
its value to determine the applicability of this statute, and in any event it is made
subject to the payment of expenses of last illness, funeral and administration. In re
Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P. 22 (1901); In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390,
73 P. (2d) 967 (1937).
49
In re Bruhns' Estate, 58 Mpnt. 526, 193 P. _III4 (1920); In re Jarrett's
Estate, 138 Wash. 404, 244 P. 694 (1926).
50
This provision is a part of each of the statutes under consideration. But a widow
cannot pay funeral expenses and expenses of the decedent's last illness in order to
reduce the "net estate" to less than $1,500. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah
353, 225 P. 1089 (1924). Nor can she obtain her widow's allowance in order to
reduce the estate to a value less than $1,500. In re Schenk's Estate, 53 Utah 381, 178
P. 344 (1919). The statutes contemplate the entire estate being subject to administration. While general creditors of the decedent may not look to encumbered property
so set off, it does not follow that such creditors having a mortgage, lien or other encumbrance on such property may not subject it to the satisfaction of their claims. Fairbanks
v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 250, 30 P. 812 {1883). See also In re Stone's Estate, 14 Utah
205, 46 -P. IIOI (1896); In re Farmer's Estate, 17 Utah So, 53 P. 972 {1898). But
a judgment or execution creditor does not have such a specific lien upon property as
to entitle him to precedence over the ·surviving family. Snyder v. Thieme & Wagner
Brewing Co., 173 Ind. 659, 90 N. E. 314 (1910); Turner v. Hammerle, 153 Ind.
App. 437, IOI N. E. 827 {1913). Nor may a debtor of the decedent purchase an
outstanding claim against a decedent after hfa death and use it as a set-off, for this
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property.61 In Arizona, however, an amendment to the statute in 1935
expressly excluded the one-half interest to which the surviving spouse
is entitled in the community property/2 The statutes of both types are
almost unanimous in providing that funeral charges, expenses of the·
last illness and expenses of administration shall be satisfied before the
residue of the estate may be paid to those entitled.58 To this extent the
rights of the family are subordinated to those of preferred claimants.
And it has been held in several cases that this right of the surviving
members of the family to the beneficial results contemplated by the
statute cannot be given effect unless these prior expenses have first
been satisfied.54 In Kansas 55 and Minnesota 56 expenses during the last
sickness and debts having preference under the laws of the United
States or the state are included among the preferred charges. In
Florida, however, it has been held that the surviving widow of a
decedent is entitled to distribution of an estate of some $626 as exempt
property even though funeral expenses are left unpaid. 57 A literal
interpretation of the Kentucky 58 and Wyoming 59 statutes would indicate a like result.
Some variation is found_ as to the persons entitled to the benefits of
would defeat the widow's right in the minimum of property allotted to her under the
statute. Haugh v. Seabold, 15 Ind. 343 ( I 860).
51
In re Leslie's Estate, 118 Cal. 72, 50 P. 29 (1897).
52 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-905. For a case under the prior statute' see
Johnson v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 49, 97 P. (2d) 933 (1940) which held that the amount
specified in- the statute applied both to community and separate property.
53 "Certainly the Legislature, in exactipg these provisions of law, could not have
intended that the expenses of the last sickness, funeral charges, and expenses of administration should not be a proper charge against small estates, merely consisting· of a
homestead of less than $1,500 in value. Such a rule would pauperize an intestate upon
his deathbed, and tend to deprive him of a Christian burial, though the means he may
have acquired and accumulated by years of toil were sufficient to pay them." From
opinion in ln_re Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209 at 214, 67 P. 22 (1901).
54
Estate of Parr, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 171, 74 P. (2d) 792 (1937); Ross v. Smith,
47 Ill. App. 197 (1893); In re Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P. 22 (1901); In re
Petersen's Estate, 69 Utah 484, 256 P. 409 (1927); In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah
390, 73 P. (2d) 967 (1937). According to the case last cited even the homestead
property may be subject to these claims if there is not sufficient other property to pay
them.
·
55
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1507 (also mentions wages
of servants during the last sickness).
56
Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.51.
157
Seashole v. O'Shields, 139 Fla. 839, 191 S. 74 (1939).
58
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 395.460, 395.490.
59
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-2905 as_ amended by_ Wyo.'
Laws, 1943, c. 105, § 5•
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such summary distribution statutes. Most of the early statutes confined
their. benefits. to the surviving widow and minor children. This was
true of the California Probate Act of I 85 I after which so many of the
others have been patterned. But a few states have recently broadened
their statutes to include either spouse who survives. 60 The California
statute was amended only in 1939 to make its provisions applicable to
either spouse. 61 Domicile in the state is not a prerequisite.02 And in
any event the status of a person at the time of the order for summary
distribution is the controlling circumstance. Thus the heirs of a widow
who died before a final determination of her rights were held not to
be entitled to the benefits of such statutes. 63 And a wife who abandoned
her husband without cause was held to have barred herself of the right
to- his support and to the provisions of the statutes authorizing summary distribution to a surviving spouse.04 But an interlocutory decree
of divorce will not of itself deprive a surviving wife of these provisions; she must also have lost her right by some .fault of her own to
receive support and maintenance from her husband and have ceased to
be a member of his family. 63 Nor will an antenuptial contract bar a
widow in claiming the benefits intended by these statutes. 66
Similarly in determining the propriety of setting off the estate to
the surviving spouse or family of the decedent, the value of the estate.
at the time of the hearing and order, rather than at the time of the
inventory, will control. 67 In a world of rapidly changing values this
becomes important upon occasions.
This is true in the present statutes of Arizona, California, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Under the
former Utah statute the wife could not mortgage the interest of the children in the
property so set off to her for the'•joint use of all. Booth Mercantile Co. v. Murphy,
· 14 Idaho·212, 93 P. 777 (1908).
61
Cal. Stat., 1939, pp. 2390-2392, c. 819.
Ol! In re Lavenberg's Estate, io4 Wash. 515, 177 P. 328 (1918); In re Jarrett's
Estate, 138 Wash. 404, 24-4 P. 694 (1926).
63 Estate of Bachelder, 123 Cal. 466, 56 P. 97 (1899).
64
In re Bose's Estate, 158 Cal. 428, I I I P. 258 (1910).
65
ln re Boeson's Estate, 201 Cal. 36, 255 P. 800 (.1927).
66 Woodburn's Estate, 212 Cal. 683, 300 P. 22 (1931). The widow's rights
under these statutes are here declared to be "in no sense either the rights of inheritance
or Fights depending upon any previous interest in the property of the decedent owned
by him during his lifetime, and which she may or may not have surrendered by virtue
of the terms of their antenuptial agreement."
67
In re Orosco's Estate, 60 Ariz. 266, 135 P. (2d) 217 (1943).· In this case
the inventory showed. an estate of $2,200. Upon the hearing of a petition by a surviv)ng huooand to have it set off to him, the court found that it was less than $2,000
and awarded it to him in its entirety.
60
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Distribution is usually made to the surviving spouse alone who has
the obligation to support any minor children.68 However, the survival
of minor children is not at all necessary to entitle the surviving spouse
to the benefits of this summary distribution.69 However, if there is no
surviving spouse, the minor children are entitled to the estate.70 Some
of the early statutes made the property distributable to the surviving
widow and children, one half to the widow and the other half to the
children equally, but this has now been changed so as to give the
widow the exclusive right if she survives. 11 In ,many cases this eliminates an unnecessary guardianship.
·
There is one rather unusual feature of the California statute 12 and
those of Arizona 78 and Utah n patterned after it. They provide that a
surviving spouse who has separate estate of a specified amount, shall
not be entitled to summary distribution of such property. This would
seem to imply that behind the application of the statute is the policy
of making•it subservient to the continued support of the family. Thus,
if the surviving spouse has sufficient independent wealth or separate
property, the benefits contemplated by the statute do not exist. and
the estate of the decedent is administered and distributed in the usual
manner. The California statute specifies that summary distribution
shall be denied if the surviving spouse or minor child has other estate
of $5,000 in value. Similarly in Arizona, if the surviving spouse has
separate property, exclusive of his one-half interest in the community
property, equal to the portion to be set apart to him, the whole property, other than his half of the homestead, shall go to the minor children. The Utah Code permits the court, in its discretion, to exclude
from any such distribution any surviving wife, husband or minor child
having either separate property or income.
In setting off an estate to the surviving spouse or minor children
68

Johnson v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 49, 97 P. (2d) 933 (1940); McGuire v. Lynch,
126 Cal. 576, 59 P. 27 (1899); In re Stuart's Estate, (Cal. 1909) 5 Cof. Prob. Dec.
270; Estate of Ne.ff, 139 Cal. 71, 72 P. 632 (1903).
69
McGuire v. Lynch, 126 Cal. 576, 59 P. 27 (1899); Woods v. Teeson, 31
N. D. 610, 154 N.W. 797 (1915).
70 Most of the statutes so provide. Where the decedent was the wife, her small
estate was set off to the minor children to the exclusion of the surviving husband under
the former California statute. In re Leslie's Estate, II8 Cal. 72, 50 P. 29 (1897).
71
McGuire v. Lynch, 126 Cal. 576, 59 P. 27 (1899); In re Stuart's Estate, (Cal.
1909) 5 Cof. Prob. Dec. 270.
72
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 645, 646. This provision was added
. to the California statute in 1929. See Cal. Stat., 1929, c. 109, p. 196.
73
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-905.
n Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-8-2.
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under the provisions of these statutes, no special notice to creditors is
required or contemplated. 75 Their interests are not involved. But any
person who will be adversely affected by such a proceeding may offer
certain objections thereto. Thus such a person will be allowed to show
that the estate exceeds in value the amount claimed or that all of the
property has not been inventoried. 76
Once an order is made setting off the estate, it cannot be attacked
collaterally except for extrinsic fraud. 77 Thus the marital status of the
surviving spouse will not be r~-examined 78 or the property reappraised
in another proceeding.
Accelerated distribution to executor
who is residuary legatee
When the executor named in a will is also the residuary legatee,
statutes in a few states,79 in lieu of requiring the executor to give a
bond that he will faithfully perform the duties of his office and
account for all property which may come into his hands, permit him to
give a bond for the payment of all claims 80 against the estate and the
legacies provided for in the will. Under some of these statutes he may
then be relieved of filing an inventory 81 or rendering any accounting.82
The bond given by him is regarded as being an adequate protection to
creditors and legatees who are deemed to be no longer interested in
knowing the extent of assets contained in the estate or in having a formal accounting. 83 In return for being allowed to give this kind of
2.

75
Wills v. Booth, 6 Cal. App. 197, 91 P. 759 (1907); Estate of Palomares, 63
Cal. 402 (1883); Estate of Atwood, 127 Cal. 427, 59 P. 770 (1900); Browne v.
Sweet, 127 Cal. 332, 59 P. 771 (1899).
76
Estate of Roach, 208 Cal. 394, 281 P. 607 (1929).
77 Eisenmayer v. Thompson, 186 Cal. 538, 199 P. 798 (1921); McMillan v.
Boese, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 764, 115 P. (2d) 37 (1941); Johnson v. Johnson, 53
Cal. App. 805, 128 P. (2d) 617 (1942).
78
Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 805, 128 P. (2d) 617 (1942).
79 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 205, § 3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943)
§ 27.3178(254); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 30-305; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942)
c. 352, § 14; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 576, § 2; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2779;
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 310.15 (sole or residuary legatee); Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-107 (sole legatee).
80 The term "claims" is used here to include debts, funeral expenses, and expenses
of administration. Some statutes have added inheritance taxes and family allowance as
items to be included in the conditions of the bond.
81
In Massachusetts, Nebraska and Rhode Island. In Vermont an inventory must
be returned within three months.
.
82
In Rhode Island. In New Hampshire an accounting is to be made only "when
required."
88
See Hatheway v. Weeks, 34 Mich. 237 (1876).

1 945]

DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION

347

bond, which frequently will be much less than the amount of bond
ordinarily required, the executor becomes personally liable for all
debts of the decedent and all legacies given in the will even though
they exceed the amount of property which he receives from the
estate. 84 To the extent indicated there is a slight relaxation of the
control over the executor in an e:ffort to minimize his duties.
Between I 8 I 9 and I 8 84 a line of decisfons construed such statutes
as giving such residuary legatee the right to immediate distributi.on or
as giving him immediate owntrship of the property upon the approval
of the bond to pay claims and legacies. These decisions were based
upon the theory that the administration was thereby terminated and
that the executor thereafter carried out the terms of the will independently of judicial supervision. "There is no longer a proceeding
in rem," said Judge Cooley, "for the res disappears when the estate
passes from the control of the probate court and becomes merged in
the individual estate of the executor himself. What before was a jus
ad rem in the creditor, to be enforced by the aid of the probate court
as a lien upon an estate in its charge, becomes now a personal obligation of the executor and his sureties, attaching itself to no specific
property, and concerning no other persons whomsoever. The court
has no power, for the purpose of enforcing this obligation, to follow
the property which before constituted the assets of the testator; and
the heirs, the beneficiaries under the will, or the creditors, are not
to be summoned when the demand is to be proved, because they have
no interest in the question of its proof, and therefore no right to be
heard upon it." 85 Such a conception of the function of a residuary
legatee's bond was a close approximation to the instituted heir under
the civil law system, making the residuary legatee and all his property,
including that received from the testator, subject to claims of the decedent's creditors.86 However, this idea of the function of such statutes
was ultimately proved to be erroneous. But while it prevailed such a
procedure was the equivalent of a summary administration.
These statutes derive originally from an act of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. In 1685 it was provided that the-court might require any
executor to give bond with sufficient sureties for paying all debts and
8

¼ Hatheway v. Weeks, 34 Mich. 237 (1876); McElroy v. Hatheway, 44 Mich.
399, 6. N.W. 867 (1880).
85
Durfee v. Abbott, 50 Mich. 279 at 285, 15 N.W. 454 at 458 (1883).
86
See Rheinstein, "European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased Persons," 20 lowA L. REv. 431 at 469 (1935). See also Durfee v. Abbott, 50
Mich. 478, 15 N.W. 559 (1883); Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54 Mich. 547, 20 N.W.
579 (1884).
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legacies or to make and exhibit a just and true inventory of the
estate.81 In 1784 one· statute 88 was passed making the real estate of a
<l;ecedent subject to execution on judgments recovered against executors
and administrators for debts of a decedent, and another statute 89
provided that a decedent's real estate should be chargeable with his
debts and that an executor who is a residuary legatee might give bond
to pay the debts and legacies. In the early case of Gore v. Brazier,9°
a residuary legatee had given sucli a bond, had then sold certain land
owned by the decedent and was later su.ed for breach of the covenant
of warranty in the deed. It was held by-Chief Justice Parsons that
such a bond was not a discharge of the creditors' lien. It was pointed
out that before the provincial statute of 1 & 2 Anne, c. 5, all executors
were bound to inventory and account for the testator's estate in order
to furnish creditors and legatees with evidence and charge them with
waste if any assets were embezzled or unaccounted for, that when
legacies are specific or could be ascertained without inventory or .
accounting and the executor was residuary legatee,' there is no occasi~n
for an inventory or accounting if legatees and creditors can be secured.
"In this case," says the court, "the statute relieves the executor from
this duty, on his giving bond with sureties to the Judge of Probate for
the payment of debts and legacies.... This lien remains in full force,
and the benefit to be derived by a creditor or legatee from the bond is
merely cumulative." 01
But in 1819 in Thompson v. Brown,02 the Massachusetts court
held that a license to an executor who was also residuary legatee and
had given such a bond was not only improper but void. By giving such
a bond it was said that he thereby "acquired a perfect title to the
estate," and th.at no license to sell property of the estate was necessary
because he could _sell without it This dictum that the executor thereby
acquired a perfect title to the estate became the source of confusion and
error later in the same court and accounted for a similar error in some
· Michigan and Wisconsi_n .decisions-later.
Similarly, in 1827 the same court declared: "The legislature has
81 Ancient Charters and Laws of Massachusetts Bay, published by order of the
General Court 206 (1814).
88
Mass. Acts and Laws, 17.84, c. 14, p. 76, also found in Mass Gen. Laws {1823)
c. 32, § 7.
.
89
Mass. Acts and Laws, 1784, c. 1, p. 53, also found in Mass. Gen. Laws {1823)
c. 32, § 17.
90
3 Massi 523 (1807).
91
3 Mass. at 542.
92
16 Mass. 172 (1819).
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made such bond [ to pay the debts and legacies] a substitute for the
estate of the deceased, so that there is no longer any lien upon the
real or personal estate of the testator by his creditors, after the executor
shall have conveyed the same to bona fide purchasers."93
In the revision of 183 5 a provision was added to the statute 9 ¼ in
Massachusetts to the effect that the giving of the bond by the residuary
legatee conditioned to pay debts and legacies should not discharge the
lien upon the real estate of the decedent for the payment of debts.
The commissioners who had been appointed to revise the statutes
stated in their report to the legislature that it was the purpose of this
amendment to make the construction of the statute conform with that
indicated in Gore v. Brazier. Later cases 95 in Massachusetts returned
to the rule of that case.
A series of cases in Michigan and Wisconsin, however, took the
position that the giving of such a bond actually terminated the administration and operated to pass title to .the property of the estate to the
residuary legatee. Thus in Hatheway v. Weeks, 96 the Supreme Court
of Michigan said that "Having given such a bond, he is not required
to make or return any inventory; he is bound to account to no one; he
takes the property of the deceased and becomes at once the .absolute
owner thereof." And in a later case 97 it was said that the approval of
the legatee's bond had the effect of closing the administration of the
estate from the time of its approval. A corresponding view had been
announced in Wisconsin. 98 But in 1889 Michigan re-examined these
cases and reached the same result 99 that Massachusetts had reached
subsequent to 183 5 and without any amendment of its statute relative
to the effect on creditors' liens. Wisconsin did likewise. 100 In other
states this same result has been reached,101 although only the Rhode
Island statute contains a specific provision corresponding to the addition in the Massachusetts revision of 1836.
The net result is that what,appeared for a while to amount to a
93

Clarke v. Tufts, 5 Pick. (22 Mass.) 337 at 340 (1827).
Mass. Rev. Stat. (1835) c. 63, §§ 3, 4•
95 Jones v. .Richardson, 5 Mete. (46 Mass.) 247 (1842); Collins v. Collins, 140
Mass. 502, 5 N.E. 632 (1886).
96
34 Mich. 237 (1876).
97
Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54 Mich. 547, 20 N.W. 579 (1884).
98 Cole's Will, 52 Wis. 591, 9 N.W. 664 (1881).
99 Lafferty v. People's Savings Bank, 76 Mich. 35, 43 N.W. 34 (1889). See also
In re Estate of Vedders, 122 Mich. 439, 81 N.W. 356 {1899).
100
Pym v. Pym, n8 Wis. 662, 96 N.W. 429 (1903).
101
Thompson v. Pope, 77 Neb. 338, 109 N.W. 498 (1906). In general, see
2 WoERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 202 (1923).
9¼
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true summary administration turned out to be nothing more than a
statutory method for providing for an executor's bond which differs
from the ordinary bond in its conditions and amount, and which
furnishes an additional remedy to legatees and creditors. The legal
consequences of giving such a bond are severe, with little or no advantage to the residuary beneficiary in pursuing the course authorized by
such a statute. Many persons were financially ruined by giving such
a bond. An examination of statutory annotations and digests reveals
no case in recent years in which such a bond has been given. What
might have been an importation of a civil law method has been refused
admission into American law of adrriinistration.

3.

Withdrawing estates from administration
With the development of the law of administration several
methods have been devised for simplifying, for shortening, or for
eliminating substantially or entirely the process of administration as it
is known in Anglo-American law. One such method is that of authorizing the withdrawal of an estate from administration. A Texas
statute 102 provides that after the return of inventory, appraisement
and list of claims, any person entitled to a porti~n of the estate as heir,
devisee or legatee may ask that the personal representative be required
to render under oath an exhibit of the condition of the estate. Thereafter the persons entitled to the estate may give bond in double the
appraised value of the estate conditioned to pay all unpaid debts which
have been or may thereafter be allowed against the estate.103 When
such bond is approved, the exhibit passed upon and the amount due
to or from the personal representative determined, the latter is
required by an order of the court to make distribution to such persons
of the portion of the estate to which they are entitled.104 If an estate
is entirely distributed to those entitled, the personal representative is
discharged and the administration declared closed.105 Thereafter the
probate court has no jurisdiction over the estate or over the personal
representative. 106
102

Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3457·
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3458.
104 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3459. This right in the distributees
is absolute. Pierce v. Foreign Mission Board, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 218 S.W. 140.
But an assignee of a distributee has no such right. Rowe v.Dyess, (Tex. Comm. App.
1919) 213 S.W. 232.
105
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3465.
106 Davis v. Harwood, 70 Tex. 71, 8 S.W. 58 (1888); Long v. Wooters, 18 Tex.
Civ. App. 35, 45 S.W. 165 (1898).
103
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After the withdrawal of the estate from administration in this
manner, creditors have a right to rely on the bond or to look to the
distributees. The statute specifically preserves a lien on that part of
the estate in the hands of each distributee and those claiming under
him, with notice of such lien, to secure the payment of the claims of
creditors.101 If recovery is sought against a distributee, any judgment
obtained must not exceed the value of the estate distributed to him.108
On the other hand, if recovery is sought on the bond, recovery is
limited only by the amount of the bond and the basis of the cause of
action is entirely independent of the value of the estate distributed.1° 0
The result achieved by this procedure is in some respects similar to
that already achieved by summary administration of small estates
which are entirely consumed in the setting off of exempt property or
in the satisfying of a minimum of family allowance. In the latter case,
however, there is a completion of the functions of administration,
while under the Texas statute authorizing the withdrawal of estates
from administration there is admittedly no such completion. In lieu of
such completion there is the substitution of a bond as a kind of res to
insure the accomplishment of the functions of administration.

4. Nonintervention wills
Another method that has been developed for dispensing with
administration of estates is that of the independent executor under a
nonintervention will. Whether administration in connection with the
decedent's estate is a required proceeding, or whether it may be
dispensed with in whole or in part, is a matter involving several considerations of policy. Unless a statute specifically authorizes it, a
testator, for example, cannot direct that no administration be had on
his estate. Solicitude for creditors has led most states to regard
administration as the normal process to be followed. A testamentary
provision that administration on the testator's estate shall be independent of judicial control is entirely ineffective in most states.110
Doubtless influenced by the procedure of the civil law, legislation has
been adopted in four states authorizing their probate courts to give
effect to an expressed wish of this kind. The purpose of such statutes,
it is said, is to provide for the settlement of estates with a minimum
107

Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3461.
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3464.
109
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3462, 3463. See also Thomas v.
Bonnie Bros., 66 Tex. 635, 2 S.W. 724 (1886).
110
Sevier v. Woodson, 205 Mo. 202, 104 S.W. 1 (1907).
108
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· of judicial supervision and expense.111 The size of the estate has no
bearing upon the propriety of resorting to this procedure.
Statutes recognizing the validity of nonintervention wills and independent executors have been passed in Arizona,112 Idaho,113 Texas m
and Washingtqn. 115 These statutes are of two general patterns, one
adopted by Texas and the other by Washington. The Arizona statute
is modeled after the Texas statute and the Idaho statute after the
Washington statute. Neither the Arizona nor Idaho statutes are used
extensively. In fact, no reported appellate cases appear to have been
decided in either of these states. But numerous cases have arisen both
in Texas and in Washington where the power to name an independent
executor is exercised .frequently. A 1'.exas statute provides that "Any
person capable of making a will may so provide in his will that no
other action shall be .had in the county court in relation to the settlement of his estate than the probating and recording of his will, and the
return of an inventory, appraisement and lists of claims of his
estate."110 The Washington statute 117 is similar but requires a preliminary finding by the court that the estate is fully solvent, which fact
may be established on the filing of the inventory. But in Texas,
insolvency of the estate will not prevent an independent administration
thereof. 118 Where estates are so administered pursuant to the express
wishes of the testator, the personal representative, following the
probate of the will, n_eed only file an inventory. Thereafter he may
administer and settle the estate without the intervention of the
court.110 No letters testamentary or of administration are granted.
Notice to creditors is required under the Washington statute but not
under the Texas sta:tute.120 Both statutes contemplate that the powers
and duties of such an independent executor shall be as full and complete as is possessed' by the personal representative acting under
111
Wilhelm's Estate v. Matthews, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 274 S.W. 251; Schu. bach v'. Redelsheimer, 92 Wash. 124, 158 P. 739 (1916).
112
Ariz. Code Ann. (1.939) § 38-1902.
113
ldaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) §§ 15-237 and 15-238.
114
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3436-3447 inc.
115
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §§ 1462 and 1463.
116
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3436.
117
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1462.
118
Shackleford's Admx. v. G~tes, 35 Tex. 781 (1872).
119
Ewing v. Schultz, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 220 S.W. 625; Cocke v. Smith,
(Tex. 1944) 179 S.W. (2d) 954; Schubach v. Redelsheimer, 92 Wash. 124, 158 P.
739 (1916).
120
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 193z) § 1462. In Texas, no statute
specifically so provides, but the cases imply this.
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judicial supervision. The Idaho and Washington statutes 121 expressly
provide that such an independent executor may mortgage, lease, sell
and convey the real and personal property of the estate without an
order of court in the first instance and without any approval or confirmation thereafter, and in all other respects administer and settle the
estate without the intervention o·f the . court. Similar powers are
implied under the Texas statute.122 In Washington, so long as the
executor faithfully performs his duties in the management of the
estate, the court is prohibited from taking any control over the executor
or the estate.128
Under the Texas system the creditor is not obliged to present his
claim to the executor or to the court for allowance or classification, but
may demand payment of the executor and may sue thereon.m If a
judgment is obtained against the executor, execution may be had
against the decedent's estate unless it be insolvent.12~ In Washington,
however, claims must be presented to the executor in the same manner
as in estates regularly administered.
Under the Texas statute,126 the court may accept the resignation of
the executor when tendered. Upon the removal, resignation or death
of the executor, the court has power to appoint a successor to the office.
A series of statutes in Texas 121 is designed to confer upon such successor
all the powers originally given to the executor named in the will,
including the power to act independently of any control by the court.
Certain disagreements between the executor on the one hand and
the heir or creditor on the oth~r hand may be the basis for the
executor's resorting to the court for a determination thereof. Thus,
the executor may ask the court to fix· the attorneys' fees.128 But the
attorney has not been allowed a similar privilege, it being said that he
has an adequate remedy by a separate action.129 A petition by the
121 Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-238; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1463.
122
Ellis v. Howard Smith Co., 35 Tex. Civ. App. 566, So S.W. 633 (1904);
Cockrell v. Lovejoy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 44 S.W. (2d) 1040; Martin v. Dial,
(Tex. Comip. App. 1933) 57 S.W. (2d) 75.
128
State ex rel. Johnson v. Superior Court, 131 Wash. 264, 230 P. 434 (1924).·
lH Bell's Estate v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 408, 76
S.W. 798 (1903); Ewing v. Schultz, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 220 S.W. 625.
125
Bell's Estate v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 408, 76
s.w. 126
798 (1903).
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3470.
127
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3456A to 3456! inc.
128
Estate of Perry, 168 Wash. 428, 12 P. (2d) 595 (1932).
129
Estate of Megrath, 142 Wash 324, 253 P. 455 (1926).
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executor for advice and instructions from the court has also been
entertained.180
In one sense, this is not a dispensing with administration but is a
true administration independent of the probate court. Such an executor
is called an independent executor and the management of the estate by
him, even though independent of the court, is nevertheless considered
an administration.131 The power of the court over the administration
does not cease absolutely, however. A potential jurisdiction remains
in the court in certain emergencies. Under the Washington statute,132
if it appears that the executor is about to commit a breach of trust or
has committed some breach, the court may order his removal. Under
the Texas statutes,133 if either creditors or other persons interested in
the estate show that the executor is wasting, mismanaging or misapplying property of the estate and that they will be affected thereby,
the court may require the executor to give bond for the faithful
administration of the estate. Only if the executor fails to give such
bond may the court remove him.134 Judicial control may thus be
invoked instantly in Washington for acts of mismanagement but in.
Texas it is invoked only by ordering the executor to give bond and
then by removing him for failure to comply with such an order. The
directness of the Washington procedure has much to commend it. The
Texas statute, on the other hand, preserves more nearly the independent administration authorized by the testator. Under both statutes, the testator may dispense with the requirement of a bond by the
executor.185
It will be noted that, except for special reasons and for limited
purposes, the administration is expected to continue independent of
any judicial control. Unless the power of the court over the estate
and its administration is invoked in some appropriate manner, the
administration - is carried out to a conclusion _including distribution
without the advice or supervision of the court in any degree. Under
the Washington statute,136 a court, upon application to it, has the
authority to enter a decree finding and adjudging that all debts have
130

Estate of Megrath, 14z Wash. 324, z53 P. 455 (1926).
Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 47 S.W. 892, 49 S.W. 367 (1898); Swearingen v. Williams, z8 Tex. Civ. App. 559, 67 S.W. 1061 (19oz).
132 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1462.
133
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3439.
134
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art._ 3441.
135
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3438-3440; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington, 1932) § 1439.
136
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1462.
131

.
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been paid and designating the heirs and persons entitled to distribution of the estate. A Texas statute 137 provides that an independent
executor may ask the court to partition or distribute an estate where
the will does not dispose of all of it or fails to provide a means for
its partition. In these particular instances also, the power of the court
may be invoked; but in other respects the administration by the
executor under a nonintervention will is truly independent.
S.

0 ther legislation in aid of surwmary
· administration

Ever since the California Probate Act of I 85I was passed, legislation in the western states has exhibited a growing tendency to
simplify, to shorten and to minimize expenses of administration proceedings. A provision for summary administration in the California
act of 1 85 I 138 as amended by the code of I 87 I,139 provided that if
upon the return of the inventory it appeared that the value of the
whole estate does not exceed the sum of $3,000 "it is in the discretion
of the Probate Court to dispense with the regular proceedings, or any
part thereof, prescribed in this Title, and there must be had a summary
administration of the estate, and an order of distribution thereof at
the end of six months after the issuing of letters; the notice to
creditors must be given to present their claims within four months
after the first publication of such notice, and those not so presented
are barred as in other cases." The shortened period !::>f administration,
the reduction of the nonclaim period and the simplified procedure were
courageous departures from established procedures and represented
appropriate objectives for the administration of small estates. Since
that time the nonclaim period in California has been reduced to six
months in all estates, and final distribution is possible at any time
thereafter. Nevertheless the basic purposes of that early statute have
not been without influence elsewhere.
Statutes in Montana and -Oklahoma 140 similarly provide that the
court may in its discretion dispense with regular proceedings, order a
summary administration in small estates, require that creditors present
their claims within four months and permit distribution after six
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3442.
Cal. Laws, 1851, p. 464, § 126.
139 2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc., p. 204, § 1469 (1872).
140 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10149; Okla. Stat.
Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 317.
137

188
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months. A group of Louisiana statutes 141 also provides for the summary settlement of small successions, or of those so heavily indebted
that no one will accept their administration. This they accomplish by
authorizing the clerk of the district court to sell the e:ffects of the estate
and apply the procee4s to the payment of debts, the whole to be done
in as summary a manner as possible. The avowed purpose of these
statµtes is to provide for the speedy and economical settlements of
estates.142
.
Another device for simplifying the problems of the personal representative in small estates is that of dispensiJJ.g with the usual requirements of notices 143 in connection with the various steps of an administration, or of permitting the posting of notices instead of requiring
the relatively expensive method of publication.144 Usually, of course,
when the entire estate is not more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements of homestead, exemptions and family allowance, creditors would
have no interest in being advised as to proceedings taken by the
personal representative. But the primary purpose of minimizing
expenses and providing a speedy settlement for the surviving family
of a decedent is evident in most of these pieces of legislation.
In three states 145 provision is made for simplifying the settlement •
of small or insolvent estates by dispensing with the appointment of a
commissioner of accounts or similar officer where such a procedure is
ordinarily followed.
The summary administratiqn and ·settlement of small estates by
public administrators or other officials having an equivalent function
is also provided for in several codes.146
·
La. Civ. Code Ann.· (Dart, 1945) art. u90; La. Gen. Stat, Ann. (Dart,
1939) §§ 9707-9715 inc.
·
142 Hoffman's Heirs v. Hunter, 127 La. 673, 53 S. 903 (1910); Rizzotto v.
Grima, 164 La. 1, II3 S. 658 (1927).
143 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 27.3178(449) (of grant of ,letters), §
27.3178(450) (after distribution to widow, widower or minor children); Mo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. ( 1942) § 249 (of all further advertis~ments after distrfbution to surviving
spouse or minor children); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935)
§ 10170 (notice 'to creditors); Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-9-1 (notice to creditors); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1477 (notice to creditors).
144 Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3861 as amended by Del. Laws, 1939, c. 142;
Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 735.03; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941)
§ 9882.308; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 567; S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 212.
.
145 N. H. Rev. Stat. (1942) c. 356, § 34; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2832; W.
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 4147.
·
146 See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, Supp. 1945) § u44;
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. (Michie, 1932) c. 194, §§ 17, 18; Minn. Stat. (1941)
§ 525.393; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (~nderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 10012,
141
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A Connecticut statute 147 enacted in 1945 provides that when any
person who has received old age assistance dies leaving personal estate
not exceeding $ 500 in value and no administration is granted within
ninety days after death, the commissioner of welfare may take possession of such estate and dispose of it according to certain statutory
prov1s1ons.
A statute 143 in South Dakota gives the county court power to combine two or more estates in one probate proceeding when the beneficiaries are the same in each estate, thus avoiding the duplication of
procedure that would otherwise result .. The consolidation of estates
for the purpose of administration is possible when two members of
the same family, such as husband and wife or brothers and sisters, die
at the same time or approximately the same time leaving identical
heirs or beneficiaries under their wills.

C.

Judicial Settlement Without Appointment
of Personal Repr.esentative
·

Another method for small estates
In the preceding discussion treating of the summary settlement of
small estates after the return of the inventory it was pointed out that
such an administration proceeding, while somewhat shorter than usual,
was nevertheless complete. Early distribution to the family was shown
to be possible because of the smallness of the estate and its complete
consumption in being set off as homestead and exempt property for
the use of the decedent's family. The determination of distributive
rights was seen to be entirely independent for the most part of the
existence of creditors and other pistributees. The time ordinarily
consumed and the effort involved in the determination of the claims
of the latter are eliminated by such a procedure. In short, the task
of the personal representative is relatively so simple that the usual
period allowed for the administration of an estate is unnecessary. But
judicial control over the administration proceeding is full and continuous while it lasts.
If these results are obtainable for small estates in comparatively
I.

10013; N. Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, Supp. 1945) § 103-b; Wyo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-917. The treatment of these statutes under
which public administrators function is not within the scope of this study.
147 Conn. Laws, 1945, Pub. Act 312.
148 S. D. Code Ann. (1939) § 32.0909(10). Cf. Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson,
1943) § 15-376, limited to community property ownership, and discussed in part III
C 4, post.
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short periods of time, it may well be inquired why they may not even
be accomplished in one step or by one order of the probate court.
,In appropriate cases similar procedure could well be made available
by one order or decree of the court, and without interposing a personal representative, without supervising his activities for a limited
time, without ordering a distribution of the property, and without
passing upon an accounting and finally discharging him. Indeed,
legislation authorizing summary settlements of this more abbreviated
character has been sl9wly developing over a period of three quarters
of a century. Its merits may be observed in states where it has been
in operation and has been subjected to the test of time and experience.
The first legislation of this kind was adopted in Missouri in
1877u9 at the suggestion and sponsorship of Judge J. G. Woerner,
judge of the probate court of the City of St. Loui~,1 G0 and author of
the well-known work on American Law of Administration. Under
this statute, if the estate of the deced~nt is less than that allowed by
law as the absolute property of the widower, widow or minor children, the court may officially determine that administration is
unnecessary and order that no letters of administration be issued.
Under such ·an order the property of the estate' is set off to the
widower, widow or minor children who are entitled to collect, and to
,sue for and retain all property belonging to the estate in the same
manner as a personal representative would if functioning in an official
capacity. The existence of debts against the estate is immaterial since
the surviving spouse or minor children are entitled to the entire estate
absolutely and irrespective of claims against it. In a suit to collect
assets no proof as to the non-existence of creditors' claims is necessary
since the order of the court that no letters be issued confers this right
upon them independent of the existence of creditors. Such statutes,
however, are necessarily confined in their operation to small estates.
Nevertheless they offer another inexpensive and expeditious proced. ure for simplifying the problem of the surviving spouse and minor
children in such cases.
In addition to Missouri, where such legislation had its origin,
similar statutes are now found in Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska,
'
9
H Mo. Laws, 1877, p. 4. This statute has been amended by subsequent legislatures, the last amendment being in 1941. For the present wording of the statute see
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 2.
uo See 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 669, note

(1923).
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Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakot~, Vermont and Virginia. Many of them have
been modelled after the Missouri statute. All of them represent
attempts to provide a direct and highly desirable method for the
collection and distribution of small estates, thus enabling the family
of the decedent to have the estate immediately for their, support.
Distribution is immediate and direct from the decedent to the heirs.
The slight amount of judicial contact and judicial control over the
estate under all these statutes is to be constrasted with that under the
summary procedure of the statutes previously discussed wherein a
personal representative was appointed.
The Missouri statute 151 was amended somewhat in 1917. It now
provides for an immediate setting off or distribution of the estate when
the estate is not greater in amount than is allowed as the absolute
property of the widow, widower or minor children under eighteen
years of age, or at the instance of a creditor when the estate does not
exceed $ rno and there is no widow, widower or minor children under
eighteen years of age, and the creditor gives a bond conditioned. upon
the creditor paying the debts of the decedent in the order of their
preference so far as the assets of the estate will permit. The order of
the court not only operates to dispense· with an official administration
but also authorizes and empowers the widower, widow, minor children
or creditor, as the case may be, to collect and sue for all the property
belonging to the estate in the same manner and with the same effect
as a personal representative. This statute was among the first to
provide that in this particular instance the title of the decedent's
property could pass directly to the heirs, distributees or other persons
entitled thereto without the interposition of a personal representative. 162 At the same time it answered a definite need in small estates
by affording adequate protection to debtors of the estate who ordinarily
would be entitled to insist on making payment only to a duly appointed
personal representative.158 The procedure is quite informal. Ordinarily
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 2.
Statutes in California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah
and Washington provide that the title to a decedent's property shall pass directly to the.
heirs, legatees or persons entitled to succeed to cl}e estate by intestacy but that such
property shall be subject to the possession of the executor or administrator and to tlie
control of the court for the purposes of administration, sale or other disposition under
the law, and shall be chargeable with the expenses of administration, debts and family
allowance. However, the totality of rights and powers possessed by a personal representative under such statutes as these is the substantial equivalent of ownership by him.
lH Parsons v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413 at 427, 221 S.W. 21 (1920). In this case it
151

152

360

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

the surviving spouse presents a verified petition to the probate court
setting forth the necessary facts prescribed in the statute together with
an itemized list of the property left by the decedent and the value
of each piece. Upon proof the court thereupon makes an order granting the petition, determines that no administration is necessary and
orders that no letters be issued and that the widower, widow, minor
children or creditor shall have full authority to collect and sue for all
property belonging to the estate.
,,
- A statute of Arizona 154 provides for the summary settlement and
distribution of any estate where the value does not exceed $300. Any
person desiring to settle such an estate may make and file an affidavit
in the superior court setting forth the death of the decedent and
stating that the estate does not exceed $300 in value. Unlike the
Missouri provision, the survival of particular members of the decedent's family, or the existence of a creditor, is unnecessary in order to
invoke the statute. The superior court is authorized to prescribe rules
and regulations for the procedure to be followed in such cases. The
statute requires the filing of an accounting of all property received
and disbursed. No fee is permitted to be charged or collected on
account of the summary settlement of such small estates.
In Calif01:nia a statute 155 was enacted in 1929 providing that if a
decedent leaves a surviving spouse or minor child or children and the
net value of the whole estate over and above all liens or encumbrances
does not exceed $2,500, the person petitioning for probate of the will
or for letters or administration may add an allegation to this e:ffect in
his or her petition therefor, together with a specific description of all
of the decedent's property, the liens and encumbrances thereon and an
estimate of its value, and may pray, as an alternative, if the court finds
the net value of the estate not to exceed $2,500, for the assignment
of the property to the surviving spouse or minor children as the case
may be. Such a petition must be verified and the notice thereof must
appropriately refer to the prayer for suinmary distribution. Another
was said: "It is manifest that Section 34 of Article 6 of our Constitution confers upon
probate· courts complete jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to probate business.
There is nothing in our Constitution which forbids the General Assembly from· passing
practical and common sense statutes, like· Section 10, supra, which facilitate the transaction and convenience of public business, at a minimum expense, and that, too. without
doing an injury to creditors and other persons, whose rights may still be asserted before
the court..•• These statutes are enacted because of their public convenience. They simplify the business before such courts at a-minimum cost, and without injury to anyone."
154 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-1901.
·
m Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 640.
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section m provides that if the original petition for probate of the will
or for letters of administration does not contain such an allegation, a
separate or supplementary petition therefor may be filed at any time
prior to the hearing on such petition, but at least ten days notice
thereon must be given and the hearing on the original petition
continued if necessary. If, upon the hearing on the petition, it appears
that the value of all property of the estate does not exceed $2,500,
the decree or order rendered thereon vests title to all property of the
estate, subject, of course, to any mortgages, liens or encumbrances,
in the surviving spouse, if any, and otherwise, in the minor child or
children of the decedent. 157 No further proceedings are to be taken in
the estate unless additional estate be discovered. By a provision in
this statute passed in I 929 any surviving spouse or minor child having
other estate of $5,000 in value is excluded from the benefits of the
statute. Another section 158 provides that if, upon the hearing, the c,:ourt
determines that the net value of the estate exceeds $2,500 or that the
surviving spouse or minor child has other estate of $ 5,ooo in valu~ or
that there is neither a surviving spouse or minor child, it shall act upon
the petition for probate or for letters of administration and cause the
estate to be administered upon in the usual manner.
A Colorado statute 159 prescribes a similar procedure as to estates
of the value of $300 or less. Upon a verified application the court may
authorize the payment, transfer or delivery of the estate to the surviving spouse, other heirs or to the creditors of the decedent in the
discretion of the court. Like the Arizona statute, the survival of any
particular members of the family is not necessary to its application.
The statutory fee for such estates is limited to five dollars.
Extensive provisions rendering administration unnecessary in
estates less than $2,000 in value are contained in recent amendments
to the new Florida Probate Codet10 which represents a distinct dep.arture from the widely held- theory that the heirs can obtain title only
through a personal representative. Several situations are said to
justify dispensing with administration. The statute 161 provides that
"The county judge may dispense with administration upon
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 641.
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 645.
158
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 646.
159
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, § 77.
16
°Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) §§ 735.01 to 735.13.
101
Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 735.04.
156

157
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the estate of any testate or intestate who died a resident of this
state:
·
(I) When the entire estate is exempt from the claims of
creditors under the constitution and statutes of the State of
Florida; or ( 2) When the estate is not indebted and does not, in the
judgment of the county judge, exceed in the aggregate two thousand dollars in value, exclusive of property exempt under the
constitution and statutes of the State of Florida, and there is a sole
heir or surviving spouse, or the surviving spouse and all the heirs
of such an estate agree upon the distribution· of the estate, or the
decedent died testate leaving an estate, and the legatees and
devisees, and the widow, if any, agree upon the distribution of
the estate after the probate of the will of the deceased."
A verified· petition is required to be filed in the county judge's
court by the ,surviving spouse and all the heirs, or by the guardians 0£
any heirs who are not sui juris, setting forth their respective relationships to the decedent, a schedule of all of the decedent's property and
its value, a statement of the agreed distribution of it among the petitioners, and if it is claimed to be exempt, the names of all creditors.102
When a decedent has died leaving a will, such a petition may be filed
only after the will has been probated. If the entire estate is claimed
to be exempt, all known creditors must be notified. If the judge finds
the facts contained in the petition to be true, he shall make a finding
of the true cash value of the estate and order that administration is
unnecessary, and, as a part of the order, make findings as to the
heirs or devisees entitled to distribution of the estate, what property
shall be distributed to each and, if the entire estate is exempt, of what
the estate consists and what debts are known to exist against the
estate.188 It is always within the discretion of the judge to deny the
petition if he is in doubt as to the truth of any of the facts alleged in
the petition,164 in which case administration may be had in the usual
manner. If the petition is granted, the distributees are then entitled
to receive and collect the respective parts assigned to them, to have
the same transferred to them and to maintain suits therefor; but they
thereby become jointly and severally liable to creditors to the extent of
t;he estate received by them, exclusive of exempt property. 165 This
liability to creditors persists for three years,166 which is the same period
162

.Fla.
Fla.
164
Fla.
165
Fla.
166
Fla.
168

Stat. Ann.
Stat. Ann.
Stat. Ann.
Stat. Ann.
Stat. Ann.

(Supp. 1945) § 735.05.
(Supp. 1945) §§ 735.06, 735.07.
(Supp. 1945) § 735.08.
(Supp. 1945) § 735.09.
(Supp. 1945) § 735.09.
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creditors are allowed to enforce their claims in the absence of administration.167 However, the distributees may publish a notice to creditors
notifying them. of the entering of the order and of the distribution of
the estate without formal administration and thereby reduce to eight
months the time for creditors to present their claims.168 Any heir or
devisee under a will already admitted to probate, or a devisee under
a will subsequently discovered, may likewise enforce his rights, in the
same manner as creditors, against those who procured the order
dispensing with administration and received the property of the decedent.169 The entire cost of a proceeding dispensing with administration
is seven dollars and fifty cents and an additional :fifty cents for each
notice given by registered mail.170
A recent Idaho statute 171 authorizes the probate court, upon verified
petition, to set aside and assign bank accounts of a total not exceeding
$300 to the surviving widow of a decedent where no administrator
has been appointed. Such deposits up to that amount are declared to
be exempt from probate, administration, claims of creditors and heirs,
and from inheritance taxes. This statute, however, does not appear
to be confined to small estates, although it doubtless is so confined in
its practical operation. It would appear to authorize such a procedure
in any estate, however large, but to limit payments therefor to $300
or less to the widow.
An Indiana statute,172 authorizes the circuit court in cases where
a decedent has left an estate not worth over $ 500 and is survived by
a widow to vest the entire estate in the widow absolutely. Upon :filing
a petition therefor the clerk is directed to appoint a disinterested
householder to make an inventory and appraisal of the estate, both
real 'and personal, which must be verified by the widow as to its completeness. Upon the return of the inventory the clerk is directed not
to issue letters but to continue further proceedings until the next term
of the court thereafter when the court shall, if no opposition be made,
enter a decree vesting in the widow all the title and interest of the
decedent in such estate at his death and directing that no letters issue
thereon. Notice thereof must be given by the widow by publishing
or posting. Creditors may contest the petition at the time set for its
hearing upon the ground that the inventory ·does not contain all
property belonging to the estate or that the estate was improperly
167 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 734.29.
168 Fla. Stat. Ann. {Supp. 1945) § 735.10.
169 Fla. Stat. Ann. {Supp. 1945) § 735.u, 735.12.
17°Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 735.13.
171 Idaho Laws Ann. {Anderson, 1943) § l 5-1406.
172

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 6-1701 to 6-1704.
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valued, and that in either qise the total .value of the estate exceeds
$500. In this event, the court must appoint two other disinterested
householders who will proceed to reappraise the property. The final
action of the court is made upon this second inventory and appraisemep.t. The order of the court vesting the title to the estate in the
widow is declared to be sufficient authority to enable her to sue for
and recover debts and property belonging to the estate. She is exempted
from liability for any of the decedent's debts, except real estate mortgages, but she is made liable for his reasonable funeral expenses and
the expenses of his last sickness.
Under the Kentucky statutes 173 the county court has jurisdiction to
dispense with administration of small estates if the _personal property
on hand or in the bank does not exceed the amount to which the widqw
or surviving minor children are entitled to have set aside to them as
exempt. After such an order is made the widow or minor children
( through their guardian) may sue for and obtain all property belonging to the' estate, and shall thereafter settle accounts in the same
manner as a personal representative.
A recent Maryland statute 174 provides that if . a decedent dies
intestate and leaves a small estate consisting solely of personal property, the person entitled to be appointed administrator may file a
petition in the Orphans' Court requesting that administration be dispensed with. The court may make a preliminary order declaring that
no formal administration is necessary and instructing the petitioner
to publish notice to creditors to exhibit their claims within thirty days.
Upon the expiration of the thirty-day period the court may then render
a final order relieving the estate of formal administration and directing
distribution of the estate.
The Michigan Probate Code 175 provides -that if the estate of a
decedent consists solely of a pay check or other personal property less
than $200, the probate judge may order such property turned over
to the widow or widower, or, if there be no surviving spouse, upon
- the showing of evidence that funeral expenses have been paid, to the
nearest of kin or the person who shall have paid such expenses. This
kind of order may be made without the appointment of an administrator or the giving of a bond.
Nebraska 176 provides for the summary settlement of small estates
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 395.450, 395.460.
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, Supp. 1945) art 93, § 151A, as added by Md. Laws,
1945, c. 458.
m Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 27.3178(451).
176
Neb. Rel'. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 30-334 to 30-338.
173
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by authorizing the filing of a petition showing the usual facts as to
the death of a decedent, the names of his·heirs and an allegation that
his estate is wholly exempt from attachment, execution or other process
and is not liable for the payment of decedent's debts. After published
notice of the t1me set for the hearing on such a petition and a finding
that the facts alleged in the petition are true, the court is directed to
make an order dispensing with regular administration and distributing
the estate directly to the heirs or devisees. These statutes are called
the "small estates act."
Nevada 177 classifies estates into two groups for the purpose of dispensing with administration. If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse
or a minor child or children and his estate does not exceed $ I ,ooo in
value, the statute directs that his estate shall not be administered upon
but that it shall be assigned and set apart for the support of the spouse
or minor children. Even though there be a surviving spouse the court
may in its discretion set aside the whole estate for the benefit of the
minor children, after directing such payments as may be deemed just.
This may be compared with the provisions of the California, Arizona
and Utah statutes 178 which exclude from the benefits of participation
in small estates a surviving spouse who has separate estate of her own.
But if the decedent leaves neither a spouse nor minor children, administration may be dispensed with only when the estate does not
exceed $400 in value. But even here the court may direct the payment
of funeral expenses, the expenses of the decedent's last illness and
other claims. All proceedings taken under this statute are initiated by a
verified petition, containing a list of all property belonging to the
estate together with its estimated value and a statement of all debts
of the decedent so far as known.· Notice is given by posting upon the
bulletin board of the county courthouse. The costs of publishing notice
· are limited to $5.oo and court costs to $ I 5.
In New Jersey,119 when the total value of the real and personal
property of an intestate estate does not exceed $IOO and there is no
surviving spouse, a statute permits one of the next of kin, with the
written consent of the remaining next of kin, to petition the surrogate
for permission to collect the personal assets for the benefit of all the
next of kin. No formal administration is required and no bond need
be given. Such petitioning next of kin has the same rights, powers
and duties as does an administrator and may' be sued and required to
Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) § 9882.117.
See notes 72, 73 and 74, supra.
179
N. J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 3ry-8.1.
177
178
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account. A related-statute 180 authorizes the payment or delivery of
debts or property not exceeding $ IOO to the next of kin upon receipt
of a copy of the affidavit furnished to the surrogate marked a true
copy by the surrogate, and that such person so paying or delivering
shall be forever discharged from all claims by any administrator who
may be appointed or by any other person, notwithstanding that it may
thereafter occur that the intestate had left an estate exceeding $ IOO
or a surviving spouse or next of kin not consenting or that the allegations of the affidavit are erroneous. Because of the limitation of amount
and the restriction that there must be no spouse surviving; it would
seem that these statutes have but little practical value.
Under the North Carolina statutes 181 debts not exceeding $300
owing to a decedent may be paid into the hands of the clerk of the
court whose receipt is declared to be a full and complete release and
discharge for such debts. The clerk is then authorized and empowered
to pay out such collected sums, first, for the family allowance, second,
for funeral expenses, and any other surplus as the law provides. This
statute applies only to certain counties and does not include the entire
state. The primary purpose is to provide a method by which a debtor
of the decedent may discharge his debt by paying the amount to ·the
clerk of the superior court. However, the statute is permissive only
and is not mandatory upon the debtor.182 In small estates where all
parties are in agreement such a procedure is valuable for providing
a means of settlement without formal administration. Its permissive
character would seem to be a serious drawback to a full realization of
its possibilities.
A similar statute in South Carolina 183 provides that when a person
dies intestate and leaves personal property only, of the value of $500
or less, it shall be the duty of the probate judge to receive such estate,
pay funeral expenses and expenses of last illness and to distriqute
the residue, if any, to the distributees without the requirement of
administration. Any person, firm or corporation having money or other
property belonging to the estate of the decedent is required to turn
the same upon demand over to the probate judge whose receipt shall
be a discharge of such liability. In Mitchell v. Dreher,184 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina expressed an opinion that this section was
N. J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 3:7-8.2.
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-68.
In re Franks' Estate, 220 N.C. 176, 16 S.E. (2d) 831 (1941).
183
S. C. Code Ann. ( I 942) § 9028.
184
150 S.C. 125, 147 S.E. 646 (1929).
180

81
~
182
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probably intended to apply only to those estates in which creditors
were not concerned, but involved "simply the distribution of untrammelled assets." If this be true a small estate which is indebted
could not be thus set off to the heirs by summary procedure.
A much broader and more inclusive Virginia statute 185 authorizes
the payment of money up to $500 into the court of the county in which
such fund accrued or arose and thereupon the court may authorize
its expenditure or use for the benefit of the person entitled to it without the intervention of a personal representative. No reported cases
have arisen under this statute. It is not a part of the probate statutes
of Virginia and it may be somewhat doubtful how effective it is for
the purpose of dispensing with administration.
In one sense these statutes of North Carolina, South Carolina and
Virginia provide for a summary administration through a personal
representative, the clerk or judge acting as a kind of substitute for the
personal representative in this case. In actuality, however, no personal
representative is appointed and the distribution is made in as summary
and as direct a manner as possible, the purpose being to conserve time,
expense and unnecessary procedure in small estates.
An Ohio statut'e 186 authorizes the court to order an estate relieved
from administration when the value of the assets of the estate is less
than $500 and creditors will not be prejudiced thereby. A petition is
filed praying for such an order, setting forth the distributees, the
character and value of the property comprising the estate and a list
of all known creditors. If the court orders the estate relieved from
administration, it also orders the property delivered and transferred
to the persons entitled thereto. For this purpose the court fixes the
amount of property to be delivered or transferred to the surviving
spouse or minor children of the decedent, in lieu of property not
deemed assets, and of an allowance for a year's support. A commissioner may be appointed to execute instruments of conveyances when
necessary. Such an order reliev~ng an estate from administration has
the same effect as administration proceedings in freeing land in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value from the possible claims of
unsecured creditors. A comment 187 on this section by the Committee on
Probate and Trust Law of the Ohio State Bar Association at the time
of the adoption of the new Ohio Probate Code in 1933 indicates that
185

Va. Code A11:n: (Michie, 1942) § 6143(a).
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10509-5.
187
See comment in annotations to this section •
188
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the purpose of this summary procedure was to relieve small estates
from_ the expenses of administration.
A Pennsylvania statute 188 authorizes the Orphans' Court to distribute estates not exceeding $200 in value without granting formal
letters of administration. Nevertheless, an accounting must be filed
and audited. Distribution may be made under such rule of court as
may be established by general order or by special order made in each
estate.
Another Pennsylvania statute 189 provides that when a decedent
shall leave a widow or children surviving him and an estate not exceeding $ 500 in value, such widow or children may petition the Orphans'
Court ,to set aside such property to them as exempt. The court may
act upon the petition and set aside such property without notice or
appraisement and irrespective of whether letters have been issued
or a will probated. The purpose of this statute, it has been saicf, is to
avoid the cost of administration on small estates where the entire
property would be consumed in being set off as exempt property, if
administration were to be granted.190
•
191
The South Dakota Code
contains extensive provisions for the
summary administration of small estates or estates of such a size and
character that creditors are not likely to share in them. It provides that
summary administration may be had (I) when the gross estate of the
decedent, including both real and personal property, does not exceed
$1,500, or (2) when the gross value of the estate, exclusive of homestead not exceeding $5,000, does not exceed $750 and the decedent
is survived by a spouse or one or more minor children. A verified
petition for such summary administration may be filed by an heir,
legatee, devisee or creditor, setting forth the fact of decedent's death
and whether he left a will; the names and addresses of all heirs,
legatees and devisees, and also, so far as known, of creditors with the
· amounts owing to each; a statement of the character and value of all
property left by the decedent; and the facts in regard to any homestead and the persons entitled thereto. Notice of the hearing on such
petition must be published for three weeks and mailed to all heirs,
legatees, devisees and creditors at least ten days prior to the date set
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 343.
Pa. Stat. Ann. {Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 477.
,
90
~
In re Madeira's Estate, {Pa. Orphans' Court, 1938) 33 D. & C. 717, 52 York

188
189

137.
191

S. D. Code Ann. (1939) §§ 35.0701 to 35.0708 inc., as amended by S. D.

Laws, 1945, c. 152.
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for hearing. If upon the hearing the court determines that the essential
facts exist, it may proceed in a summary manner to adjust and determine the respective rights of all persons interested including creditors
and their rights in regard to homestead and exempt property. It may
also probate a will if there be one. It is authorized to make findings
of facts and conclusions of law and to distribute the estate, first, in
payment of court costs incurred, second, to those entitled to exempt
property and homestead, third, to creditors, and fourth, to heirs,
legatees and devisees. Such decree has the same effect as a final judgment and may be recorded. No further action is required for the distribution of the estate. If necessary for such distribution, the court may
order the sale of any property other than the homestead. The entire
responsibility for collecting and distributing the estate is upon the
judge. He may not appoint an agent for these purposes.192 If such
petition is dismissed, regular probate proceedings may be instituted.
Even in an appropriate case, summary administration is not an absolute
requirement; -indeed the court may, in its discretion, require regular
administration if it finds that the circumstances are such as to render
it for the best interests of those interested in the estate.
A Vermont statute 1113 provides that if a husband dies leaving a
widow or minor children or both, or if a wife dies and leaves minor
children and no surviving husband, and the estate does not exceed
· $300 or is not sufficient to pay the debts and expenses of settlement
and leave a balance of $300, the court, in its discretion, may assign the
estate to the value of $300 to the minor children or to the widow or
for their joint use and benefit.
As previously mentioned, the prime purpose of this kind of legislation is to make available to a decedent's family a modicum of economic resources without delay and at a time when the cessation of
regular earnings are likely to be felt most acutely by them. To the
family of small means the value of such procedure is at once apparellt.
To compel the surviving family to await the termination of a usual
administration would be most unjust; and in addition, it would decrease the amount distributable to them by the expenses of administration and would keep the property out of commerce for an interval
of time. "Practical and common sense statutes . . . which facilitate
the transaction and convenience of public business, at a minimum expense, and that, too, without doing an injury to creditors and other
19 2
•
193

Smith v. Terry Peak Miners' Union, 16 S. D. 631, 94 N.W. 694- (1903).
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2831.
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persons" is the characterization of these statutes by the supreme court
of the state of their origin. 1114
The restrictions on the rights of heirs generally to collect and sue
for debts due a decedent, in the absence of aelministration will be discussed hereafter. Suffice it to say at this point that such actions are
ordinarily not permitted, but the heirs are required to have a personal
representative appointed in order to make an effective collection of
the assets belonging to the estate. Under statutes of the kind now under
consideration, however, the heir becomes the "authorized agent of the
law to collect debts and give acquittances." 1115 Without such authority,
having its genesis in a denial rather than a grant of administration, the
heir is powerless to make collection of property to which he and
others will ultimately be entitled. An estate of sufficiently small
quantity to come under the statutory amount will not of itself entitle
the hei_r to sue to collect assets. He must first secure a judicial determination that such facts exist and the corresponding authority to proceed· in this fashion. 1116
Upon slight reflection the reasonableness of such a requirement
appears. Soµie sort of showing is necessary to call this exceptional
short-cut into play. A court having control over such functions will
respond upon proper proof.' Creditors are entitled to this amount of
protection, at least. Furthermore, more than one person may claim to
be the heir or next of kin entitled to the estate. This slight judicial
supervision will stave off potential controversies among heirs and
· creditors in the vast majority of cases. In addition, debtors are afforded
explicit assurance of the discharge of their obligations upon making
payment to the one thus authorized to make collection. It would, of
course, be unsafe to make. the heirs the exclusive judges of the applicability of the statute to the facts of a particular case.197
The order of the court denying administration is the equi~alent
Parsons v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413 at 427, 221 S.W. 21 (1920).
Bradley v. Raulerson, 66 Fla. 601, 64 S. 237 (1914); Coral Gables First
National Bank v. Hart, (Fla. 1945) 20 S. (2d) 647 at 648. And the person to 'fhom
it is set off may perfect his or her title as by a suit to quiet title. Bassett v. South, 87
Ind. App. 136, 156 N.E. 410, 158 N.E. 229 (1927).
196 Chenoweth v. McDowell, 26 Ariz. 420, 226 P. 535 (1924); Phifer v. Abbot, 68 Fla. 10, 65 S. 869 (1914); Noblett v. Dillinger, 23 Ind. 505 (1864); Griswold v. Mattix, 21 Mo. App. 282 (.1886); McMillan v. Wacker, 57 Mo. App. 220
(1894); Adey v. Adey, 58 Mo. App. 408 (1894). But in Mahoney v. Nevins, 190
Mo. 360, 88 S.W. 731 (1905), it was held that a surviving widow was entitled in
equity to be recognized as the owner of an estate less than $400 without proceeding
to have it set off to her.
197 Bradley v. Raulerson, 66 Fla. 601, 64 S. 237 (1914).
194

195
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of a judgment or decree, it is entitled to corresponding recognition,198
and it cannot be collaterally attacked.100 While such an order or decree
• remains in force a personal representative may not be appointed. 200
Nor may the valuation of the property set aside be assailed in a different proceeding.2°1. Nor may an action to collect assets by the next of.
kin be defeated by showing an indebtedness against the e~tate.202 Likewise the setting off of the estate to a person erroneously determined to
be an heir cannot be questioned in a different proceeding.2°3 If the decree is to be assailed at all it must be done directly, by appeal or by
steps appropriate to revoke it. Such a procedure is expressly provided
in the statutes of Florida, Kentucky and Missouri and is to be found
in the general procedure sections of other probate codes. 204
It is conceivable that regular administration might be preferable ·
to the summary setting off of a small estate in a given case due to
the existence of certain problems or conflicts of interest. The statutes
of Kentucky, South Dakota and Vermont expressly make their use
discretionary with the judge, while all others appear to be subject to
invocation as of right. 205
Several variations are to be noted among these statutes. Some are
predicated primarily upon the existence of a small estate and the survival of parti~ular members of the decedent's family who would be
entitled to the entire estate as exempt property, homestead, or as a
family allowance if administration were had in the usual manner,
while others are predicated solely upon the existence of a small estate
198
Eisenmayer v. Thompson, 186 Cal. 538, 199 P. 798 (1921); McMillan v.
Boese, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 764, II5 P. (2d) 37 (1941); Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Cal.
App. 805, 128 P. (2d) 617 (1942); Downs v. Downs, 17 Ind. 95 (1861); Boyden
v. Ward, 38 Vt. 628 (1866).
199
Although often called inferior courts, probate courts are courts of record in
almost every state and within the orbit of their jurisdiction, their decrees are entitled
to the same weight as those of courts of general jurisdiction. See Simes and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MtcH. L. REv. 965 at 990-992
(1944).
200
Nelson v. Troll, 173 Mo. App. 51, 156 S.W. 16 (1913).
201
Downs v. Downs, 17 Ind. 95 (1861).
202
Coral Gables First National Bank v. Colee, (Fla. 1945) 20 S. (2d) 675.
208
Coral Gables First National Bank v. Hart, {Fla. 1945) 20 S. (2d) 647.
204
Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 735.09; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 395.460,
395.500; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 2. The rights of creditors and other persons
may still be asserted in the court ordering summary distribution. Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1945) § 735.1 l; Parsons v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413, 221 S.W. 21 (1920).
205
The discretionary character of these statutes will not permit a successful appeal from an order denying a petition filed to obtain summary distribution. Frost v.
Estate of Harlow Frost, 40 Vt. 625 (1868).
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and attempt to provide for its distribution to those entitled, whether
they be the -surviving family, next of kin or creditors, or some of
each.206 The first group of statutes is limited in its application primarily to those estates in which creditors are not entitled to share;
the second group is intended to apply when the estate is of such small
size that it should be administered simply, summarily and with the
least possible expense and delay. In these latter cases, more conflicts
of interest as between distributees are likely to arise, and yet the very
size of the estate is such as to make real conflicts rare. As in the case
of summary distribution by a personal representative the rights of
distributees are usually made subject to expenses of the funeral and
last sickness. 201 But the rights of other creditors are ordinarily suboi:dinated to the paramount social interest of providing for the surviving family.
It may be objected that such statutes open the door to fraud uponcreditors, either through a process of concealing assets or by withdrawing assets from judicial inspection such as could ordinarily be
observed from the inventory. Legislation of this kind has also been
challenged on the ground that creditors are deprived of their property
without due process of law.
As to fraud, such is always a possibility even when an administration
runs its full course. An examination of the statutes of the kind ,under
consideration reveals that most, if not all, of them require a sworn
petition or affidavit to be filed to entitle the applicant or petitioner to
a summary distribution of the estate. There is no more reason why the
concealment of assets could be effected under such circumstances than
when there is a full administration. The limited judicial contaet with
the surviving family or the decedent furnishes no more fertile medium
for the practice of fraud of the concealment of assets. In any case, the
statutes contemplate that the court may revoke its order of summary
distribution upon a showing of other or further assets. 208 Creditors
206 In the first category are the statutes of California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky
and Missouri. In the ,eccind category are those of Arizona, Colorado, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia. The statutes of Florida, Nevada, South Dakota and Vermont must be classified
under both types, i.e., as applying when there is a small estate and certain members of
the decedent's family survive. See Turner v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 133, IOI S.W.
JI 9 ( 1907), indicating this limitation upon the application of the Missouri statute.
207
Fleming v. Henderson, 123 Ind. 234, 24 N.E. 236 (1890). But see In re
Ulrici's Estate, 177 Mo. App. 584, 160 S.W. 812 (1913), where it was held that
the widow's allowance of absolute property is paramount even to funeral expenses and
expenses of administration.
208 The California statute explicitly so provides. A general power of revocation
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would seem to have ample protection by this provision alone, not to
mention their power to ask that the order or decree be set aside for
fraud, if such is found to exist•.
As to the constitutionality of such legislation in the face of the
objection that such a procedure deprives creditors of their rights without due process of law, two things m~y be said. If the rights of the
decedent's family in his small estate by virtue of homestead, exempt
property, family allowance and the like are superior to those of
creditors, then the latter have not been affected adversely. On the other
hand, if the rights of creditors are superior to those of the decedent's
family, then the statute authorizing a summary distribution to the
latter does not extinguish the creditor's right. Whatever right he had
against the decedent is merely transferred as a chose in action against
the heir who has received distribution. On this precise point the language of the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Coral Gables
First National Bank v. Hart 200 is quite explicit:
"Under the'law of this state (Probate Act) personal and real
property descends to the heirs. Since devolution is a matter of
legislative discretion, it is entirely competent for the legislature to
say that any kind of property shall pass direct to the heirs rather
than be suspended until a personal representative be appointed and
vest in the heirs through him. Unsecured creditors are at all times
subject to the caprice of the legislature in so far as estates are concerned. While it is proper that their claims be paid and they may
apply for letters of administration but if they fail to do this and the
heir secures an order of 'No Administration Necessary' then they
may sue the heir to collect the debt. In other words, the most they
have at any time is a chose in action an<f they may sue the heir who
secured the order to collect the debt. They had no property right
before the Act was passed and no property right was taken from
them by it. Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnston, 3 Ohio 553, 17 Am.
Dec. 609."
A meJhod for distributees who die during adm,inistration
It sometimes happens that an heir or distributee who will ultimately be entitled to a portion of an estate being administered dies
before final distribution of that estate. The decree of final distribution
strictly determines only who are the heirs of the senior decedent and
2.

'

is contained in the Florida, Kentucky and Missouri statutes. A like power doubtless
prevails elsewhere under the general power of courts over their own judgments.
200 (Fla. 1945) 20 S. (2d) 647 at 649.
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makes distribution to them. Proper procedure would suggest that the
heir's estate should also be administered and his share in the ancestor's
estate distributed to his heirs. On the other hand, it is apparent that
the second administration may be unnecessary in certain situations. In
the early California case of McClellan v. Downey,210 a husband died
intestate leaving only community property to be administered. He
was survived by his wife and six children, two of the children being
by a former marriage. The wife died during the administration of her
husband's estate. Administration on her estate was then had and completed before final distribution of her husband's estate. But the decree
of final distribution qid not include her interest in the community
property. Upon the subsequent distribution of the husband's estate the
wife's interest in the community property was ordered distributed
directly to her heirs, "no creditor of hers objecting." 211 The court admitted that it would have been more orderly to have had her interest
in her husband's estate distributed to her heirs by the decree of distribution of her estate, or to have made distribution .of any personalty
to her administrator for the purposes of administration, but it held that
it had the power to make distribution of the wife's interest in her
husband's estate directly to_ her heirs under the dictate of the statute
which required it to distribute the residual estate of a decedent "among
the persons who by law are entitled thereto." 212 The power of probate
courts to make distribution to the secondary next of kin has been declared in a small number of cases,218 provided there are no creditors
of the decedent.
When the heir or distributee who dies prior to the final distribution of the ancestor's estate is an unmarried minor, it may be presumed
that he had no capacity to make a will and was incapable of contracting
binding obligations. Under these circumstances his estate could safely
be distributed to hi~ heirs in connection with the final distribution of
63 Cal. 520 (1883).
63 Cal. 520 at 523 (1883). (Italics the court's.)
212 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 1020.
2 1 3 Johnson's Administrator v. Longmire, 39 Ala. 143 (1863); Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124 at 133 "(1875); Ward v. Ives, 75 Conn. 598, 54 A. 730 (1903);
In re Sprague's Estate, 125 Mich. 357, 84 N.W. 293 (1900); Maxwell v. Craft, 32
Miss. 307 (1856); Watson v. Byrd, 53 Miss. 480 (1876); In re Riley's Estate, 92
N.J.Eq. 567, 113 A. 485 (1921); Matter of Losee, 46 Misc. 363, 94 N.Y.S. 1082
(1905); Young v. Kennedy, 95 N.C. 265 (1886); Roberston v. Gillenwaters, 85 Va.
u6, 7 S.E. 371 (1888); Cook v. Nelson, 209 Wis. 224, 244 N.W. 615 (1932). In
the New Jersey case of In re Riley's Estate, supra, the court said that only the Court
of Chancery, and not the orphans' court, in New Jersey could order distribution to
the secondary next of kin and thus dispense with administration. In the Alabama cases
210

211
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the primary estate, undiminished by debts or expenses of administration. By an amendment in I 866 to one of its statutes on distribution
of estates, California provided that if a decedent "shall have left him
or her surviving several children, or one child and the issue of one or
more other children, and if any one of such surviving children shall
before the close of administration have died while under age and not
having been married, no administration on such deceased child's estate
shall be necessary, but all the estate which come to the deceased child
by inheritance from such deceased parents shall without administration
be distributed to the other heirs as prescribed by law." 214 This statute
has since been broadened in California 215 to include any heir, devisee
or legatee who is issue of a decedent, and also to authorize distribution
directly to his heirs at law in the case of his death intestate while under
age and not having been married, before final distribution of the ancestor's estate. The result in most cases will be that distribution of the
ancestor's estate will be made to the other heirs of the ancestor whose
shares will thus be augmented, since they are his heirs also. Similar
statutes have since been adopted in Arizona, 216 ,Idaho,217 Montana, 218
North Dakota, 219 Oklahoma,220 South Dakota,221 Utah 222 and Wyoming,223 all patterned after the early· California statute. With the exception of Arizona these statutes are limited in their operation to
unmarried minors and cannot be applied to dispense with administration on the estate of a deceased adult heir. 224 In Arizona it is required
only that the heir dying before the close of administration be a child
of the decedent in order for the statute to apply.
The function of such legislation is to avoid two administrations
when the court already has jurisdiction of one estate and in that same
proceeding may readily determine the persons who are entitled to the
share of the deceased heir and order distribution directly to them.
it was said that it was within the province of equity to thus dispense with administration when it appeared that there were no debts or that administration had not been
taken out.
214 Cal. Stat. 1865-1866, p. 329, c, 297, § 2.
215
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 1022.
216 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-1504.
217 Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-1306.
218 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10327.
219 N. D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943) § 30-2106.
220 Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 631.
221 S. D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.1705.
222 Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-12-7.
223
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-3601.
224 ln re Skelly's Estate, 32 S.D. 381, 143 N.W. 274 (1913).
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The in rem nature of the proceeding is sufficient to justify the court's
exercise of such power. At the same time it may well be realized that ·
secondary administration may be preferable in large estates of minors
or if there be indebtedness of the minor, as for necessaries. But if the
estate is small this statutory permission to avoid an administration
answers a need in a sensible manner. Without exception, however, the
operation of these statutes is· independent of the size of the estate.

3. A method for persons who die while under guardianship
Another type of statute comparable in function to those just discussed but somewhat different in operation concerns minors or other
persons who die while under guardianship. The justification for dispensing with administration upon the estate of a minor or incompetent
who dies while his estate is being administered by a guardian should
depend primarily upon an ability to determine with reasonable certainty the existence of liabilities against the ward. Since such a ward
cannot ordinarily incur debts, it may be said that the guardian, who
has. incurred and presumably knows of all outstanding obligations
against the ward, should be permitted to pay them and distribute
the estate remaining in his hands in much the same manner as a personal representative would do~ On the contrary it may be argued that
the ward may be liable on obligations incurred before the inception
of the guardianship, for torts committed by him or for some other
obligation which the guardian did not incur or is not aware of. In
passing upon the merits of the statutes to be discussed in this connection, the machinery afforded to creditors to obtain payment of their
, claims during the lifetime of the ward as well as after his death will
be an important factor.225
·
•
Upon the termination of a guardianship by the death of a ward,
a guardian is ordinarily required to make an accounting.220 Distribution
of the ward's estate is then made to a personal representative to be
appointed. In an attempt to dispense with a formal administration,
however, legislation has been adopted in several states to provide for
distribution of the ward's estate by the guardian directly without requir225 In most states creditors are not notified or afforded an opportunity to present
their claims in a guardianshjp proceeding as they are in a probate proceeding. A few
•statutes do so provide, however. See Wis. Stat. (1943) § 319.41. To enforce pay-ment on contracts or torts of the ward, in most states an action must be commenced
against the ward personally, which action may be defended by the ·guardian. See George
& Ratcliffe v. Dawson's Guardian, 18 Mo. 407 (1853).
226
Such a provision is a part of most guardianship statutes.

1 945]

DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION

377

ing the appointment of a personal representative. According to such
legislation the guardian, after making the required accounting upon the
death of the ward, is authorized to make distribution of the residual
estate directly to the distributees. It is intended to render unnecessary
both the appointment of a personal representative and a complete
formal administration on the ward's estate.
.
In Arkansas 221 and Missouri 228 it is provided that if a minor under
guardianship dies, no letters of administration need be granted upon
his estate unless he leaves obligations, or unless he leaves a valid will,
but that the probate court shall proceed to authorize distribution of
the personal estate by the guardian among those interested.
A Pennsylvania statute 229 adopted in r93r similarly provides for
distribution by the guardian of a deceased minor ward to creditors and
distributees under the intestate law, unless it appears that the estate
is involved or is likely to be involved in litigation, in which case distribution of the estate is made to a personal representative who must
be appointed for the ward's estate. This statute depends upon judicial
discretion for its application. Notice to creditors is usually given by
advertising the final account. 280
A recent Colorado statute 231 applies in the case of the death of
any person under guardianship, whether a minor or other incompetent.
The guardianship is continued and the estate of the decedent administered in the same proceeding; thereafter the guardian is designated as an administrator, unless the decedent dies testate, in which
case the executor or other personal representative appointed shall administer the estate. The court may make any orders necessary to protect creditors and other interested parties.
Statutes in Delaware 282 and Georgia 233 contemplate that no new
administration shall be opened in the case of the death of any mArk. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 6246, 6247.
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann (1942) §§ 427, 428. These statutes formerly purported
to apply to all minors under guardianship. However, they were later construed in Norton v. Thompson, 68 Mo. 143 (1878), as inapplicable to married minors. The statutes
have since been amended accordingly.
229
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, § 872.
230
Templar's Estate, (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1940) 38 D. & C. 288. In this case the
court indicated that it would be inclined to authorize such a distribution when it was
affirmatively shown that the funeral and medical expenses have been paid or provided
for and the next of kin joined in the petition for distribution by the guardian.
281
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 176, § 89(5). This statute was
adopted in 1941.
282
Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3096.
233
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 49-316.
221

228
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competent under guardianship, but that the guardian shall distribute
the estate in the same manner as if he had been appointed administrator.
Likewise in Illinois 234 a guardian or conservator of a deceased
ward's estate is authorized under the letters of guardianship previously
issued to him to administer the estate of the deceased ward without
further letters of admin,istration, unless within thirty days after death
a petition for letters testamentary or of administration is filed. If letters
are so granted, the executor or administrator shall supersede the
guardian or conservator in the administration of the estate.
An Indiana statute 235 provides that upon the death of a ward
whose personal estate does not exceed $500, the guardian may proceed
to settle the ward's estate without letters of administration. Claims
against the estate may be filed, litigated or allowed and paid the same
as in cases of executors or administrators, and distribution of the estate
made under the same rules and regulations.
· In Wisconsin,230 a statute provides similarly with respect to the
estate of any person other than a minor under ~ardianship whose
total estate does not exceed $300. The guardian is authorized to pay
funeral expenses and expenses of the ward's last sickness. In ot}:ier
guardianship matters in which notice to creditors has been given and
the ward owned only personal estate of a value not to exceed $ r ,ooo,
the court, upon notice to all interested parties, may order the guardian
to pay funeral expenses together with expenses of the guardianship
and all liabilities incurred by the guardian, and distribute the balance
to the heirs of the deceased ward.
. Statutes in Massachusetts 237 and Vermont 238 authorize the guardian
of a deceased ward to pay the funeral expenses of the ward. When
the estate is sufficiently small that the entire amount is so consumed;
the need for a separate administration is thus avoided.
All of these statutory devices represent bona fide attempts to
dispense with the necessity for a separate ·administration proceeding.
They apply only when a guardian has been acting under the supervis~on
of the probate court. In most instances he is cognizant of all obligations against the ward's estate. In all probability he has incurred them.
If this is true and it can be determined that the guardian has paid and
satisfied all outstanding indebtedness from funds in his hands, there
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 476.
lnd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 8-135.
236
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 319.32.
•
237
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 201, § 48A.
238
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 3282.
234

235
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is rio .reason why distribution of the ward's estate should not be made
by the guardian directly to the distributees entitled to it. Doubtless
this could be done as a practical procedure in the vast majority of
instances with reasonable assurance that no creditor was overlooked. ·
But if there remains some outstanding indebtedness against the
ward at the time of his death, it may be inquired at this point what
procedure is available for determining it and what devices may be
employed by creditors to assert and enforce payment of their claims.
In an early Missouri case 239 creditors of a deceased ward presented
their claim to the guardian and sought its allowance in the county
court which had jurisdiction over the guardian and continued to exercise it pursuant to the statute authorizing distribution of the ward's
estate direct to the distributees upon his death. It was held, however,
that the county court had no jurisdiction to allow claims against the
estate of the deceased ward, and further, that the statute was not intended to apply when there were outstanding debts. No indication was
made as to how the existence or non-existence of debts was to be deter:..
mined. The tacit assumption necessary for the application of the
Missouri statute was that no outstanding indebtedness does actuaHy
exist. Its practical uselessness in that stite may be inferred from t~e
fact that there are no reported cases in which use of the statute has
been attempted in nearly three quarters of a century.
The Indiana statute likewise provides for an accounting by the
guardian upon the ward's death and for settlement of the ward's estate
without letters of administration. The defect of the Missouri statute,
however, has been provided against. Express provision is made for the
filing and allowance of claims in the settlement of the estate by the
guardian in the same manner as when settlement is made by an executor
or administrator. In a recent Indiana case 240 a guardian attempted to
function under this statute and refused t<;> allow or pay a claim presented after the expiration of some two years subsequent to the death
of the ward. The creditors excepted from his final accounting and
also from the non-allowance and non-payment of their claim. No
notice to creditors had been published. The Supreme Court of Indiana
declared that the statute contemplated merely that new letters of
administration need not issue to a personal representative, but that
the guardian, under the letters already issued to him, should proceed
289

George & Ratcliffe v. Dawson's Guardian, 18 Mo. 407 (18-53).
, •,
Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Pardue, 214 .lnq.•. 579, 1_.6
N.E. (2d) 884 (1938).
·
· ·
240
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to' admi~ister the estate under the same rules and regulations applicable
to an executor or administrator. In other words, he must publish notice
to creditors and of final settlement as he would do in administering on
a decedent's estate. The net result of this conception of the Indiana
statute i~ that it operates to dispense with the necessity of issuing new
letters of administration. In function, though not in name, the guardian
is transformed into an administrator.
- Though st.atutes of the kind under consideration may have contemplated some summary distribution of a deceased ward's estate by
his guardian, it seems clear that this is not always practical. Furthermore, the estate of an insolvent decedent is marshalled for creditors
quite differently from the estate of an ins~lvent ward under guardianship. Creditors are entitled to protection and consideration comparable
to that accorded them in the administration of a decedent's estate. To
permit the guardian to function as an administrator to save expenses,
· and to have the settlement and distribution of the estate occur in the
same court ,and in the same proceeding are sensible and sound objectives.241 But to dispense with notice to creditors or other safeguards
employed in an ordinary administration proceeding is neither desirable
nor justifiable.
On the whole, the Indiana and Colorado statutes seem to provide
a sound method for merging the administration proceeding with the
guardianship proceeding. 242 Notice to creditors and other safeguards
applicable to an ordinary administration proceeding are provided for.
While the Illinois statute seems to permit a short-cut, it authorizes a
guardian or conservator to make distribution of his deceased ward's
estate direct to the persons entitled, only if a petition for letters testamentary or of administration is not filed within thirty days following
the ward's death. Creditors and other persons are thus afforded a
reasonable period of time to apply for administration, failing which
summary distribution to the heirs may be made. While no case has
yet arisen in Illinois, a personal representative subsequently appointed
would probably be entitled to recover from the heirs the property reEdwards v. Edwards, 145 III. App. 457 at 460 (1908).
,
In Wingate v. James, IZI Ind. 69, zz N.E. 735 (1889), the court ordered the
sale of a ward's real estate to pay a judgment. Before the -sale was made the ward died. ,
Nevertheless the guardian sold the land without obtaining a new order. In upholding
the sale, the court said: "When the fact of the ward's death, and the amount and condition of her estate, were reported, the jurisdiction of the court over the settlement of
the ward's estate were continued precisely as if the ward had remained in life. The
J?COceedings were propei:ly continued in the matter of the guardianship; the guardian
proceeding, as such, to the settlement and distribution of the estate."
241
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ceived by them from the guardian. The thirty-day provision is doubtless a counterpart of another Illinois statute,243 to be referred to later
in another connection, which authorizes any person or corporation indebted to or holding personal property of a decedent to turn it over
to certain surviving members of his family, provided that no letters
are then outstanding and no petition therefore is then pending, and
that thirty days have elapsed since the death of the decedent.
If a guardian proceeds to administer and make distribution of the
estate, as is contemplated in the Indiana and Colorado statutes, he is
entitled to exercise all the powers of an executor or administrator and
he'is subject likewise to the same duties. 2 4-1 But it should be noted that
the effect of such statutes is to alter somewhat the functions of a
guardian. Before the death of the ward, he carries out vari9us activities
for a living person. After the death of the ward, he administers and
accounts for the estate of a deceased person. The statutes add nothing
to the estate under his management and control. They do give him
additional power to close up the estate. 245 This transformation of function is a small aid, but only a small aid, in the simplification of the
problem of administration. They save the necessity of appointing a
personal representative, but otherwise administration proceeds in the
usual manner. If the ward has left a valid will and appointed an
executor, such statutes should not and ordinarily do not apply. 246 It
is hard to justify such legislation as exists in Arkansas and Missouri
unless an estate is of such small size as to come under the provisions
of some other statute justifying summary administration or distribution. Thus the Indiana· statute is limited in its operation to estates less
than $500 and the Wisconsin statute to estates less than $300 and
$1,000, respectively. And the Orphans' Court of Phila<;lelphia has indicated that it will apply the Pennsylvania statute only in estates less
than $1,000. 2' 1
248

Ill. Ann. Stat. {Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3,, § 478, discussed in part III D 2,

post.
244
This is implied in the Colorado statute. See also Hire v. Hrudicka, 379 Ill.
201, 40 N. E. (2d) 63 (1942); Wingate v. James, 121 Ind. 69, 22 N. E. 735
(1889).
245
People v. Harms, 187 Ill. App. 140 (1914).
246
Belleville Sav. Bank v. Schrader, 214 Ill. App. 388 (1919); Keener v. Ochsenrider, 85 Ind. App. 156, 149 N. E. IOI (1925). But if there is no will or if the
executor named cannot serve, the guardian has been held entitled to administer the
estate as against the next of kin. Lang v. Frieseneckcr, 213 Ill. 598, 73 N. E. 329
(1905).
im Templar's Estate, (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1940) 38 D. & C. 288.
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Despite the· infrequent application of these statutes, it may be
possible to increase their utility. If a notice to creditors could be combined with a notice of the guardian's final accounting, opportunity
would thus be afforded creditors to present their claims on or before
the hearing on the final account. If ample time is thus allowed, such
notice may be deemed the equivalent of notice to creditors in an administration proceeding, and the period of time so allowed, as a reasonable nonclaim period. This practice is apparently followed by the
Pennsylvania Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County.248 The Wisconsin statute is also applicable to estates of less than $ I ,ooo worth of
personal property where notice to creditors has been given in the
guardianship proceedings.

4. A method for community property
The administration of community pi:operty in those states having
the community property system presents certain problems that deserve
special consideration in dispensing with administration on such property. Upon the death of either spouse, one-h~lf of tfie community
property is said to go to or belong to the surviving spouse while the
other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the deceased
spouse.249 In some of these states if either spouse dies intestate, the
entire community property passes to the survivor.2°0 It has been held
in some states that the community property is not liable for the wife's
separate debts. m
As a result of this immunity from the wife's obligations, administration on the wife's interest in the community property is deemed
unnecessary if her surviving husband becomes entitled to all o~ the
community property upon her death. Such is the implication of the
California Probate Code.252 The community property under the
ht,1sband's control remains subject to the community debts. An Arizona statute 253 specifically provides that if community property passes
to a surviving husband, he may obtain a decree determining his ownership which, when recorded, will have the same effect as a decree of
distribution. The appointment of a personal representative has been
248
249

Templar's Estate, (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1940) 38 D. & C. 288.
I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, §§ 198, 202, 203

(1943).
250

This is true in California and Idaho. See I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY, § !99 (1943).
251 I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, §§ 160-162 (1943).
252
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 201-203.
258
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-201 I.
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held futile under these conditions and properly subject to revocation.254 Similar statutes apply in Idaho 255 and New Mexico 256 when
the wife dies intestate. There is also a provision in the California Probate Code 257 for the determination of title to property which is affected
by the death of a person, but it does not specifically refer to community
property. A Nevada statute 2s8 dispenses with administration on community property when the husband dies and the surviving wife or
surviving wife and children pay or secure all the community debts. 259
Similarly, a Texas statute 260 provides that when either spouse dies
intestate without children or separate property, the community property passes without administration to the survivor but it is charged
with the debts of the community. In each case the community property is relieved of administration because of its immunity from the
separate debts of the deceased spouse and its continued liability for
community debts. Only in Nevada is the payment of community debts
or the securing of their payment a condition precedent to the passing
of full ownership and control to the surviving wife or surviving wife
and children.
In connection with the administration of community property an
Idaho statute 261 deserves special mention. It provides that "When a
marital community is dissolved by the death of either member thereof,
thereafter, if the survivor shall die before proceedings shall have been
commenced for the probate of the estate of the person who first died,
and both have died intestate the estates of both of the said decedents
may, by order of the court, be joined for probate in a single proceeding . . . provided the same person is . . . entitled to letters of
administration in both estates. . . . " This statute seems to be unique
2H

In re Anderson, 18 Ariz. 266, 158 P. 457 (1916).

255 Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 14-113. Under the authority of this
statute, administration has been held unnecessary upon the wife's estate in State ex rel.
Gallet v. Naylor, 50 Idalw 113,294 P. 333 (1930) and Pierson v. Pierson, 63 Idaho
1, II5 P. (2d) 742 (1941).
256 N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 31-108.
257
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 1170-1175.
258
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 3365.
259
Wright v. Smith, 19 Nev. 143, 7 P. 365 (1885).
260
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3662. Administration has been
dispensed with under the authority of this statute in the following cases: Wall v. Clark,
19 Tex. 321 (1857); Ross v. Martin, 104 Tex. 558, 140 S. W. 432, 141 S. W. 518
(19II); Graves v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App. 19II) 140 S. W. 487; Antone v. Stiles,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944) 177 S. W. (2d) 246.
261 Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-376. Cf. S, D. Code Ann. (i939)
§ 32.0909(10) cited at note 148, supra.
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in permitting the liquidation in one proceeding of the two estates of
the members of a marital community.

D. Informal Family Settlements
Despite the existence of an established procedure for the administration of estates, heirs do not always avail themselves of this procedure. If the decedent leaves no debts or only such as the heirs are
willing to pay, there may be no one to insist upon administration.
Arid if the heirs can gain possession of or divide the decedent's property among themselves amicably, there may be no real justification
for administration. Most states possess no legislation recognizing or
condemning such settlements. In fact, it has often been said that the
law looks with favor upon family agreements for the settlement of
estates. Justice Cooley expressed this sentiment in an early Michigan
case 262 when he said: "Formal proceedings for the settlement of an
estate are never necessary if all parties concerned can agree to dispense
with them. . . · . Family arrangements for this purpose, it is said, are
favorites of the law, and when fairly made are never allowed to be
disturbed by the parties, or by any others for them." That countless
numbers of them have been e:ffected successfully is within the experience of most lawyers. Sometimes, however, difficulties of collection or
distribution are encountered; sometimes unexpected creditors' claims
interpose obstacles; or problems of marketable title to land, registered
securities or similar property arise long after a decedent's death and
262
Browne v. Forsche, 43 Mich. 492 at 500, 5 N. W. IOII (1880). A definite
sentiment to the contrary was voiced in an early California case, Estate of Strong, II9
Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078 (1898), wherein it was said at 665-666:
"Whatever the law may be in other jurisdictions, there is nothing in our probate
law which would, either expressly or by implication, exempt the property of this estate
from the requirement of administration. The whole subject matter of dealing with the
estates of deceased persons is one of statutory regulation, and the policy and intent of
our statute very clearly contemplates that property of decedents left undisposed of at
death . . . shall, for the purposes of ascertaining and protecting the right of creditors
and heirs, and properly transmitting tlie title of record, be subjected to the process of
administration in the probate court. Indeed, there is no other method provided by
the statute whereby the existence of creditors or heirs of decedents may be conclusively
established. And such administration may be initiated and had at the instance of any
person entitled under the law to administer upon the estate.»
This statement, made at the time it was, should not be taken to reflect a permanent
policy in California. Some of the most useful- legislation for the purpose of dispensing
with administration exists there. It is also true that administration was necessary· in
order -to confer marketable title to the land in the above case, yet neither the vendors
nor the vendee were seeking that objective. The public administrator alone desired
administration.
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the informal settlement of his estate among the heirs. At this point
it is proposed to examine the efficacy of these settlements as a substitute for an official administration.
· In the first place it may be said that the body of law concerning the
informal settlement of decedents' estates has been largely constructed
• by the judiciary. That a paucity of legislation exists on the subject is
not surprising when it is considered that such settlements are confined
to small estates for the most part, and that courts have worked out
fairly satisfactory solutions to most controversies. Areas of doubt and
uncertainty still remain in which debtors and heirs alike often take
certain risks when formal administration is omitted. When there is a
large estate the heirs prefer to have a formal administration so that
property ultimately distributed to them will be free of any possible
claims of creditors. Nevertheless informal settlements may also be
effected in estates that cannot be classed as small. Only scattered legis-lation exists which explicitly recognizes the propriety and validity of
such settlements. There is a wide feeling that our probate codes are
in need of positive legislation dealing with this subject in its varied
aspects and giving certainty and assurances instead of leaving doubts
and compelling parties to assume risks for their acts.
Only a few statutes deal positively with the necessity for administration and the duty of the court to grant administration upon an
estate. An Arkansas statute,263 for example, provides that no administration shall be granted unless, in the opinion of the court, it shall be
necessary to preserve the estate from waste or damage or to protect the
rights of creditors.- Also a Colorado statute 264 provides that administration may be dispensed with if there is no property in the state
belonging to the deceased of sufficient value to justify administration,
or if the testator at the time of his death was living outside the state
and left no debts there. A Georgia statute m provides that if a husband
is the sole heir of his deceased wife, he may take possession of her
estate without administration upon payment of her individual debts.
These statutes are a recognition that the process of administration is
more than an empty gesture to fill an office and that it should be
required only when a real necessity exists therefor. A Texas statute 260
provides that "No administration upon any estate shall be granted
unless there exists a necessity therefor, such necessity to be determined
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 6.
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, § 52.
285
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § 113-902.
m Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3356.
263

264
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by the court hearing the application." A companion statute 267 provides
that "such necessity shall be deemed to exist if two or more debts exist
against the estate, or if or when it is desired to have the county court
partition the estate among the owners."
There are, in addition, several statutes which direct the granting
of administration unless · the heirs desire to settle the estate without
administration. In Arkansas 268 the heirs of an intestate decedent, if all
are of full age, may collect, manage, control and dispose of an estate
if creditors consent or the claims of creditors are satisfied. Or if
administration has already been granted, it may be revoked. Authority
is conferred upon the heirs to sue for and collect all ·demands and
property belonging to the estate. There is no requirement of administration under a Georgia statute 269 when the heirs, distributees or
legatees prefer to settle the estate without administration. If there are
no debts, official recognition of such settlements has been provided by
a new statute 210 enacted in 1945. It provides that any heir of a decedent who has died intestate and upon whose estate no administration
has been had may file a petition in the court of ordinary stating that
there are no debts and that the heirs have agreed upon a division of
the estate amicably among themselves and desire to settle the estate
without administration, and praying for an order that no administration is necessary. The court may then make a decree declaring that
formal administration is unnecessary. In Illinois 271 the court need not
issue letters testamentary or of administration if it is satisfied that no
federal estate or Illinois inheritance tax will be due and if it finds
that all claims are paid, that all heirs, legatees or devisees are residents
of Illinois, and that they are of legal age and desire to settle the estate
without administration. A Kentucky statute 212 authorizes the court to
- dispense with administration on the estate of an intestate decedent upon
the written agreement of all persons interested in the personal estate,
in cases where there are no creditors or the heirs designate a trustee to
collect claims and demands. Such an agreement may be executed on
behalf of a minor or other person under disability by his guardian,
curator or committee. And if administration has already been granted,
267

Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3.370.
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 1, 2, 3. Such an agreement may be entered
into after administration has been granted, waiving further accounting by the administrator. Herndon v. Adkisson, (Ark. 1945) 184 S. W. (2d) 953.
269
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § II3-1314.
270
Ga. Laws, 1945, Gov. No. 202.
271
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 227.
272
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 395.450, 395.470, 395.480, 395.490.
268
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it shall be revoked. A Florida statute 273 likewise authorizes the court
to dispense with administration when an estate of not more than
$2,000, exclusive of exempt property, is not indebted, and there is a
sole heir or the heirs make division thereof amicably among themselves.
•
These are the legislative reliefs from administration. There are,
in addition, some legislative prohibitions against administration after
the expiration of a designated period of time.274 Most legislation of
the latter kind is designed to bar claims of creditors generally, operating as a kind of special nonclaim statute when there has been no
administration, although some of the legislation merely relieves land
from the lien of creditors' claims. One practical effect of these statutes
is to preclude creditors from attacking these family settlements and
demanding administration after the lapse of a specified time.
There remains to be considered the extent to which informal
administrations may be carried out in the performance of the functions
for which administration is ordinarily granted. Even in the absence of
a specific statute, many cases have upheld the right of heirs to proceed
without administration where assets are applied to the payment of
debts. There is no vested right to the office of personal representative;
and the state possesses no prerogative to demand an administration for
the mere purpose of carrying out a procedure.275
The functions of administration have already been stated as being
(1) to collect assets, (2) to pay debts, and (3) to make distribution of
the residual estate to those entitled to it. It is commonly said that
the title to a decedent's personalty passes to his personal representacive. There is some truth in this statement. Its universal accuracy
may be doubted, however. Suppose that no personal representative
is appointed. Does it follow that the heirs do not under any circumstances become entitled to the decedent's property in the absence of
administration? Can it be that rights can be thus extinguished? Some
coµrts have seen fit to say that the personal representative possesses
only a naked legal title or that an exception to the general rule will
be made when no administration is granted. A different point of view
is contained in the codes of some western states which provide that the
title to a decedent's property shall pass directly to his heirs, devisees
or legatees, but "all of his property shall be subject to the possession of
the executor or administrator and to the control of the . . . court for
273

Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) §§ 735.01 to 735.13.
See part III D 1, post.
275
Christe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697 (1898).
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the purposes of administration, . . . and shall be chargeable with the
expenses of administering his estate, arid the payment of his debts and
the allowance to the family.m 76 In those states administration is unnecessary to the mere vesting of title, but vesting is' made subject to
-administration in which liability for''-payment of debts is determined.
Perhaps in the final analysis there is little practical difference in these
two views. Even under the first view the title of the personal representative is very limited, to say the least. Under either mode of
looking at it, interposition by him is but a recognized means of accomplishing the three functions of adininistration.
It will not be denied that the h~irs have an inter~st in the personal
property of a decedent and may enter into contracts for the division
of it, valid as among themselves. Such contracts cannot by their very
nature affect the right of creditors. It has often been stated as a general
principle that the heirs may agree to divide and_ distribute the property
of an estate when they are all of age and legal capacity and there are
no debts against the estate. This principle itself is looke<l: upon as an
exception to the general rule that the title to personalty passes to the
personal representative.
· This exc½ption, that the heirs by a division of the decedent's
property among themselves may obtain full ownership of it, seems
to have taken root from a practice prevailing where courts of equity
have administered estates. As authority for recognizing the legal
rights and ownership of heirs who have taken possession of a decedent's
property without administration, courts have frequently cited decisions of Alabama and Mississippi. An examination of the earlier of
these decisions, however, indicates that merely the "equitable title,"
not the "legal title,". was recognized as being in the heirs in the absence
of administration. For example, in Miller v. Eatman,211 one of the
early cases on the subject, the Supreme Court of Alabama said:
"In courts of equity, where it is not necessary that the legal
title should be vested in the plaintiff, an administration may be
dispensed with, where the right is asserted by those who would be
entitled to distribution, and where it is clear that there are no
creditors to be prejudiced.n27s
_ 276 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 300. The following contain substantially identical language: Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 84, § 212; S. D. Code Ann.
(1939) § 56.0102; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3314; Utah Code Ann.
(1943) § 101-4-2; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1366. See also N. D.
Rev. Code Ann. (1943) '§ 56-0103.
277
II Ala. 609 (1847).
278
II Ala. 609 at 614 (1847).
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In each instance the court required proof and made a determination
that there were no creditors. Moreover, a court of equity, if asked
to do so, would actually make a decree distributing the property of
the decedent, to the heirs so as to give them the same indicia of ownership as would be obtainable from a personal representative at ~he close
of an administration. As said in the later Alabama case of Fretwell
v. McLemore. 279
"The rule to be extracted from these decisions is, that a court
. of equity will dispense with an administration, and decree distribution directly, when it affirmatively appears, that, if there was an
administrator, the only duty devolving on him would be distribution. Then administration is regarded as 'a useless ceremony.'
An administrator or an executor is a trustee clothed with the legal
title. He holds in trust for creditors and distributees or legatees.
The creditors are entitled to charge the assets with the payment of
their debts, in priority of the equity of distributees or legatees.
When there are no debts, the equity of the distributees or legatees
is perfect; the legal title, if there was a personal representative,
would be a naked trust, which a court of equity ought not and
would not permit to be interposed as a bar to the equitable title of
the distributee or legatee."
These words have often been cited elsewhere 280 as authority for
dispensing with administration. In applying this principle, courts of
other states have not been content to accept it as one to be applied only
in courts of equity. They have readily extended it to various actions
at law and without any antecedent decree of distribution in equity.281
In a wide variety of situations heirs have been deemed to possess all
the elements of legal ownership. What was once regarded as purely
equitable doctrine to be applied in courts of equity has blossomed
into full flower as a well recognized legal principle.
Reverting to the question previously raised, what becomes of the
decedent's property if administration is not granted? May the heirs
prevent the appointment of a personal representative? Does it follow
that the heirs may never sue for and collect the decedent's property?
Do they ever become entitled to the possession and ownership of it?
And may they gain a marketable title? Perhaps simple, categorical
answers are not feasible. The solutions to these inquiries, however,
279

52 Ala. 124 at 133 (1875). See also Watson v. Byrd, 53 Miss. 480 (1876).
(1921);
Murphy v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 142, 84 P. 646 (1906).
281
See the text and cases cited in the discussion following.
28

°For example, see In re Riley's Estate, 92 N. J. Eq. 567, II3 A. 485
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will circumscribe the areas in which administration may be dispensed
with. We turn now to a consideration of each of the inquiries in relation to the stated functions of administration.
I.

Right of creditors to require administration
and enforce claims
·

Let us assume that the heirs of a particular decedent have agreed
upon a division of the estate among themselves, but that there are
one or more outstanding creditors. Under what circumstances may
the heirs successfully resist the demands of creditors that formal
administration be granted? Will the claims of creditors also become
barred in the absence of administration? Several possibilities need to
be considered here.
First, the heirs may pay the creditor directly and thus disable
him from further demanding adm:inistration. A Texas statute 282 provides that they may defeat the application of the creditor "by the
payment of the claim of such creditor." It is also sometimes provided
that it may be defeated by proof that such claim is fictitious, fraudulent, illegal or barred by limitation.2 88
Second, provision is also made in Texas 284 for the heirs to execute
a bond. conditioned to pay the debt. Creditors are thus given a new
res as security for their debts in place of the estate which can be
transmitted to the heirs without an official administration.
Administration has also been refused when the creditor had ample
security for his debt, 285 or where he could bring a direct action against
the heirs themselves.286 Under a Texas statute 287 already mentioned,
necessity for administration on an estate is determined by the existence of at least two creditors. Where there is only one creditor, he is
said to be adequately protected by permitting him to enforce his claim
against the estate in the hands of distributees. 288 This procedure resembles very closely that of the civil law under which the heir takes the
decedent's property and at the same time becomes liaple for his debts.
282

Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, '1939) art'. 3340.
See, for example, Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3340. Similar
provisions are found in many probate codes.
284
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3340, 3341.
285
Webb v. Tri~ble Bros., 143 Ky. 375, 136 S. W. 870 (19II).
286
Cross v. Hancock's Estate, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 176 S.W. (2d) 586.
287 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3370. This statute applies only to
decedents who die intestate.
288
Cross v. Hancock's Estate, (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 176 S.W.(2d) 586.
283
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Where several debts exist, the problem begins to suggest complications which justify a formal administration.
Finally there is a substantial body of legislation designed to
encourage timely administration proceedings and to bar creditors who
do not take appropriate steps to enforce their claims when others do
not apply for administration. First, there is the group of statutes
already referred to limiting the time for the granting of administration. Such statutes exist in Connecticut,289 Iowa,29° Kentucky,291
Maine,202 Massachusetts,293 Pennsylvania,294 Tennessee 295 and Texas. 298
There is a difference of opinion as to whether these statutes affect the
power or jurisdiction of the court, or whether they are intended merely
as statutes of limitation on the granting of letters.297 In Idaho it has
been held that an administration proceeding is regarded as an "action"
and is subject to the general four year statute of limitations.298
Second, there are statutes in Colorado,299 Florida,300 Kansas,801
Nebraska,202 Oregon 8 and Wyoming 304 which purport to bar claims
'31)

Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4909 (ten years except for good cause shown).
Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § u891 (five years, except that if death
occurs out of state, period does not begin to run until death is known; if property is
discovered after the expiration of five years, administration may be granted only for
the purpose of making distribution thereof).
291 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 395.010 (twenty years). Administration granted
thereafter is declared to be void.
292
Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141, §§ 1, 2 (twenty years).
298
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 193, §§ 4, 5 (twenty years).
294
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 342. (twenty one years1 except upon
order of the Orphans' Court upon due cause shown). But letters granted after the
expiration of twenty one years without such an order have been held not to be absolutely void for all purposes. Foster v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. St. 148 (1860).
295
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8167 (ten years; twenty-two years for
infant distributee).
298
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) arts. 3325, 3370 (four years except
where administration is necessary to recover funds or other property due the estate).
297
In Maine it has been held that the lapse of time deprives the probate court
of any jurisdiction to grant administration. Bean v. Bumpus, 2.2 Me. 549 (1843).
An early Tennessee case held similarly. Rice v. Henly, 6 Pick. (90 Tenn.) 69, 15
S. W. 748 (1891). But see Weaver v. Hughes, 26 Tenn. App. 436, 173 S. W. (2d)
159 (1943), which held that an appointment of an executor after the expiration of
ten years could not be attacked collaterally.
298
Gwinn v. Melvin, 9 Idaho 202, 72 P. 961 (1903).
299
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1945) c. 176, §§ 75, 76 (one year).
80
°Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 734.29 (three yeats).
301
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2239 (personal representative must be appointed within one year).
802
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 30-609 {two years).
so 3 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 1-216.
804
Wyo. Laws, 1945, c. 69 (two years).
289

290
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of creditors unless administration· is granted within a specified time
after death. These are special statutes of nonclaim applying in the
absence of administration. The basic idea behind these statutes is that
when the parties immediately interested in an est_;lte fail to have an
administrator appointed within the time fixed by the statute, then any
creditor may cause one to be appointed, and the statute of limitations
then begins to run against the creditor. Failure to apply for administration within the prescribed period operates to bar the claim as
effectively as does the statute of nonclaim when administration has
been granted.305 To permit the statutes of limitation to be tolled
indefinitely in the absence of administration would be to defeat their
fundamental purpose as statutes of repose. General nonclaim statutes
operate only after administration is granted. There seems no adequate
reason to authorize creditors to effect collection of their claims by
demanding administration and at the same time toll the statute of
limitations in their favor when they do not employ the means afforded
to enforce their claims. In Michigan and Minnesota statutes 808 differing in form but not in substance require creditors to file their
claims in the probate court within a designated period of time or be
forever barred, implying that they or some other interested person
must initiate proceedings for administration in ample time prior
thereto.307
Third, statutes exist in Missouri,808 Nevada,809 New Hampshire,810
New Mexico,811 Rhode Island,1112 Washington 818 and Wisconsin,814 pro805 Gilpen v. Bower, 152 Fla. 733, 12 S. (2d) 884 (1943); Nickel v. Vogel,
76 Kan. 625, 92 P, 1105 (1907); Brown v. Baxter, 77 Kan. 97, 94 P. 155, 574
(1908); Crow v. Hartzler, 103 Kan. 800, 176 P. 651 (1918); Timmonds v. Messner, 109 Kan. 518, 200 P. 270 (1921); Glathart v. Madden, 122 Kan. 563, 253 P.
426 (1927); In re Estate of Dumback, 154 Kan. 501; II9 P. (2d) 476 (1941); First
National Bank of Superior v. Bradshaw, 91 Neb. 714, 136 N. W. 1015 (1912)
(dictum); Crawford State Bank v. McEwen, 132 Neb. 399, 272 N. W. 226 (1937);
Luikart v. Quinn, 138 Neb. 849, 295 N. W. 890 (1941); Stander v. Pankonin, 141
Neb. 738, 4 N. W. (2d) 895 (1942); Luse v. Webster, 74 Ore. 489, 145 P. 1063
(1915).
.
806 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178(430) (six years); Minn. Stat. (1941)
§ 52:5•431 (five years).
307
In re Wisser's Estate, 248 Mich. 393, 227 N. W. 752 (1929).
808
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 179, 180 (ten years).
309
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, i929) § 8534 (three years).
810
N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 355, §§ 29, 30 {two years).
811 N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-804 (six years).
812
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 579, § 30 (six years).
318
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §§ 1368, 1370a (six years).
814
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 316.01 (three ye~).
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hibiting creditors from subjecting land of a decedent for the payment
of their claims if administration is not granted within a designated
period of time following death.816 All statutes of this kind do not apply
to personalty. They are primarily statutes of repose, passed in the
interests of marketability of titles of land. Idaho statutes 816 provide
a method for a determination of heirship after two years have elapsed
from the date of death of a decedent upon whose estate administration
is not contemplated in Idaho. Provision is made for creditors to :file
their claims in that proceeding, failing which all claims are barred.
In regard to the statute of limitations it is ordinarily held that its
running is interrupted from the date of death until the appointment of
a personal representative.817 Even if no such interruption occurred it
would be difficult to determine with any great certainty when all debts
have become barred, for maturity dates may not occur until long after
death, or disabilities of creditors may prevent the continuous running
of the statute. A North Dakota statute 818 suspends the running of the
statute of limitations upon death only until a creditor is authorized to
apply for letters of administration. For the reasons mentioned, it is
doubtful how. e:ffective this statute is for the purpose of determining
the non-existence of creditors' claims at any particular time.
Closely associated with the liability of the decedent's property for
his debts is its liability for inheritance or succession taxes. A frequent,
though not universal, procedure, is for such taxes to be assessed in
connection with or as a part of the administration proceeding. If
administration is not had and there is no separate assessment of inheritance taxes, what is the duration of liability of the property of ·the
estate in the hands of distributees? A common provision of tax statutes
816
Austin v. Shipman, 160 Mo. App. 206, 141 S.W. 425 (19n) (dictum);
Kling v. Greef Realty Co., 166 Mo. App. 190, 148 S. W. 203 (1912) (dictum);
In re Smith's Estate, 25 Wash. 539, 66 P. 93 (1901); Gleason v. Hawkins, 32 Wash.
464, 73 P. 533 (1903); Murphy v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 142, 84 P. 646 (1906);
Fuhrman v. Power, 43 Wash. 533, 86 P. 940 (1906); State ex rel. Speckart v.
Superior Court, 48 Wash. 141, 92 P. 942 (1907); Duvall v. Healy Lumber Co., 57
Wash. 446, 107 P. 357, 109 P. 505 (1910); In re Mason~s Estate, 95 Wash. 564, 164
P. 205 (1917); In re Peterson's Estate, 137 Wash. 137, 241 P. 964 (1926); Scott
v. Stanley, 149 Wash. 29, 270 P. I IO (1928) (dictum); In re Mundt's Estate, 169
Wash. 593, 14 P. (2d) 59 (1932) (dictum); In re Patrick's Estate, 195 Wash. 105,
79 P. (2d) 969 (1938); Scholl v. Adams, 206 Wis. 174, 239 N. W. 452 (1931)';
Estate of Koebel, 225 Wis. 342, 274 N. W. 262 (1937).
816
Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) §§ 15-1401 to 15-1405.
817
2 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 401 (1923).
See also comment, "Executors and Administrators-Comparison of Nonclaim Statutes
and the General Statutes of Limitations" 36 MicH. L. REv. 973 (1938).
818
N. D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943) § 30-1809.
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is that inheritance taxes remain a lien until paid, which is another way
of saying that the statute of limitations does not run against the state
on its claim for inheritance taxes. In some states this would compel an
entire administration proceeding in order to obtain an assessment of
inheritance taxes. Several states have statutes providing for the assessment and payment of taxes in a separate proceeding when no administration is had, or for a determination that none is due. Some statutes
now provide that the claim of the state for such taxes is barred after
the expiration of a stated period of time.319 Such special limitation
statutes are representative of a larger trend toward barring the state
in respect to certain claims affecting land and promoting marketability.
In some cases, however, these statutes of limitation bar the state only
with respect to property in the hands of purchasers. Irrespective of the
form of these statutes of limitation, they are intended primarily to
promote marketability of titles and in some instances to give repose
to the possession of the heirs.
2.

Right of heirs to collect assets

The problem of making collection of assets belonging to an estate
is the first concern of heirs where no administration is contemplated.
It is often said that when there are no debts, the heirs may take
possession of the estate without administration.320 An ability to make
819 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, Supp. 1944) p. 549, § 33 (seven years); Colo. Stat.
Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1945) c. 85, § 38 (fifteen years); D. C. Code (1940) § 47-~603
(ten years); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 198.22 (ten years); Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 14-404 (five years after state auditor notified of death); Ill. Ann. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1940) c. IZO, § 397 (five years after death as against purchaser); Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 6-2430 (ten years); Iowa Stat. (Reichmann, 1939)
§ 7311 (five years except as to certain classes of beneficiaries succeeding to the decedent's
estate); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 79-1529 (ten years); La. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) § 8587 (five years after opening of succession); Md. Ann.
Code (Flack, 1939) art. 81, § 121 (four years); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 291.14 (as
to real estate, ten years after decree of final distribution) ; Miss. Code Ann. ( 1942)
§. 9284 (three years); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 77-2037 (five years); N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 105-404 (twenty years); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
( 1 940) § 20- 1 13 ( six years after Si:ate Treasurer notified; seven years in case of
nonresident decedent); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Stipp. 1944) tit. 72, § 2443 (five
years after death as against purchaser); Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1941) §
1279 subdivision 7 (four years); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940)
§ 11201 as amended by Wash. Laws, 1945, c. 184, § I (ten years); Wyo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. ( Courtright, 193 I) § II 5-1 2 IO ( five years in case of resident decedents, but
limitation does not begin to run in case of nonresident until notice of death is filed
with Inheritance Tax Commissioner).
320 Johnson's Administrator v. Longmire, 39 Ala. 143 (1863); Walworth v. Abel,
52 Pa. 370 (1866); McLean's Executors v. Wade, 53 Pa. 146 (1866); Weaver
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an effective collection is an essential for a successful informal settle..:
ment. If the heirs are already in possession of the decedent's property
or can make a physical assembly of it, well and good; but when the
assets include property in the hands of or claims against third persons,
difficulties may be encountered. Immediately the question arises as to·
whether the heirs may successfully sue to recover specific property or
a debt from the third party. It will probably be agreed that such actions
should not be allowed as a matter of general policy unless all debts
have been paid or the estate is not subject to them. Suppose, however,
that it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that all debts have been
paid. May recovery be permitted? A negative answer has been given
in most cases 821 on the theory that the decedent's creditors, if any, are
not parties to the action and that the non-existence of debts can only be
judicially determined by an official administration. As was said in one
case, "One of the purposes of administration is the payment of the debts
of the deceased and the barring of claims against the estate. A mere
statement or affidavit that there are no such claims cannot establish that
fact. Such fact can only be judicially established by due course of administration." 822
Such decisions are predicated upon three implicit assumptions. First,
it is said that the heirs cannot know or prove with absolute certainty
whether the decedent was indebted or not. But absolute proof of a fact
is seldom, if ever, required. Why should it be required in actions of this
kind? Something less than absolute verity could well be accepted here.
Should it always be doubted that the decedent's family never know of
his financial affairs? In proceedings for the summary administration of
estates or for an order of "no administration" their word is accepted by
the probate court as a basis for action. Second, it is said that if payment
is required of a debtor or if payment is voluntarily made by him, he
would also be liable to a subsequently appointed administrator. This
v. Roth, 105 Pa. 408 (1884); Needham v. Gillett, 39 Mich. 574 {1878); Woodhouse v. Phelps, 51 Conn. 521 {1884); Vail v. Anderson, 61 Minn. 552, 64 N. W.
47 {1895); Richardson v. Cole, 160 Mo. 372, 61 S. W. 182 (1901); Moore v.
Brandenburg, 248 Ill. 232, 93 N. E. 733 (1910).
321
Sowle v. Potter, 223 Ky. 136, 3 S. W. (2d) 174 (1928); Brobst v. Brobst,
190 Mich. 63, 155 N. W. 734 (1916); Weis v. Kundert, 172 Minn. 274, 215N. W. 176 (1927); Champollion v. Corbin, 71 N. H. 78, 51 A. 674 (1901);
McBride v. Vance, 73 Ohio St. 258, 76 N. E. 938 (1906); Mears v. Smith, 19
S. D. 79, 102 N. W. 295 (1905); In re Collins' Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 P.
1016 (1918); McKenney v. Minahan, l 19 Wis. 651, 97 N. W. 489 (1903). In
general, see 2 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 200 (1923).
822
State ex rel. Mann v. Superior Court, 52 Wash. 149 at l 52, JOO P. 198
(1909).
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oft.:.repeated statement has just enough truth in it to justify caution in
allowing recovery or to justify a debtor in refusing pay~ent voluntarily. But it will be shown later that the actual cases do not support
this statement as a general proposition. If payment is made, courts will
go to unusual lengths to relieve the debtor from making a second payment. Third, it is assumed that the payment of money to the heirs will
result in its immediate dissipation by them and that recovery of it from
them by a subsequently appointed administrator would be impossible.
It is never assurr>:ed that the heirs might apply it to the payment of
claims;particularly to funeral expenses or other preferred claims. Insolvency or dishonesty on the part of heirs is too readily assumed. Why
not assume that money or property in their hands would be as safe there
as in the hands of the third person? These are the arguments advanced
to deny recovery by the heirs. They are not without some weight.
Their validity, however, as expressions of human conduct may be open
to some question as a basis for an absolute rule of law.
More courageous courts have seen fit to depart from this strict rule
and have permitted the heirs to show, by whatever evidenc~ available
to them, that there are no creditors with outstanding claims at the time
of trial or that the assets of the estate would not be subject thereto.
Recovery from debtors is permitted upon such proof.323 The functions
of a personal representative, if appointed, would be purely formal and
perfunctory, it is said, and would serve no useful purpose. Under such
circumstances the only office of administration would be to make distribution and this may be accomplished equally well in an action to
recover assets. Such a rule is found to be in particular favor in Alabama
and Mississippi where courts of equity have traditionally administered
estates.82~ Courts of other states, however, have not hesitated to allow
similar actions, even though not instituted in equity.
Even courts which ordinarily refuse recovery from debtors generally permit it under special circumstances. For example, recovery has
823
Cooper v. Davison, 86 Ala. 367, 5 S. 650 (1888); Braun v. Pettyjohn, 176
Ala. 592, 58 S. 907 (1912); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 Ark. 366,
209 S. W. 77 (1919); Business Men's Accident Assn. v. Green, 147 Ark. 199, 227
S. W. 388 (1921); Battey v.. Meyerhardt, 157 Ga. 800, 122 S. E. 195 (1924);
Moore v. Brandenburg, 248 Ill. 232, 93 N. E. 733 (1910) (lack of indebtedness admitted by demurrer); Merchants' Natl. Bank of Muncie v. McClellan, 40 Ind. App.
1, 80 N.E. 854 (1907); in general, see 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 201 (1923); 70 A.L.R. 386 at 389-393.
824
See cases from those states cited in note 323, supra. In Weiland v. Weiland,
297 111. App. 239, 17 N. E. (2d) 625 (1938) it was mentioned that although this
was originally the rule in equity it would be applied in law as well.
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been permitted when the decedent was a minor 325 or insane person 326
and presumably incapable of contracting debts. Occasional cases have
said that the non-existence of creditors will be presumed from the mere
lapse of time without administration having been had.221 Of course, the
lapse of time required by various statutes for the barring of claims when
no administration is sought, will serve equally well as a sufficient basis
for allowing recovery.828 Where a formal administration has proceeded
beyond the nonclaim period, recovery by the heirs has sometimes been
permitted.329 But this seems an unsound practice, for it has the effect of
a partial distribution in an official administration without satisfying the
ordinary requirements therefor. As long as administration has been
started, the better practice would seem to be to require its completion
before permitting final. or partial distribution by a process of a direct
collection by the heirs.
As a basis for denying recovery in a direct action by the heirs, the
argument is frequently made that the debtor might be called upon to
pay a personal representative who might be appointed subsequently.
This_ argument is employed not only by courts in formulating or applying a rule of policy, but it is also constantly reiterated by debtors of the
decedent who are requested by heirs to make voluntary payment to
them. The comment made by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on this
subject is pertinent here:

"If a presumption may be indulged that creditors are barred,
or if a reasonable time has elapsed since the death of decedent
325
Vanzant v. Morris, 25 Ala. 285 (1854); Graves v. Davenport, 45 Colo. 270,
100 P. 429 (1909); Lynch v. Rotan, 39 Ill. 14 {1865); McCleary v. Menke, 109
Ill. 294 {1884); Hargroves v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211 {1856) {two months old
child); Gobb v. Brown, 17 Speers {S. C. Eq.) 564 {1844). In Cobb v. Brown, supra,
it was said that this exception dispensing with administration on estates of deceased
infants may be going too far "because even infants may be liable for necessaries."
326
Drummond v. Hardaway, 21 Ga. 433 (1856).
827
Jones v. Brevard, 59 Ala. 499 (1877); Anderson v. Smith, 3 Met. {60 Ky.)
491 {1861) {twenty-eight years); Richardson v. Cole, 160 Mo. 372, 61 S. W. 182
(1901) {twelve years); McDowell v. Orphan School, 87 Mo. App. 386 (1901);
McLean's Executors v. Wade, 53 Pa. 146 (1866); Dixon v. Roessler, 76 S. C. 415,
57 S.E. 203 (1906); Duncan v. Veal, 49 Tex. 603 {1878) {fourteen years); Mott
v. Riddell, {Tex. 1880) 2 Posey, Unrep. Cas. 107; Hill v. Young, 7 Wash. 33, 34
P. 144 {1893) {eight years); Murphy v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 142, 84 P. 646 (1906);
State ex rel. Speckart v. Superior Court, 48 Wash. 141, 92 P. 942 (1907); Duvall
v. Healy Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 446, 107 P. 357, affd. on rehearing, 57 Wash. 452,
109 P. 305 (1910) {thirteen years); In re Peterson's Estate, 137 Wash. 137, 241
P. 964 (1926) {twenty-seven years).
828
See notes 289 to 319, inc., supra.
829
Powell v. Pennock, 181 Mich. 588, 148 N.W. 430 (1914).
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to give creditors a full opportunity to open on administration, .••
and they have failed to do ,so, a stranger, who is called to an account at the suit of the distributees, ought not to be permitted to
defeat a recovery, for the reason that there are or may be outstanding debts. A recovery by them does not cut off creditors or put
them in a worse predicament than they were before.... After so
·long a time, with no steps taken by the creditors to take out letters,
or otherwise move toward its collection, it would be inequitable to
permit . . . defendant to set up the right which this stale creditor
may or may not have, might or might not assert, to cut off the
right of the distributee." 330
However, where payment has been made voluntarily to the heirs,
where no creditors appear or demand administration, and where a personal representative is later appointed who brings an action on the debt,
courts have seldom hesitated to deny a second recovery. 831 For example, in Molendorp v. First National Bank of Sibley, a decedent by
his will left all of his estate to his wife. A son was later· appointed
administrator with the will annexed and sought recovery of a bank
deposit which had previously been paid to the widow, although ~he had
not taken out administration. There were ample funds in the estate
to pay all debts. In denying the right of the administrator to make a
second collection of the deposit from the bank, the court said:
"The one chief purpose of administration upon an estate is to
collect the assets, apply the same to the payment of all proper
charges and expenses, and turn the remainder over to the heirs or
legatees entitled thereto. For this purpose, it is true that the legal
title to the assets is in the administrator, and, in strict regularity,
one who is indebted to the estate should make payment to him;
but if, instead of so doing, the debtor, acting in good faith, should,
by mistake of law or fact, make payment directly to the person
who would be entitled to receive it through the administrator, and
the money is not needed or required by the administrator for the
payment of claims or expenses, the end of the law is accomplished,
and it would be little less than ridiculous to hold the debtor liable
to pay his debt over again . . .. The law requires no vain things.
330

Ricks v. Hilliard, 45 Miss. 359 at 363-364 (1871).
Van Meter v. Ill. Merchants Trust Co., 239 Ill. App. 618 (1926); Christe
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 104 Iowa 707, 74 N.W. 697 (1898); Molendorp v. First
National Bank of Sibley, 183 Iowa 174, 166 N.W. 733 (1918); Bell v. Farmers' &
Traders' Bank, 188 Mo. App. 383, 174 S.W. 196 (1915); Northern Trust Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 17, 196 A. 497 (1938); McKeigue v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 130 Wis. 543, uo N.W. 384, II L.R.A.(N.S.) 148 (1907).
331
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When the deposit was paid to the widow, the money reached the
hands of her who was vested with the ultimate right to receive it;
and, as no part of it was required to meet or defay the needs of
administration, no one was in any manner injured or wronged by
the 'short circuiting' of the deposit from the bank to the widow,instead of passing it through the hands of the administrator." 382
The risk entailed in paying out money to those persons apparently
entitled to it can be reduced to a minimum by applying it or by seeing
that it is applied to the payment of funeral expenses and other preferred
claims. If a personal representative is subsequently appointed, the
debtor is subrogated to the right of the preferred claimant to whom the
payment has been made and thus freed from any further liability to
the estate.838 Thus in Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co.,
a decedent left $355 on deposit in a Chicago bank. At the instance of a
sister the deposit was applied in payment of the funeral expenses
amounting to some $367. Subsequently the public administrator applied for and was granted letters and attempted to make a second
collection of the deposit. In denying recovery and saying that admin- istration should not be granted merely for the sake of administration,
the court said: 334
"It is stated in defendant's brief that it is a long-established
and well-known custom among Chicago banks generally voluntarily to pay over, without administration, small balances to either
the undertaker or heirs of depositors reported dead upon being
furnished with proper affidavit, inheritance tax release, receipted
funeral bills, and an undertaker's assignment. Such a custom, especially where the heirs consent, would seem to be desirable and
commendable and should not be disturbed by officious intermeddling for the sake of possible administration fees."
In small estates also where there are but a few debts owing to a
decedent and these small in amount, the practice of requiring formal
administration seems an unnecessary burden imposed upon the decedent's family. Ordinarily, such debts include nothing more than small
bank accounts, wage or insurance claims, all of which would ordinarily
not be more than sufficient to pay funeral expenses and perhaps a small
family allowance. Often they are less than the amount to which the
surviving family is entitled as exempt property.
882

183 Iowa 174 at 176, 166 N.W. 733 (1918).
Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 239 Ill. App. 618 (1926); Goldsmith v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 156 Misc. 889, 282 N.Y.S. 783 (1935).
884
239 Ill. App. 618 at 622 (1926).
888
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Under such. circumstances, methods should be available to permit
collection of these assets by the surviving family or other relatives,
irrespective of the existence of debts against the estate. Administration
could only decrease the net amount available to them and prolong the
time of its realization. An historical survey of existing legislation reveals that numerous statutes have been passed, particularly during the
last decade, authorizing the payment of small bank: accounts,835 wage
claims,886 savings and loan shares 887 and proceeds of insurance policies sss to designated surviving members of the decedent's family. These
statutes vary considerably in the kind of debts and property to which
they apply and the amount or value which they permit to be paid without administration. All of them represent wholesome legislation although the maximum amounts of money provided in many of them are
often appallingly small. For example, the amount of wages which may
be paid to a surviving widow under such a statute must not exceed
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 51-515 ($500); Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering,
1944) § 630.5 ($500); Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4970 as amended by Supp. 1943,
§ 671g ($500); Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3846 ($75); Ga. Code Ann. (Park, Supp.
1943) § 13-2048 ($600); Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-1406 ($300);
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 6-1515 ($100); Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie,
Supp. 1944) c. 167, § 31A ($500 in bank liquidations); Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
§ 5205 ($300); N. J. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 3:7-8 ($200); N. M. Stat. Ann. {Supp.
1945) § 33-1307 ($300); N. Y. Banking Law (McKinney, 1942) art. 6, § 239(4)
($500); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 40-1004 ($500); Utah Code Ann. (1943)
§ 7-3-49 ($300); Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 4149(34) ($300); Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1943) §§ 3249-1 and 3249-2 ($500).
336
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 7, § 666 ($100); Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §
38-2003 ($300); Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § 630 ($1,000); Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4970 as amended by Supp. 1943, § 671g ($500); Del. Rev.
Code (1935) § 3845 ($75); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 222~15 and 222.16 (any
wages and traveling expenses, up to $300); Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) § 66-103
($300); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 6-1514 ($150); Minn. Stat. (1941)
§ 181.58 ($200); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 653 to 656 ($300); N. J. Stat. Ann.
(i937) § 3:7-8 ($200); N. M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) §§ 33-1305 and 33-1306
($200); N. Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 103-a ($150); N. D. Rev.
Code Ann. (1943) § 34-0112 ($400); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1943)
§ 10509-5a ($150); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1943) §§ 91-1005, 102-607a
($200); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 867 ($150); Utah Code Ann.
(Supp. 1945) § 102-8-3 ($300); Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5278a1 ($300);
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940) §§ 1464-1, 1464-2 ($300); Wis.
Stat. (1943) § 103.39 (any amount).
337
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4970; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1943)
§§ 41-614 to 41-616.
888
Conn. Gen. Stat.· (1930) § 4970 ($500); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick,
Supp. 1943) § 40-258 ($1,000); N. D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943) § 65-0527 ($So
workmens' compensation insurance); Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 102-8-3
($300).
835
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I

$75 in Delaware, $mo in Alabama, and $r50 in Indiana, New York,
Ohio and Pennsylvania. The Connecticut statute is more liberal, allowing up to $ 500, and the Wisconsin statute does not limit the amount.
Corresponding variations exist in the amounts of bank deposits thus
payable.
The singling out of particular kinds of property or debts for allowing payment direct to the heirs seems an unsound practice. Much of
it appears to be banking or employer legislation, rather than probate
legislation. A better method is not to restrict the payment of such
claims to a particular type of property such as bank deposits or wages,
but to permit the payment, delivery or transfer of any kind of debt
or property where the total amount of the estate does not exceed a
stated sum. This has been done in California,339 Florida,340 Illinois,341
Montana 3¼ 2 New Jersey 343 North Carolina 344 South Carolina 845 and
' In New Jersey,
' however, the amount
'
Virginia.346
thus payable must
not exceed $200. A more liberal sum is allowed in California and
Illinois where a maximum of $ I ,ooo may be paid, transferred or delivered. The sum thus payable under the California statute is not considered exempt property, however. It is payable to a surviving spouse
or other relative as a temporary expedient with the expectation that it
will be applied to the payment of funeral expenses and used as a kind
of family allowance If administration is later granted, then the person
receiving such funds must account for them to the personal representative. In Brezzo v. Brangero,341 the California Court of Appeals said that
such collection does not give a surviving spouse title to the fund but
that "the purpose of legislation ... was to provide the family of the
deceased with temporary funds for such immediate necessities as funeral
expenses, and perhaps to provide ready money for their support pending the probate of their estate. This being so, the husband ... was enCal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 630, 631, 631.1 ($1,000).
(Supp. 1945) §§ 735.01 to 735.09 ($2,000).
341
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941 and Supp. 1945) c. 3, §§ 478, 481, 482
($1,000).
342
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10012 ($500).
343
N. J. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 3:7-8 ($200).
344
N. C. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-68 ($300).
m S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 9028 ($500).
848
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 6143a ($500).
347
51 Cal. App. 79 at 81, 196 P. 87 (1921). The Washington statute is explicit
on this point. See Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1943) §§ 3249-1 and
3249-2.
339
34

°Fla. Stat. Ann.
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titled to withdraw the funds from the bank, but this did not give the
husband title to the fund, that is to say, it was not intended by the
provisions of the section that the fund should become the-property of
the husband." On the contrary, it must be accounted for or paid over
to the personal representative, if one is later appointed. It seems probable, however, that in the great majority of small estates no administration would later be granted and that the collection and application
of the money by the surviving spouse or other relative .would never be
questioned or disturbec;l.
The procedure contemplated by the statutes of California, Illinois
and New Jersey is for some member of the family to present an affidavit to the debtor to the effect that the total amount of the decedent's
estate does not exceed the statutory amount. The debtor is thereupon
entitled to accept and rely upon the facts stated in the affidavit. This
appears to be a highly desirable way of permitting the collection of
small estates without resort to some judicial procedure. It provides a
simple and inexpensive method of administration for a small estate,
and at the same time it provides adequate and complete protection to a
debtor who is willing to make payment. The Illinois act, said Professor Freund at the time of its enactment in r 92 7, "legalizes a practice
which it is understood has in the past been indulged in to some extent
by institutions at their own risk." 848
These statutes vary in another respect. Some are obligatory upon
the debtor while others are only permissive. The Indiana statutes, for
example, provide that "It shall be lawful for any employer" to pay
wages or earnings owing to a decedent to the surviving spouse, children
over the age of eighteen years, or certain other relatives. It is further
provided that "The payment of such wages or personal earnings shall
be a full discharge and release to the employer." Corresponding provisions exist for the payment of bank deposits. Such statutes are to be contrasted with the Illinois statutes which provide that "Upon receiving
an affidavit that a resident of this state died leaving personal estate not
exceeding one thousand dollars in value, that no letters are then outstanding on the estate in this state, that no petition for letters on the
estate is pending in this state, that all funeral expenses of the decedent
have been paid, that thirty days have elapsed since the death of the
decedent and that the a:ffiant has knowledge of the facts, any person
or corporation indebted to or holding personal estate of the decedent
848 Freund, "The Product of the Fifty Fifth General Assembly," 22 ILL L.
REv. 473 at 475 (1928).
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may pay the indebtedness or deliver the personal estate" to certain
designated members of the decedent's family. This statute, standing
alone, is purely voluntary as is the Indiana statute. A companion Illinois statute provides, however, that if such person or corporation to
whom the affidavit is delivered refuses to pay, deliver or transfer the
personal estate, "it may be recovered in- a civil action by or on behalf
of the person entitled to receive it upon proof of the facts required to
be stated in the affidavit." lt is also provided that "For the purpose of
the action the affidavit is prima facie proof of the facts stated therein."
Such a statute has the advantage of permitting a recovery of property
without taking out administration where the heirs are actually entitled
to it. It is not only permissive in character, but it also permits direct
action to be brought to recover money or property where the amount
is sufficiently small as not to justify formal administration. Whether
payment or delivery is made by the third party voluntarily or pursuant
to a judgment rendered in an action by the heirs, such third party is
adequately protected and becomes fully discharged of his obligation to
the estate of the decedent. Whether the estate actually exceeds the
statutory amount does not affect the debtor's discharge. He is entitled
to rely upon and have the benefit of the recitals contained in the affidavit. Similar provisions of this latter kind exist also in the California
and New Jersey statutes. Another desirable feature of the Illinois statute is that it requires a thirty-day waiting period before such payment
or delivery may be made. If there are outstanding creditors and the
family has not applied for administration, the creditors would doubtless
have taken action by this time. Such a requirement operates as a practical protection to creditors by affording them a reasonable opportunity
to apply for administration during this period.
A further difference in these statutes authorizing the collection of
wages, bank deposits and the like, concerns the stated maximum. In
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey, the entire
estate, including the bank deposits, wages and all other property must
not, in the aggregate, exceed the amount specified in the statute. On
the other hand, the statutes of Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Utah and Washington treat each item separately.
As a result, it is possible in any of these latter· states for the family of
the decedent to collect bank deposits, wages, insurance and building
and loan shares each in the maximum amount stated in the statute. This
selection of different kinds of property as a basis for allowing recovery
by the heirs seems unjustified in view of the primary purpose of these
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statutes. The total amount of the estate, not the separate amounts of
different kinds of property, should be the basis for their application.

3. Distribution of residue
Assuming that neither heirs nor creditors have demanded administration or that they have been successfully resisted, and that the heirs
have been able to make a full collection of all assets belonging to -the
estate, the next question concerns the efficacy of distribution and partition of the assets of the estate among the heirs. With the property in
their possession there might seem to be no obstacle to its distribution
as long as all of the parties in interest are sui juris and have reached
an agreement as to its division. So long as no one is adversely affected
by such a family settlement, such a procedure is a commendable oiie.
It relieves the burden of the courts, it promotes good feeling among
the heirs, and it returns property to commerce sooner than would ordinarily be possible by the processes of an administration proceeding.
The solution of the problem, however, is not always possible or as
simple as above stated. As indicated, three conditions must exist: the
absence of creditors with existing claims, the legal capacity of all heirs
who are entitled to share in the estate, and their agreement as to how
the property is to be distributed. It is assumed that there is a participation by all heirs and that no question exists as to their identity or relationship. Only in relatively rare causes 849 is there likely to be any difficulty as to who is entitled to the estate under the statute of descent and
distribution, or under any agreement which the parties may enter into.
It is entirely possible also that the nature of the property interests involved is so complex, or the rights of the parties ·so various, that a division may be ·impracticable if an attempt is made to distribute according
to the statute; but, of course, there is nb requirement that they make
division in that precise manner.. Any agreement among the heirs, fairly
entered into, will be given full effect as between all persons bound by
it. Any attempt by an heir to withdraw or repudiate such an agreement
by seeking the appointment of a personal representative will ordinarily
meet with failure. 850 To permit an administrator so appointed to recover
849
See, for example, Bennett v. Morris, II I Ill. App. I 50 ( I 903), where an
agreement between the widow and heirs to distribute the estate became impossible to
carry out and the court thereupon granted administration and ordered distribution made
as though no such agreement had been made.
859 Richardson v. Cole, 160 Mo. 372, 61 S. W. 182 (1901); Estes v. Estes, (Mo.
1942) 166 S.W. (2d) 1061. In general, see 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw OF ADMINISTRATION, _3d ed., 663 (1923).
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property from the heirs, only to redistribute it to them later, would be
utterly futile.

4. Effectiveness of distribution as conferring marketable title
Another aspect of this problem arises when the assets of the estate
consist of land, registered securities or other property the title to which
is registered. The heirs may be in perfect accord as to its division and
distribution. They may even make division and distribution among
themselves. In this connection two matters need consideration, one
presently, the other prospectively. For registered securities or other
similar property immediate transfer will usually be desired. The heirs
will ordinarily have physical possession of such securities or property
but the transfer agent or public officer must be satisfied of the validity
and effectiveness of such a family settlement to justify his transfer to
those persons entitled to succeed to their ownership This means compliance with the three conditions already enumerated: An examination of
existing legislation discloses several statutes, most of them recently enacted, designed to provide. for the transfer of such registered property
without the necessity of formal administration.
As to registered securities and stock in a corporation, the statutes of
California 851 and Illinois 11~ 2 are specific in authorizing their transfer
upon the furnishing to the corporation or transfer agent of an affidavit
of the same kind as is required for the payment of money or the delivery of property where no administration has been had. This would
probably also be true under the New Jersey statutes,8 68 although it is
not explicitly declared. In the absence of such legislation, there are
those occasional instances in which corporations or transfer agents do
make transfers of registered securities and stock upon evidence satisfactory to them that the transferee is entitled thereto and that there is no
outstanding indebtedness.
As to automobiles for which certificates of title are now generally
issued, a similar problem is presented. The public official, whose duty
it is to issue a new certificate of title in place of the old one issued in
the name of the decedent, ordinarily relies upon an order of transfer or
decree of distribution made by the probate court having jurisdiction
over the decedent's estate. In the absence of administration the transfer
of the family car involves much the same problem as payment of wages
or bank deposits. Within the past decade statutes have been adopted in
851

Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 630, 631, 631.1.
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941 and Supp. 1945) c. 3, §§ 478, 481, 482.
868
N.J. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 3:7-8.
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California m Maryland 355 Michigan 856 Montana 357 Utah 858 Vir
' Wyoming 860' authorizing the
' transfer of' a registered
' titleginia 359 and
to motor vehicles when their value is less than a stated amount, upon
presentation of an affidavit showing the value of the estate left by the
decedent and the right of the person seeking the transfer.861
As to, land, the heirs may make immediate partition or division
among themselves by an exchange of deeds. There is no transfer agent
or public officer to question the validity of such a procedure. And the
respective heirs may continue to possess and enjoy the property so
allotted to them. Only upon a future sale by the heirs to some third
party will the subject of the validity of the family settlement be presented. This future purchaser will want to know that the land is not
subject to claims against the decedent and that those who participated
in the settlement constituted all the heirs of the decedent. In some few
states the bar of creditors may not be possible in the absence of administration, but statutes of the kind already discussed 862 may be determinative of the question.
As earlier indicated, a separate determination and assessment of
inheritance taxes may be had in most states where no official administration is had. Such proceedings will afford the basis for a clearance of the
state's lien. And in a substantial number of states there are statutes 868
which bar the state in the assertion of its tax lien after the lapse of a
period of time without administration and without any action having
been taken by the state to make collection.
The determination of heirship alone remains. In some states there
is an official and conclusive determination of heirship in an administram Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1943) § 185 ($1,000).
855

Md. Ann. Code (Flack, Supp. 1943) art. 93, § 243A, as amended by Md.
Laws, 1945, c. 35. By art. 93, § 243B, added by Md. Laws, 1945, c. 466, the certificate of registration of a boat or vessel not exceeding $ 500 in value may likewise
be transferred.
866
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 9,1474- ($500).
357
Mont. Laws, 1943, c. 148, § 2(e) ($1,000).
858
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 57-3a-70 ($1,000).
359
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1944) § 2154(74) (f) (when automobile is
only personal property belonging to decedent and his debts have been paid or will be
paid out of proceeds of sale of motor vehicle).
860
Wyo. Laws, 1945, c. II2 (when there is no other property necessitating administration and there are no unpaid debts; and after creditors have been given twenty
days' notice) .
861
In general see comment:·"A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration," 48 YALE L. J. 1238 (1939).
862
See notes 289 to 319, supra.
868
See note 3 19, supra.
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tion proceeding.m Elsewhere, where the land passes directly to the
heirs and the personal representative obtains no jurisdiction over it unless needed for the payment of debts, an affidavit is employed or the
heirship is inferred from the record or from recitals in a conveyance
from the heirs. 865 The absence of administration does not affect the
problem of determining heirship except in those states where there is an
official determination of heirship in connection with the administration
proceeding or as a part of the decree of final distribution. And, of
course, where it is inferred in some manner from the record in the administration proceedings, some substitute is needed when no administration is had.
Where an affidavit or a recital in a deed from the heirs is customarily employed to prove heirship and is accepted as a basis for marketable title, the same procedure should be followed where no administration has been had. But when a. decree of heirship in an administration
proceeding is customarily relied on, obviously some substitute for it
will be necessary here. In several states statutes 866 have accordingly
been passed providing for a summary determination of heirship where
there has been no administration proceeding. Some of these statutes
purport to make the determination conclusive in the same manner as a
similar decree made in connection with an administration proceeding.
Usually, however, decrees of heirship have only prima facie effect as
to their correctness. Despite this shortcoming, they do have some value
and are readily accepted as evidence of heirship by title examiners.
Special statutes have been enacted in Idaho,867 Nebraska 368 and
364
3 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., § 561 (1923);
3 BANCROFTS PROBATE PRACTICE, § 1147 (1928).
365
PATTON, LAND TITLES, § 288 (1938).
366
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935 and Supp. 1944) c. 176, §§ 28-34; Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1941) § 734.25; Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) §§ 15-1401 to
15-1405; Ill. Ann. Stat. {Smith-Hurd, 19,.p) c. 3, §§ 209-210; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, Supp. 1943) §§ 59-2250 to 59-2252; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 27.3178
(145) to 27.3178(149); Minn. Stat. (1941) §§ 525.31, 525.311, 525.312; Miss.
Code Ann. (1942) §§ 1270-1272; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 30-1701 to
30-1708; N. J. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§ 3:4-1 to 3:4-3; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941)
§§ 33-1213 to 33-1218; N. Y. Surrogate's Court Act {Cahill, 1937) §§ 311 to 313;
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 30-2201 to 30-2213; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 84,
§§ 251-261; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. {Vernon, 1939) arts. 3590 to 3597a; Utah Code
Ann. (1943) §§ 102-12-34 to 102-12-35; W. Va. Code Ann. {Michie, 1943) §
4088; Wis. Stat. (1943) §§ 237.09, 315.02-315.06; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 88-4101 to 88-4103, as amended, Laws, 1945, c. 79.
367
Idaho Laws. Ann. (Anderson, 1943) §§ 15-1401 to 15-1405.
368
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 30-1705 to 30-1708.
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New Mexico 369 providing that where a certain period has elapsed since
the death of a person owning real property in such state, and upon
whose estate no administration has been had or applied for, the heirs of
the decedent or other person having an interest in said real property,
may file a petition in the probate court and ask for a determination of
heirship. After notice by publication, the court makes an official determination of heirship which has the same effect as a decree of final distribution in those states where such a decree is regarded as having full
effect with respect to the decedent's property. Under the Idaho statute, if a creditor appears and presents a claim, then the court must grant
administration in the usual manner; otherwise the decree of heirship
is final. Under the Nebraska and New Mexico statutes, however, no
such permission is given for creditors to present their claims, for the
reason that their claims, insofar as land of the decedent is concerned,
have ceased to be a lien thereon. Since there is no such statute in Idaho
barring claims after the lapse of two years when there has been no
administration, it is only proper that creditors be given the right to
present their claims in connection with such a proceeding and ask for
administration in the usual manner. Being afforded such an opportunity, creditors are not deprived of_any right without due process of law.

E. Dispensing with Ancillary Administration 870
I

When a decedent dies owning property in states other than that
of his domicile, it is conceivable that one administration upon his estate
would suffice. The domiciliary representative would need powers to
collect assets throughout all the states; and local creditors in each state
would be required to come to the state of domicile where administration
is being had to present their claims. The law has not developed in this
fashion, however. The orthodox view is that, in the absence of statute,
the powers of a personal representative cease at the borders of the state
which appointed him. And other states in which the decedent's property may be located have sometimes insisted on local administration in
order to simplify the problem for the decedent's creditors residing
there. The phenomenon of ancillary administration has resulted.
Assuming that domiciliary administration is had on the estate of a
N.M.Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 33-1213 to 33-1218.
an extended consideration and analysis of the problems here considered
from the point of view of conflict of laws, two studies should be mentioned: Buchanan
and Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v.
Maine," 48 HARV. L. REV. 9u (1935); Hopkins, "Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedents' Intangibles," 28 lowA L. REV. 422 (1943).
369

°For
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decedent, to what extent may the requirements of administration be dispensed with in a second state in which assets are located? The answer
to this question will depend on two factors: (I) how far the second
state will give recognition to the appointment and powers of the personal representative of the' state of domicile; and (2) to what degree
and for what duration it desires to protect local creditors by making
assets located there available to their claims.
If a personal representative ~ould make physical collection of assets
located in states other than that of his appointment, administration
would then, as a practical matter, be confined to that state. This is a
practical possibility only if debtors and persons in another jurisdiction
are willing to make payment, or deliver property voluntarily to the
personal representative, or are under a legal obligation to do so. The
conflict of laws rules of such jurisdiction thus become the determining
factor in the solution of the whole problem of dispensing with ancillary
administration.
If the domiciliary representative be regarded as succeeding to the
"title" to all property of the decedent, irrespective of its location, it
would seem to follow that extraterritorial recognition should be given
to his rights and powers. Unification of administration on decedents'
estates would be the rule rather than the exception. Opposing this view
is the theory which confines the official personality of the personal representative to the state of his appointment: Multiplication of administrations is the result of this latter view. Despite the existence of both
of these theories it would be untrue to say that any state recognizes one
to the complete exclusion of the other. Often both theories have undergone a measure of contemporaneous development in the same jurisdiction.
As will be shown in the discussion that follows, the protection of
local creditors has been the primary argument for denying to foreign
domiciliary representatives the right to collect assets or to maintain an
action therefor. This alleged reason of policy, it is submitted, has little
or no basis in fact in the great majority of estates. The resulting requirement of ancillary administration leads only to a wasteful expenditure of time, effort and expense. It is time to re-examine the question
whether the alternative of requiring all creditors to file their claims in
the domiciliary administration would not be a more desirable solution
from every point of view.
Despite the risks involved in making payments or delivering property to foreign domiciliary personal representatives in the absence of
· statutory authority, the fact is that many debtors and persons having
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possession of property take such risks and make payments or deliver
property to the foreign administrator. It is seldom that such persons
are called upon to account. again to a local administrator. The problem
involved is similar to that which arises when a debtor of a decedent
makes payment direct to the heirs when no personal representative has
b.een appointed and administration is not contemplated.
I.

Voluntary payment to_ foreign personal representatives

Behind such cases as Crohn v. Clay County State Bank,371 in which
a Missouri debtor was held not discharged in making voluntary payment to an Iowa administrator, lies a policy of protecting local creditors. Such a result is often explained by saying that the legal personality of the administrator does not extend beyond the borders of the
state from which he derives his authority. While there is a logical basis
for such a view, the alleged protection of local creditors is more often
a myth than a reality. An early decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Wilkins v. Ellett,312 gave momentum to a contrary view
when it held that voluntary payment by a debtor to a foreign administrator was a valid discharge of the debt. Reference was made in the
opinion to the doctrine of mobilia seqttuntur personam. This timeworn
rule, so often of late disregarded in matters of taxation, was thought to
be socially serviceable in that situation. Fortunately this decision has
influenced others and today its rule serves as the controlling guide in
· most states.378
It should be said, however, that most of the decisions which have
upheld voluntary payments to a foreign administrator .have been those
in which creditors did not exist or did not assert their rights in the state
where payment was being made. When creditors do exist or when an
ancillary personal representative has been appointed, it may be arguable
that a contrary decision would be justified. In either of these events,
two other inquiries become pertinent. First, the existence of local creditors may not be known to the debtor; indeed, it is often said that local
administration is a prerequisite to the determination of the existence or
absence of creditors. Second, the appointment of a local ancill_ary
administrator may not be known, especially since the venue for administration on the estate of a nonresident decedent may be the result of
371

137 Mo. App. 712, II8 S. W. 498 (1909).
9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 740 (1869).
373
3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws 1472 (1935); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
2d ed., § 183 (1938); Beale, "Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Administrator," 42
HARv. L. REv. 597 (1929).
372
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a wide choice on the part of those applying for it.374 The New York
Court of Appeals remarked in one case 375 that to require that there be
no local administrator as a prerequisite for discharging a debtor who
made voluntary payment to a foreign personal representative would,
in effect, require the debtor to examine the records of every surrogate's
office in the state. Such a rule, it was most appropriately said; would be
exceedingly burdensome to debtors and seriously interfere with the
collection of debts. The Conflict of Laws Restatement 316 has adopted
the pronouncement of the New York court by making the lack of
knowledge on the part of the debtor of the appointment of a local personal representative the sole condition for his discharge. But while
voluntary payments made to a foreign personal representative have
in some instances been recognized as a valid discharge of the debtor's
obligation if he has received no notice of the appointment of an ancillary representative,877 some states are willing to give an acquittance to
the debtor only in the event that no ancillary representative has in
fact been appointed,878 and still others only in the event that an ancillary representative is not appointed later.879
In a few states 880 legislation expressly provides that local debtors .
may pay debts to a decedent's personal representative in another state
if they have no knowledge of local administration proceedings. Of this
legislation~ the Ohio and Rhode Island statutes permit payment at
See Basye, "The Venue of Probate and Administration Proceedings," 43
M1cH. L. REv. 471 at 477 et seq. (1944).
375
Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 382, 68 N.E. 658 (1903).
876
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, § 482 (1934).
377
Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903); Compton's Administrator v. Borderline Coal Co., 179 Ky. 695, 201 S.W. 20 (1918). See
also Mersch, "Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator," l 8 GEo. L. J. 130
(1930), and statutes cited in note 389, post.
378
Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S. W. 772 (1922);
Union Trust Co. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 Cal. App. 64, 159 P. 820 (1916);
Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 370 (1878); Cameron v. Riggs National Bank, (D.C.D.C.
1943) 53 F. Supp. 56 (after one year); McNamara v. McNamara, Q2 Ga. 200
(1879); In re Williams' Estate, 130 Iowa 553, 107 N. W. 608 (1906); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Williams, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 303, 105 S. W. 952 (1907); Citizens' Nat.
Bank v. Sharp, 53 Md. 521 (1880); Morrison v. Berkshii:e Loan & Trust Co. 229
Mass. 519,118 N. E. 895 (1918); Reynolds v.·McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N. W.
41 (1885); Dexter v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 78 N. W. 1111 (1899); Willard v.
Hammond, 21 N. H. 382 (1850); Gray's Appeals, 116 Pa. 256, II A. 66 (1887).
379
Crohn v. Clay County State Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, 118 S. W. 498 (1909);
Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.) 55 (1855).
.
880
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 416; Ohio Gen. Code Ann •.
(Page, 1937) § 10511-3; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 19-302; R. I. Gen.
Laws (1938) c. 575, § 26; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5349a.
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any time; the Oregon statute requires thirty days notice to the state
treasurer; and- the Virginia statute authorizes such a procedure only
after ninety days from the death of the decedent, unless the amount
is more than $ I ,ooo, in which event public notice for f~ur weeks is
required followed by an additional thirty days before making such payment. In the Illinois statute provision is made for the debtor to rely
upon an affidavit ~rnished by the foreign personal representative that
he has no knowledge of any letters issued in that state.
This rule is also contained in the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act in which it is provided 381 that, in the absence of local
administration or application therefor, a foreign personal representative
may exercise all powers which would exist in favor of a local personal
representative. Payment by the debtor is clearly obligatory and his·
acquittance, upon payment, .is equally certain. The debtor is thus
relieved of any uncertainty as to the effect of payment by him under
such circumstances. Another section 882 of this act expressly provides
that no person who, before receiving actual notice of local administration or application therefor, shall be prejudiced if he makes payment
to- the foreign representative, although local proceedings have been
begun or applied for. Simplification and unification of administration
on decedents' estates are thus rendered possible.
A larger number of statutes 383 authorize such payments only if no
administration has in fact been commenced. In most instances authenti- ·
cated copies of domiciliary letters must be filed in local probate courts
or furnished to the debtor. The Alabama statute permits such payments
381

Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, § 2.
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, § 5.
383 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 141 (after sixty days); Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1945) § 734.30 (after three months); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943)
§ 59-1707; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141, § 82 (after six months and no objection by
local creditors); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 622; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 272
(after six months notice and payment to any local creditors who may appear and file
claims) and§ 6024 (insurance proceeds); N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 353, §§ 28, 29
(after notice to residents and authorization by local probate court after expiration of six
months after death); N.J. Stat. Ann (1937) § 3:14-1; Pa. Stat. Ann. {Purdon, Supp.
194-4) tit. 20, § 995 {upon filing an affidavit by the foreign personal representative with
the register of wills that decedent is not indebted to any person in Pennsylvania and
that the receipt is not made for the purpose of removing assets beyond the reach of
Pennsylvania creditors); S.C. Code Ann. (1942) § 8955; Tenn. Code Ann. {Michie,
1938) § 1288; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 6719 (as to bank deposits only, but by§ 2726
the tax commission must be notified, which will in turn, notify the bank whether any
personal representative has been appointed in Vermont); Wis. Stat. (1943) § 287.16
(upon filing certified copy of appointment _in Wisconsin).
382
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only after sixty days, the Oregon statute after ninety days, and the
Maine statute after six months. The Vermont statute is unnecessarily
narrow in confining its application to bank deposits. Notice to local
creditors or other interested persons is required in Maine and New
Hampshire; and in Maine the foreign personal representative must
obtain permission from the local probate court to entitle him to receive
such payment.
2.

Actions by foreign personal representatives

One might expect to find that the right of foreign personal representatives to enforce payment of debts due tp.eir decedents would follow
this same pattern as in the cases of voluntary payment by debtors.
While it might be agreed that the foreign personal representative had
such title to his decedent's property as to entitle him to give a valid
receipt for voluntary payment oy the debtor, it is another thing to say
that he may sue to enforce payment in the courts of another state. In
its early stages the law developed the rule that a personal representative could not maintain an action outside the state of his appointment
in the absence of statutory permission.384 It is still generally accepted
that a personal representative is an officer only in the jurisdiction of
the court which appointed him, although he has authority extending
throughout the state. He has no authority outside the borders of that
state by virtue of his appointment there. Consequently, unless a statute
of the debtor's state authorizes actions by foreign personal representatives, the domiciliary representative is powerless to enforce collection
and ancillary administration may be a necessary consequence.
Over a period of years, however, states have gradually opened
their doors and given permission to a foreign personal representative
to sue in the local courts.885 The general tenor of legislation on this
subject is to grant power to foreign representatives to maintain actions
384

3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 507.1 (1935).
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 151; Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §1309;
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935 and Supp. 1944) c. 176, §§ 141, 142; Del. Rev.
Code (1935) § 3868; D. C. Code (1940) tit. 20, § 505; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1945) § 734.30; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) §§ II3-2401 to n3-2404; Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 419; Ind. Stat: Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-908;
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1708; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944)
§ 395.170; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141, § 82; Minn. Stat. (1941) § 573.05; Miss.
Code Ann. (1942) § 622; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 30-807; N. J. Stat. Ann.
(1937) § 3:13-7; N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-209; Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
(Page, 1937) § 10509-165; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 262; R. I. Gen. Laws
(1938) c. 575, § 27; S. D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.II03; Wis. Stat. (1943)
§ 287.16.
885
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in much the same manner as local representatives are authorized to do.
The recent Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act,886 authorizing such actions in the absence of local administration or application
therefor, should give added impetus to this desirable method of procedure. A needless administration is thus dispensed with in many cases
where the only function of a personal representative is to enforce payment of a debt. Unless there are local creditors whose interests also
deserve local protection, there is no reason why a foreign personal representative should not be allowed to enforce such payment.
If it is thought that this does not afford adequate protection to local
creditors, it may be said that they are or should be afforded ample time
either before or during the pendancy of such actions to apply for letters
and thus make sure that they may receive payment through local administration. If local credit9rs do not take advantage of their right to
apply for administration within a reasonable time after death, no valid
objection should be raised against the maintenance of actions by the
domiciliary representative. If statutes have barred the rights of creditors when no local administration has been applied for or granted
within a reasonable time, this right to sue would seem to follow. However, no specific statute to this effect has been noted. Since only the
rights of local creditors to local enforcement of their claims is inv0lved
and not a liability to complete extinction,387 the period allowed to local
creditors to apply for administration should be quite short, say sixty or
ninety days. This would give a reasonable amount of protection to
local creditors and at the same time obviate the requirement of needless
administration. A few of the statutes noted above 888 attempt to secure
a measure of convenience to local creditors. Thus, Alabama permits
local creditors or distributees to intervene; Colorado, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, and Kentucky require a bond for the protection
of local creditors; and Illinois requires the substitution of a local personal representative if one should be appointed pending the action.
Actions by a foreign personal representative are not permitted in
Florida prior to the expiration of three months, nor in Rhode Island
prior to the expiration of six months after the decedent's death. This
much of an opportunity is afforded to local creditors to institute ancillary administration or otherwise obtain local enforcement of their
claims.
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, §§ 2, 3.
The state of domicile must entertain the presentation of claims by all creditors
irrespective of their residence. The Federal Constitution requires this. Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S. Ct. 165 (1898).
388
See statutes cited in note 38 5, supra.
886
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If actions by foreign representatives are not permitted, the recovery of assets may be possible by assigning the debt or other interest in
property to a third party who may then institute an action in his own
name and in his·own right. In a majority of states where the question
has been directly presented, such actions have been permitted.389

3. Transfer of mercantile specialties
Much the same considerations apply to the transfer of stock or
other registered securities by corporations in a state other than that of
the decedent's domicile. The traditional view has been to treat shares
of stock as having a situs at the domicile of the corporation so as to require administration there. 390 Opposing this is the mercantile theory
which treats the attributes of ownership of stock certificates and similar
instruments which pass by endorsement or delivery as having the same
situs as the instruments themselves, and which places the power of the
domiciliary representative to transfer the stock on the same basis as
other chattels physically located at the decedent's domicile. 391 Thus
transfers of stock certificates by a domiciliary representative, supported
by appropriate documents showing authority to make such transfers,
are entitled to recognition in other states. The elimination of numerous
ancillary administrations would follow as a matter of course from this
theory. In an attempt to simplify to this extent the problem of administering estates, several states have passed statutes 392 which specifically
authorize corporations to make transfers of stocks and registered bonds
from the domiciliary representative in the absence of ancillary admin389

The leading case on this subject is Peterson' v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21
(1865). For a full discussion and collection of authorities, see Buchanan and Myers,
"The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v. Maine," 48
HARV. L. REv. 911 at 921-924 (1935), and Beale, "Voluntary Payment to a Foreign
Administrator," 42 HARV. L. REv. 597 at 600-604 (1929). Some cases have denied
the right of an assignee for collection to maintain an action. See Thacker v. Lindahl,
(Tex. Comm. App. 1932) 48 S.W. (2d) 588.
390
3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LA.ws, §§ 477.1 to 477.4 inc. (1935).
891
3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, §§ 477.1, 477.2 (1935). See also the opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel
Corporation, 267 U.S. 22, 45 S. Ct. 207 (1924).
392
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 328d; Ga. Code Ann. (1936) § II32406; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) § 610; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 141,
§ 82; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, §§ 81, 82; Minn. Stat. (1941) §
291.19; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 272; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 77-2017;
N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 353, §§ 28, 29 (upon authority of local probate court);
N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 34-109, 34-IIo; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944)
tit. 20, § 99s; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 575, § 25; S. C. Code Ann. (1942) §
8955; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 1288; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942)
§ 5349a; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 4263, 4264.
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istration in the state of the corporation's domicile. The Restatement 393
has likewise adopted this rule of convenience.

4. Release of mortgages by foreign personal representatives
While local prejudices have tended to confine the activities of foreign representatives to the state of their appointment, certain situations
have operated to extend their activities. For example, when a decedent
dies owning a mortgage on property situated in another state, it may
be highly advantageous for the mortgagor to_ have the mortgage satisfied of record by the foreign personal representative, without requiring
ancillary administration. This would be especially true if the mortgage
had been paid prior to the death of the mortgagee but formal satisfaction had not been made. No useful purpose would be served by requiring the appointment of an ancillary representative for the mere purpose
of making formal satisfaction. If such were required, local land titles
would too often be clouded with unreleased mortgages.
As might be expected in this situation, legislation 394 has been extremely liberal in authorizing a foreign personal representative to
satisfy local mortgages left by their decedents, upon recording an
authenticated copy of his letters. Statutes of this kind greatly facilitate
land title procedure and obviate unnecessary ancillary administration;
it is not surprising therefore to find that this procedure is authorized
irrespective of the possibility of the existence- of local -creditors. The
interests of local creditors are subordinated to the paramount interests
of local mortgagors.
5. •Collecti~ of tangible personal property.
The preceding discussion has been largely confined to the administration of intangibles. The problems incident to the reduction to possession or recovery of tangible personal property arises much less frequently today than formerly. Nevertheless it is an important part of
the larger problem under consideration. It has often been said that
the domiciliary representative has all the rights of ownership which
393
CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 477(2) (1934f. See also 72 A.L.R.
179 et seq. (1931).
894
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 141; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941)
§ 2939_¼; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5631; Fla. Stat. Ann, (Supp. 1945) § 734.30;
Idaho Laws Ann. (Anderson, 1943) § 15-813; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939)
§§ 11897 to 11900; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-1707; Minn.
Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 8792; N. J. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§ 3:7-11.1, 3:14-1; Okla.
Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 262; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 20, §995;
S. C. Code Ann. (1942) § 8955; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 71-224.
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the decedent had _during his lifetime with respect to property owned by
him.395 In application, however, this generalization is an overstatement,
if not a misstatement. Certainly if a local personal representative is
appointed in the jurisdiction where tangible personalty belonging to the
decedent is located, he and he alone is entitled fo receive delivery of it
or to sue for its possession.396 On the other hand, if no local personal
representative is appointed, there is authority for permitting the voluntary delivery of tangible personal property to the domiciliary representative,397 or even to the heirs directly under some circumstances.398
There is no substantial difference in the policies permitting the voluntary payment of a debt and those permitting the voluntary delivery of
chattels under such conditions. But if the person in possession or control
of the property refuses to deliver it and an action for recovery is necessary, the same rules exist as were considered in the bringing of actions
by foreign personal representatives. As seen previously, actions by a
foreign personal representative are not ordinarily allowed in the absence of statutory permission. Whether the denial of this right _be due
to lack of title or is merely a procedural obstacle, the result is the same
--an inability to collect assets in a foreign jurisdiction without taking
out ancillary administration there.

6. Sale of land by foreign personal representatives
Another purpose for which foreign personal representatives are
allowed to extend their activities outside the state of their appointment
is that of selling, leasing or mortgaging land 389 for the purpose of
paying debts or legacies. From considerations already discussed, it
would seem to follow that in carrying out this function the foreign
personal representative would be encroaching upon local prerogatives.
Nevertheless the land is an immovable and cannot be removed out of
the jurisdiction, although the proceeds from its sale may be so removed.
Several statutes 400 have been passed to authorize foreign representa395 Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 740 (1869); Peterson v. Chemical Bank,
32 N.Y. 21 at 43 (1865).
394 McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 (1896).
397 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, §§ 472-475 (1934).
398

See discussion in part III D 2, supra.
Personal powers conferred upon a representative by the will of a decedent are
not included. The discussion here refers only to statutory powers given to foreign personal representatives in their representative capacity and not to personal powers conferred upon executors.
00
•
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § u3-2405; Ind. Stat. Ann, (Burns, 1933)
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tives, without obtaining local letters, to apply to local probate courts
and obtain authority to sell land for these purposes. It is customary to
require the foreign representative to furnish authenticated copies of the
domiciliary proceedings and also to give a bond to secure creditors and
other interested parties. As in the case of authorizing foreign representatives to satisfy mortgages, local creditors are not unduly inconvenienced.

7. Clearing title to land
It is a well-known fact that where a decedent leaves only real estate
in a foreign jurisdiction, ancillary administration is frequently taken
out as a formality in order to bar the rights of possible creditors and
to give a marketable title. In the vast majority of these cases no creditors appear and the whole procedure becomes a mere formality which
serves to restrain the alienation of the real estate in the interim. Special
statutes of nonclaim applying in the absence of administration have
already been discussed.401 These are fully effective for the purpose.
The practical objection to most of these statutes is that the period provided to bar creditors is too long to afford free alienability and marketable title within a reasonable period. At the present time the best legislation designed to promote marketability and alienability of land left
by nonresident d~cedents is found in Ohio.402 There it is provided that
when administration has been granted in any other jurisdiction on the
estate of a decedent and no administration has been had in Ohio, the
domiciliary representative may file in any county in Ohio where the
decedent left real estate an authenticated copy of his letters, whereupon
creditors are notified by publication for three weeks. If creditors make
claims within six months and their claims remain unsatisfied after reasonable notice to the nonresident personal representative, ancillary
administration may be had. Otherwise the lien of creditors is extinguished.
A similar procedure is suggested in the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act. 408 Upon application by a foreign representa§§ 6-II41 to 6-1143; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 150, §§ 14, 15; Mass."Ann. Laws
(Michie, 1932) c. 202, §§ 32 to 3s; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 30-1133 to
30-II38; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 358, § 12; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937)
§ 105II-27; Wis. Stat. (1943) §§ 287.16, 316.30, 316.31.
401

See notes 289 to 319, supra.
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 1O5II-2.
403 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, § 4.
402
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tive to the probate court where land of a decedent is located, notice
of his appointment is published, and unless creditors file their claims
within a specified time, their claims are barred as a lien upon all property of the decedent within such state. If claims are presented and
remain unpaid after reasonable notice to the foreign representative,
ancillary administration may be granted. The effect of this act, like the
Ohio statute, is to provide an opportunity for local creditors to enforce
their claims in their own jurisdiction, and to specify a period of nonclaim in much the same manner as if ancillary administration were
carried out.
Other statutory methods also exist to facilitate the transfer of
property in a foreign jurisdiction without requiring ancillary administration there. When a nonresident decedent leaves property in
South Dakota 404 or Wyoming 4 os which has a value not to exceed
$10,000 and administration has been had in another state, administration in either of the two states named may be dispensed with after
one year from the decedent's death on filing with the probate court
a verified petition therefor with certified copies of the petition, the
order of appointment of the domiciliary representative, and the inventory and final decree of distribution therein. After notice by publication for three weeks, the court is authorized to have the domiciliary
probate proceedings admitted as a probate or administration of the
estate in those states. If creditors appear, the hearing is postponed to
permit such creditors to apply for letters of administration. But if no
creditors appear, this summary procedure affords a satisfactory substitute for full ancillary administration.
Proceedings to determine heirship or distributees have already
been discussed 406 in another connection. Proceedings of this kind are
particularly useful in the case of nonresident decedents, although they
are applicable to resident and nonresident decedents alike. Where
administration proceedings have not been had in a state other than
the decedent's domicile and creditors have become barred by the lapse
of time, such proceedings will often furnish a simple and effective
method of supplying the final indicia of marketable title to land
located in the other state.407
S. D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0801.
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-918.
406
See part III D 4, supra.
407
There is also always the question of the determination and discharge of the
state's lien for inheritance taxes. See note 363, supra.
404
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IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The current demand for the improvement of probate procedure is
toward two objectives: clarity and simplicity. Much has been done in
the past decade in revising, and also in rewriting entire probate codes.
Much will be done in the years just ahead. In undertaking the task of
simplification the primary functions of administration should be constantly kept in mind. By way of summary and recommendations for
methods to dispense with administration in whole or in part, several
things may be said.
First, when an estate is small and administration is neither had nor
contemplated, statutes should afford the surviving family of a decedent a means of collecting the assets of the estate without the necessity of resorting to administration. Estates up to some agreed value
should be embraced within such legislation. This amount should not
be so small as to render such legislation useless except in insignificant
estates. Furthermore, the family of the decedent entitled to invoke
its provisions should not be limited to those entitled to homestead,
exemptions or family allowance, but should include all persons who
would be classed as distributees. The Model Probate Code 408 contains concrete suggestions for legislation of this kind. A lapse of thirty
days after death is required before invoking its provisions in order to
afford creditors an opportunity to apply for administration. The
payment or delivery of assets to the heirs pursuant to the terms of
such statutes is not intended, however, to preclude administration at a
subsequent date. If letters are granted later, only the heirs to whom
such payment or delivery may have been made should be accountable
to the personal representative who is appointed.400 In the absence of
administration, such statutory devices supply a much needed method
for the small estate which is not indebted. For several years statutes
of this kind 410 have functioned well in California and Illinois where
they are primarily utilized to collect bank deposits, wage claims,
insurance proceeds and the like, and to transfer the family automobile
and small amounts of registered securities. Statutes in some states
authorizing the payment of wages, bank accounts or only one kind of
debt are unnecessarily restricted in function.
§§ 86, 87.
See Brezzo v. Brangero, 51 Cal. App. 79, 196 P. 87 (1921); Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1943) §§ 3249-1 and 3249-2.
410
See discussion in part III D 2, supra.
408
409
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Second, if the value of the estate does not exceed that to which the
surviving family of the decedent would be entitled as homestead,
exempt property and a family allowance, a wholesome provision would
authorize the surviving spouse or minor children to petition the
probate court asking that the same be set aside to them for these
purposes, and that an order then be made that no administration is
necessary. Procedure of this kind should be as simple as possible,
eliminating all unnecessary formalities. Inasmuch as notices may not
be required to creditors and others who may have a possible interest,
such an order may well be made subject to revision, correction or
annulment within a substantial period of time after it has been made.
This will encourage full disclosure and an opportunity to all interested
persons who may not have had an opportunity to be heard at the time
the order was made. The Model Probate Code contains such provisions m and places an upper limit of $2,500 upon the value of
estates, exclusive of homestead and exempt property, to which it
applies. Since the expenses of the last illness and funeral charges must
be paid by the surviving family as a condition precedent to invoking
these provisions, the amount of $2,500 will do no more than furnish
a minimum of a family allowance. Such an estate should not be subjected to the expense of formal administration.
Third, if letters have been granted to a personal representative
and it later appears that the estate of a decedent, exclusive of homestead, exemptions and family allowance does not exceed the amount of
preferred claims, the personal representative should be authorized to
distribute the estate for these purposes so far as inay be done and
thereupon present his report and account for final settlement, and upon
the approval and allowance thereof, be discharged. As already
mentioned, statutes of this kind or some variation thereof exist in
many states at the present time/12 A similar section is contained in
the Model Probate Code.418
• All of the foregoing methods, it will be noted, are intended to
aid the summary administration or to eliminate the necessity of
administration on small estates. To require the family or dependents
of a decedent of small means to pursue the regular routine of administration, with its delays in transmitting the property to those entitled
to it, and subject to the expenses incidental thereto, seems obviously
unfair and unnecessary in an enlightened age. In none of these situam
412
418

§§ 88-91.
See discussion in part III B 1-a, supra.
§ 92.
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tions are the interests of creditors adversely affected. In the third
method, court supervision is fully provided for. In the second method,
court inspection and authorization are required. And in the first
method, resort to judicial administration is always possible by a
creditor or other person interested, to the end that the interests of
every interested person are amply protected.
In larger estates it is true that all the heirs may make distribution
of the decedent's property by an informal family settlement,414 if they
are able to make collection of all the assets and there are no creditors
to insist upon administration. It is also true that most states recognize
the validity of such settlements when made, insofar as the parties to
them are concerned. In view of the possible interests of creditors in
all cases, and of distributees in some cases, the advisability of authorizing such a procedure by statute seems questionable. A contrary
opinion may be supported from the experience of those few states -m
which do authorize such a procedure but, generally speaking, it is
likely that a more orderly and satisfactory distribution of a large estate
can be effected by a formal administration. This is not to say that
informal family settlements should not be recognized. On the contrary they should be fully recognized when made. But problems arising in connection with such settlements are probably better solved by
ordinary case law, as they have largely been solved in the past.
As to actions by the heirs to enforce payment of debts due the
decedent, without resorting to administration, an argument can be
made for permitting or for denying them. While it is true that in
rare instances creditors may be prejudiced, it is also true that creditors
may invoke their right to apply for administration. And if such debts
are collected by the heirs, it does not follow that they are lost to
creditors. In fact, they are subject to administration, if a personal
representative is subsequently appointed. The more pertinent inquiry
is whether the proceeds are more likely to be lost or dissipated in the
hands of the debtor or in the hands of the heirs.
•
In addition to these three basic methods for dispensing with
administrati9n, various other devices have been discussed in the
preceding pages. Some of these, such as the independent executor
under a nonintervention will and the withdrawal of an estate from
administration, are said to work satisfactorily in the states where they
414 An informal family administration and distribution is meant here, not a compromise settlement involving adversarial rights of distributees under a will or by the
laws of intestacy.
415
See discussion in part III B 3 and 4, supra.
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are used. Others, in particular instances, are no more than alternative
ways of accomplishing the objectives outlined and authorized by the
basic methods above described. This is often true in such matters as
making distribution to the heirs of a distributee who dies during
administration, or in making distribution of an estate of a person who
dies while under guardianship. In both of these latter instances, there
is the added advantage of having distribution made pursuant to the
order of a probate court having jurisdiction of a decedent's estate in
one case and of a ward's estate in the other. In the final analysis, the
virtue of any given method for dispensing with administration is
dependent upon the extent to which the basic functions of administration are accomplished in the particular situation.
Administration may be dispensed with in any case in which the
heirs can and do make collection and distribution of assets, irrespective
of amount, to all those entitled to them, including creditors, and to the
federal and state governments for estate and inheritance taxes. The
efficacy of any such informal settlement will depend upon the agreement of all the heirs and the actual satisfaction of all creditors. In no
case should it be said that administration is a required proceeding. An
administration proceeding is intended to secure useful functions in
society-to be a servant, not a dictator of procedure for its own sake.
The dominant function of administration in Anglo-American law
has been the protection of creditors. It is submitted, however, that we
have carried this to an extreme. Ordinarily, the running of the statute
of limitations is stopped upon death. The statute of nonclaim is
substituted after administration is granted. But ordinarily no general
nonclaim statute operates against creditors in the absence of administration. Whatever arguments may be made in favor of the retention
of this as a rule, the fact remains that the marketability of property,
both real and personal, is usually impaired. In a commercial society
free marketability is an objective in itself. Statutes in a number of
states 416 have barred the claims of creditors after the expiration of
specified periods of time following the death of a decedent when
administration has not been had. Such a statute should exist in every
state. It should apply to personal as well as to real property, and it
should bar any creditor from applying for administration. 417 The
trend toward shortening the period of time could well be carried
further.'
Similarly the state should be required to be diligent in asserting
416

See discussion in part III D I, supra.
m See Model Probate Code, § I 35 ( d).
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its lien for estate or inheritance taxes. F~ilure to take steps for their
determination anq collection within some reasonable period of time
should likewise operate to free the assets of the estate from the state's
~~

.

When a decedent leaves property located in several jurisdictions,
administration in more than one jurisdiction should be rendered
unnecessary as far as possible. If domiciliary letters are granted,
payments to, actions by, and the transfer and delivery of property to
the domiciliary representative in any state should be an established
procedure upon some reasonable basis. The rights of local creditors
and distributees are important, but their assµmed existence has been
emphasized to the point of making ancillary administration a requirement all too· often to no r~al end. It is suggested that tlie lapse of
some short period of time without the commencement of proceedings
for local adminis~ration should be sufficient to justify full recognition
of the powers and authority of the domiciliary representative in that
state. Thus the interests of local creditors and distributees are not
extinguished but are merely relegated to the domiciliary state for
assertion.418
,
•
The problem Qf clearing title to land in a state other than that in
which the decedent was domiciled remains. The experience under the
Ohio statute,419 which has been followed in the Uniform Powers of
Foreign Representatives Act, 420 reveals a simple expedient for the
purpose.
When a dec~dent leaves a will, the question may arise as to
whether administration may be dispensed with, even though the will
is probated. A statute, of course, may r~quire the delivery of a will by
the person in possession of it to the court. Its probate, however, is not
automatic upon delivery. A proceeding to probate the will is distinct
from a proceeding to admjnister the estate of a decedent. The fact
that the latter is customarily carried on in connection with the former,
at the same time, and in the same court, is likely to lead to the conclusion that the two constitute a single proceeding. Historically and
functionally, however, they are separate. A proceeding to administer
an estate is not a necessary consequence of the probate of a will. If the
devisees or legatees are able to make physical collection of the assets
and agree upon a distribution among themselves, and if there are no
ns For ~oncrete suggestions i~ this respect see Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, §§ 2, 3.
419
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105i1-2.
420
§ 4. See discussion in part III E 6, supra.
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creditors to insist upon administration, their action is clearly lawful.
Although not usually stated in so many words, it is expressed or
implied in several statutes 421 that a will may be probated without being
followed by administration. The rights to the decedent's property will
be governed by the provisions of the will, but subject to the rights of
homestead, exemptions and family allowance, which are independent
of a will. Under the usual statutes dispensing with administratiqn, the
rights of devisees and legatees,, as such, are not important, for the
estate of the decedent is entirely consumed in setting off homestead and exempt property and in paying a -family allowance. However, where the beneficiaries of a decedent's will, without talcing
out administration, proceed under a statute authorizing the collection
by them of assets less than a designated sum, they. may be permitted
to avail themselves of this power without first probating the will.4 22
A general survey of the legislation discussed in this study indi<;ates
that the eastern states are far more inclined to regard administration
on a decedent's estate as the normal course of procedure. This is
particularly true where inheritance taxes are applied to successions
without allowing more than a bare minimum of exemptions. In those
states, debtors cannot safely pay the heirs without incurring a pos$jble
liability to the state for inheritance taxes as well as to creditor$ for
their claims. The natural tendency of such tax laws .is to exert.~ strong
pressure upon heirs to take out administration in every estate. The
tendency in the west is in the other direction, particularly in small
estates. Furthermore, the large majority of statutes barring creditors,
upon the expiration of a designated period of time after death and in
the absence of administration, are in the west. Such devices as the
independent executor acting under a nonintervention wi.U, the withdrawal of estates from administration, and direct distribution to the
heirs of a distributee who dies during administration may be local
examples, but they also represent a feeling that the traditional process
of administration is not an absolute for every decedent.
In states where it is felt that administration upon estates should
· -m See, for example, Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie~ Supp. 1944) c. 176, § 62; Ill.
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 478; N. C. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§
31-27 to 31-29; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105n-20; Wis. Stat. (1943)
§ 238.19. Such statutes are particularly common when domiciliary administration has
been had in one state and the will is then probated in a foreign jurisdiction without
granting letters thereon.
422
Under Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) §§ 630 and 630.5 an unprobated will may be the basis of payment of money or delivery of assets to the beneficiaries
designated therein. See also Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) §§ 735.ox' to 735.13.
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be retained as a norm, probate procedure should be streamlined. Every
method possible should be employed to shorten and to simplify the
task of the personal representative in his duties in order that distribu.tion of the estate may be made to those entitled to it as soon as possible.
Notices could be combined; notices by mail could be substituted for
notices by publication; and times of notice could be shortened. And
most important of all, the nonclaim period should be shortened so as
not to exceed six months. The trend to reduce the nonclaim period
which has already acquired a momentum during the past decade, will
likely continue along with the larger movement of procedural reform
under way.
From a consideration of the functions to be achieved by administration, it would seem that legislation for dispensing with. administration should be confined primarily to the small estate. Other legislation for the same purpose should be valued according to the manner
i_n which it permits the accomplishment of the basic purposes of administration. In no event should administration be required as a process.
If heirs can ID;ake collection and distribution of an estate and pay
. all claims, legislation should not prohibit it. In larger estates both the
problems of claims, including the determination of estate and inherit~nce taxes, and of distribution are such as to cause the persons interested
to pursue the usual course of administration.

